The Beijing authorities have recently claimed that they are promoting the “deep integration and complementary advantages” of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises. However, many observers point out that in the context of economic downturn and lack of confidence among private enterprises, this so-called “integration” appears more like a repackaged campaign of reacquisition. Even though private capital has been invited to participate, it is apparent that the playing field is still controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, with some scholars likening it to the “public-private partnership” of the 1950s.
Since 2024, private enterprises in China have been facing difficulties. The number of business cancellations continues to rise, industries such as real estate, internet, and education are being restructured, manufacturing orders are decreasing, and many small and medium-sized enterprises are either stopping operations or closing down. Reports from local commerce and industry authorities indicate a decline in private investment, a tightening financing environment, and a general lack of confidence among business owners regarding the future.
Recently, the Beijing authorities introduced a new slogan of “integration,” emphasizing the need for state-owned and private economies to “develop together.” Many interviewees believe that this is no different from the earlier “mixed-ownership reform” and is still a continuation of strengthening the dominance of state-owned economy. On September 28, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council held a meeting to promote the “deepening and enhancing” of state-owned enterprise reform. According to official reports, the meeting proposed to “perfect the system mechanisms, deepen reforms, and enhance the core functions and competitiveness of enterprises.” Though not directly mentioning “mixed-ownership reform,” the wording suggests that the authorities are continuing the “mixed-ownership reform” ideology to further strengthen the dominant position of state-owned capital.
Mr. Weng, a Chinese scholar of literature and history, expressed in an interview with reporters that such policy statements may seem pragmatic but actually reflect the intention of the CCP to politicize economic governance. “Both local and state-owned enterprises are required to perfect their systems, indicating that ‘mixed-ownership reform’ is no longer an experiment but a mission.”
He added that the participation of private enterprises in the reform is actually selective absorption of high-quality enterprises; poorly performing private enterprises are not intended for intervention by the authorities. “I have a friend who moved his company to Southeast Asia out of concern for being entangled in the system. He said, if a company can make money on its own, why collaborate with state-owned enterprises? From a commercial perspective, this seems more like a political move rather than a market choice.”
In September 2016, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council issued the “Central Enterprise Compliance Management Measures,” requiring centrally-owned enterprises to improve risk prevention and internal control systems. Subsequently, policy documents frequently mentioned statements such as “operate according to law,” “innovate in cooperation,” “deepen reforms,” and “win-win cooperation.”
By 2025, when reporting on state-owned enterprise reforms, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and official media often use terms like “operate according to law,” “deepen reforms,” “cooperative cooperation,” emphasizing the integration of state-owned capital and social capital in equity and governance structures. The officials also pointed out that the mixed-ownership reform is “not a merger, but a structural integration,” aimed at creating a non-acquisition-style reform image.
Many scholars interviewed believe that this shift in language demonstrates the CCP’s renewed politicalization of the private economy. While the narrative speaks of “win-win cooperation,” in reality, it is a institutionalized process of power infiltration and control.
Mr. Weng pointed out that the official slogans of “integration” and “cooperation” frequently seen in announcements actually serve to constrain the independent space of private enterprises. “From documents to propaganda strategies, everything is guiding private enterprises toward political alignment. The so-called ‘collaborative innovation’ ultimately turns into a systemic cooperation, rather than a market behavior.”
A scholar from Jiangsu who preferred to remain anonymous also noted that this trend evokes memories of the “public-private partnership” of the 1950s in the context of the CCP. “In the CCP’s context, ‘integration’ mostly implies cooperation dominated by power. If private enterprises want to participate, they must first establish party branches and unions – this is no longer something that can be explained by market cooperation.”
Beijing sociologist Cindy (pseudonym) pointed out that the CCP’s implementation of the “special management shares” system is a typical model of obtaining maximum control with minimum equity participation. “Since 2016, government-backed funds have gradually acquired around 1% ‘golden shares’ in private enterprises, obtaining directorial positions and veto power in major decisions. By 2021 to 2023, this model has become a norm.”
As early as 2016, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television of the People’s Republic of China required major video websites to introduce at least 1% of state-owned “special management shares,” with accompanying review rights. In the same year, Reuters revealed that Beijing had obtained “golden shares” in private media and internet companies through government-backed funds, securing directorship and decision-making power.
According to multiple media reports, in 2022, CCTV and Beijing Radio and Television each acquired around 1% of shares of Douyin and Kuaishou; in 2023, national background institutions also acquired shares of Alibaba’s subsidiary companies, possessing special rights. Although the shareholding is limited, it is enough to influence company decisions. Cindy analyzed, “This model may expand to more industries. Under the guise of ‘maintaining security and stability,’ the authorities are actually reinserting economic governance into the framework of political control.”
Mr. Wang, a retired university professor in Jiangxi, pointed out that from “mixed-ownership reform” to “integration,” it is not just a change in terminology but an extension of power logic. “Official media often depict state-owned enterprises and private enterprises with phrases like ‘resource sharing’ and ‘complementary advantages’: state-owned enterprises ‘stably lead,’ while private enterprises ‘flexibly innovate.’ However, under conditions of unequal power, ‘sharing’ often means that the technology and capital of private enterprises are absorbed into the national system.”
He continued, “In the context of economic slowdown and fiscal constraints, the authorities are reemphasizing political leadership under the guise of ‘cooperation.’ In the past, the boundary between state-owned and private enterprises was in ownership; now, the boundary lies in political loyalty. Enterprises that perform well and are politically ‘qualified’ will be included in the cooperation system.”
In the 1950s, the CCP absorbed private enterprises under the guise of “public-private partnership,” ultimately achieving complete nationalization. The current policy form of “integration” is more flexible, but the logic remains the same – under the name of “cooperation,” it exercises political control in reality.
On September 29, 2025, the CCP Politburo held a meeting to discuss the “Fourteenth Five-Year Plan” and decided on the time for the Fourth Plenary Session. The press release mentioned terms like “firmly coordinate development and security” and “promote high-quality development,” indicating that political stability still holds a priority position in policies. Analysts expect that during the discussion of enterprise policies at the Fourth Plenary Session, the direction of “deep integration” will be further emphasized. Some netizens commented, “It is said to be reform, but in reality, it is just a change in terminology for control.”