The onset of the summer offensive by the Russian military against Ukraine began on May 10th, as Russian forces crossed the border from the northeast of Ukraine, re-launching attacks towards the Kharkiv region, stretching the 1200-kilometer front line once again. A new front has been opened by the Russian military, but with limited forces deployed currently, it is challenging to break through the Ukrainian defense lines. If the Russian military continues to increase troops, will they have the capability to capture Kharkiv, the second-largest city in Ukraine?
Over two years ago, at the end of February 2022, the Russian military divided its forces into four routes simultaneously attacking Kyiv, Kharkiv, and the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, attempting a blitzkrieg strategy for quick victory. However, due to the desperate pursuit of victory, the Russian military failed to achieve its goals and had to retreat from around Kyiv and Kharkiv.
More than two years later, the Kharkiv region saw renewed conflict. On May 10th, Russian forces crossed the border again and began armored and infantry assaults toward Kharkiv, penetrating 5 to 10 kilometers deep into Ukrainian territory, encountering the first line of defense of the Ukrainian forces, slowing down their advance.
At this location, the Russian military has deployed at least around 35,000 troops, with a potential increase to 50,000 to 70,000. Ukraine has constructed three defense lines from Kharkiv city to the northeast border. The first line is not positioned directly on the border but rather 12 to 13 kilometers away, allowing the Russian forces to make progress relatively easily. Over the past week, fierce battles have ensued between the two sides.
Currently, the Russian military’s forces are not sufficient to rapidly advance to Kharkiv city. However, if the Russian forces continue advancing to within 20 kilometers of Kharkiv, their artillery and rocket launchers will be able to shell the city. The Russian military is now approximately 30 kilometers away from the suburbs of Kharkiv, and if the Ukrainian forces cannot hold the first defense line, they will have to work hard to keep the Russian forces outside of Kharkiv, 20 kilometers away.
The Russian missiles and drones are ready to strike Kharkiv city from a distance. Ukraine is requesting more air defense systems assistance from the United States and NATO. Russian warplanes can launch missiles or drop gliding bombs without crossing the border. Ukraine not only needs the Patriot air defense missiles from the US but also requires the US to permit Ukraine to use the Patriot missiles to strike Russian aircraft inside Russia, a restriction that the US has not relaxed yet. The Ukrainian forces are facing significant pressure.
The Russian military estimates that they need to add 300,000 troops to complete the encirclement of Kharkiv, and the approximately 35,000 Russian troops currently in the Kharkiv region are insufficient to pose a significant threat. Even if increased to 50,000 to 70,000, they would not be able to achieve the goal of capturing Kharkiv city.
The Russian military currently has approximately 510,000 troops in Ukraine, but it is challenging to imagine them giving up the offensive in eastern Ukraine to redirect around 60% of their forces towards Kharkiv.
Kharkiv is close to the Russian-Ukrainian border, theoretically allowing the Russian military to launch a massive attack from the north, but they lack effective support in the surrounding areas. A direct rush could easily expose their flanks to attacks. Therefore, capturing Kharkiv is not a simple operation for the Russian military; it requires a significant amount of troops to cover each other, systematically advancing on a wider front, step by step, approaching the suburbs of the city to be in a position to assault it.
At the end of February 2022, the Russian military had already demonstrated deep penetration operations, even sending some elite paratroopers for sudden assaults. However, being isolated, although posing a threat to Kharkiv, they lacked the capacity to capture it. Their supply lines were constantly harassed, forcing them to abandon and withdraw. After suffering heavy losses in the offensive operation, the Russian military withdrew to Russia for reorganization and reportedly did not re-engage in Ukrainian battlefields for a considerable amount of time.
Even if the Russian military could mobilize 300,000 troops to encircle Kharkiv, they would need to rebuild their supply lines. The Ukrainian forces could also send reinforcements, shifting the main battlefield away from the eastern region. If the main forces of the Russian military in eastern Ukraine are redeployed, it will be challenging for them to maintain their current offensive, and the defense in both the eastern and southern regions could face difficulties, possibly opening up opportunities for Ukraine to launch counterstrikes.
The mobilization of 300,000 troops is no easy task. The main forces of the Russian military would need to be brought back to their country first, then re-enter Ukraine from the north. Although the Russian military already occupies parts of eastern Ukraine connecting them, the distance to Kharkiv is far, posing a significant risk in a direct assault, almost guaranteeing the safety of their flanks and securing a supply line. If the Russian military manages to break through massively from the east, there may be no need to open the Kharkiv front. The current situation shows that the Russian military is facing challenges in achieving rapid breakthroughs on any front.
If the Russian military prepares to besiege Kharkiv, it would completely disrupt the current deployment of forces and change the strategic focus from the primarily eastern region of Ukraine. If the Russian military insists on exerting such efforts, maintaining dominance in eastern Ukraine will be difficult, and capturing Kharkiv could prove protracted, risking the shift of the initiative on the battlefield and falling into passive dilemma.
The Russian military may only intend to continue applying additional pressure on the Ukrainian defense lines, lengthening the front, causing strain on Ukraine’s limited troops and equipment. The Russian military is likely also aiming to protect Belgorod city, adopting a defense-first approach to prevent Russian-backed rebel forces from Ukraine from crossing the border to attack Belgorod city again, establishing a defense line within Ukrainian territory before seeking opportunities in an offensive operation.
The fronts between Russia and Ukraine have stretched over 1200 kilometers, with the Russian military holding numerical superiority and taking initiative, launching attacks from multiple directions, intensifying the new Kharkiv offensive, making it more challenging for Ukrainian forces to allocate troops effectively.
The Ukrainian military has deployed reserve units in the north of Kharkiv Oblast to defend against the Russian military’s offensive actions. The Ukrainian military is working on promptly establishing 10 new brigades to counter the Russian military’s summer offensive in 2024. The Ukrainian military also notes that the primary bottleneck in defense operations is still the assistance in military equipment, with manpower coming second. In reality, Ukraine not only needs continued support from NATO but also requires an immediate increase in personnel.
The Ukrainian military estimates that the next two months of hostilities will enter a critical phase, with the Russian military likely to continue concentrating attacks on the Luhansk and Donetsk regions in the east while possibly expanding operations in Kharkiv as well as launching attacks in the Sumy region in the northeast. The Ukrainian defense lines may become overwhelmed.
Regarding the Russian forces attacking Kharkiv, it is believed that some units may not possess high combat capability, possibly providing some respite for the Ukrainian forces.
On May 10th, the US announced a new batch of $4 billion in military aid, including Patriots and other air defense missiles, Humvee rocket ammunition, 105mm and 155mm shells, armored vehicles, and antitank missiles. The shortage of Ukrainian artillery shells should be alleviated, the Humvee rockets are expected to deliver a punch, and unmanned aerial vehicles can continue to destroy Russian armored units. However, the shortage of personnel remains a significant issue as the front line extends further.
Recently, President Putin has replaced the defense minister with Andrei Belousov, who lacks a military background but excels in the economy. Upon his appointment, he indicated that the “most urgent issue” is the continuous supply of modern equipment, ammunition, communication devices, drones, and electronic warfare systems and the ongoing recruitment of personnel.
Moscow is gearing up for prolonged warfare in Ukraine and possibly preparing for future confrontations with NATO. The Kremlin may realize that the 2024 summer offensive might not be sufficient to compel Ukraine to capitulate. By having an economic specialist control the defense ministry, it appears that Moscow is facing economic challenges.
Moscow may assess that Ukraine is no longer capable of mounting a counteroffensive, and while the Russian military’s offensive is slowly devouring Ukrainian territory, the Kremlin may feel impatient. They hope that the attack on Kharkiv will enlarge their battlefield advantage and rapidly deplete Ukrainian forces.
With the US presidential election still six months away, the potential return of Trump to the White House could prompt negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Moscow urgently needs to gain more leverage, break through the Ukrainian defense lines quickly, and seize as much land as possible. By expanding their operations, the Russian military aims to divert Ukrainian forces’ attention, ultimately forcing Ukraine to completely abandon counteroffensives and settle at the negotiation table under acceptance of the current situation.
The Russian military continues to augment its forces in Ukraine to compensate for battlefield losses; however, the effectiveness of the Russian military is declining. The Russian armored units still struggle against Ukrainian antitank missiles and drones, often resorting to small-scale infantry assaults at the front line. Even Russian military bloggers acknowledge that these small-scale assaults indicate insufficient training and readiness, increasing casualties and slowing down their offensive speed.
The Ukrainian military emphasizes that they have stabilized the defense line in Kharkiv and claims to have destroyed at least 20 Russian armored vehicles on the first day of the conflict on May 10th. They also report that on May 14th, the Russian military incurred up to 1,740 casualties in a single day of fighting.
While the Russian artillery forces vastly outnumber Ukraine’s, the Ukrainian firepower is more accurate. Despite the Russian military’s numerical advantage, their progress is slow and significant breakthroughs are difficult to achieve.
Most of the Russian ground forces are already in Ukraine, with the remnants defending Moscow, the border with NATO, and the Far East region, reaching a critical point. Moscow plans to mobilize around 100,000 troops in June and July and another 300,000 by the end of 2024. The Russian military suffers casualties of 25,000 to 30,000 per month, and while new recruits can reinforce their ranks, the overall strength cannot be vastly increased, with declining personnel quality. The Russian military claims to have captured 547 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory since 2024. Their advantage has yet to be translated into a swift victory.
Acquiring 3 million rounds of ammunition from North Korea, the Russian military can fire 15,000 to 20,000 rounds per day. The stockpile of 3 million rounds should last a maximum of 7 months. However, these are outdated stocks from North Korea, which may struggle to sustain such massive quantities thereafter. In 2023, Russia produced approximately 2 million rounds of 122mm and 152mm ammunition, barely enough for 4 to 5 months. Russia must significantly increase its production capacity; otherwise, they will face an ammunition shortage post-2024. This is one reason the US hopes Ukraine can maintain full defensive capabilities in 2024, with NATO’s overall ammunition production expected to surpass Russia’s in 2025.
Russia faces even greater bottlenecks in missile production, leading them to mass-produce drones, already utilized to attack Ukrainian infrastructure and increasingly employed on the front lines. With significant stocks from the former Soviet Union, Russian armored vehicles theoretically have the capacity to last another year and a half. Still, this relies on the condition that these weapons remain operational, ongoing maintenance, replacement, and refurbishments are prompt.
Moscow’s defense industry is increasingly reliant on Chinese supplies, including semiconductors, navigation devices, aircraft components, ball bearings, etc. Seventy percent of machine tools and 90% of microelectronic products in Russia come from China. Russian nitrocellulose for producing gunpowder is primarily supplied by China.
Putin’s recent visit to China likely aimed to secure more aid, especially non-reimbursable support. However, China is currently facing financial constraints, making substantial non-reimbursable assistance less probable. In 2023, China exported around 110.972 billion USD to Russia, while importing around 129.139 billion USD from Russia, resulting in a trade deficit of approximately 18.17 billion USD. China is not eager to fill the trade deficit quickly, and Moscow holds a significant amount of renminbi; China is not keen on exchanging more commodities. China may also be concerned about relations with Europe and additional sanctions from the US and EU.
The Russian military has opened a new front in Kharkiv, launching the summer offensive, adding more pressure on the Ukrainian armed forces. However, capturing the second-largest city in Ukraine remains a significant challenge, mishandling the operation could lead to the repetition of past mistakes. Ukraine relies on external assistance for defense, while Russia may struggle to sustain prolonged warfare on its own. Both sides show no signs of retreat, and the attritional warfare will likely continue until one side or both can no longer bear the strain.
(Note: The content provided is a direct translation and rewriting of the original news article, and any opinions or interpretations presented are for illustrative purposes only.)