The Chinese Communist Party’s civil service examination, known as the “National Examination,” for the year 2026, opened for registration on October 15th, with the highest competition ratio reaching 162:1. However, the number of recruits has decreased for the first time in nearly eight years. In recent years, China’s economy has been on a downward trend, with frequent news of financial crises emerging. The massive fiscal support system behind the CCP’s blood-sucking rule has once again attracted attention.
According to statistics from Huatu Education, a Chinese vocational recruitment examination and skill training enterprise, on the first day of registration for the 2026 civil service examination, the highest competition ratio was found in positions related to the Zhejiang Provincial Grain and Material Reserve Bureau, with a ratio of 162:1.
In Shandong, Jinan Railway Public Security Bureau’s grassroots police position only recruits one person, but the number of unverified registrations has reached 649. The National Healthcare Security Administration’s comprehensive management position, which recruits three people, had a total of 560 registrations, making it the second-highest position in terms of registrations on the first day.
Chinese capital sector veteran, Xu Zhen, told Epoch Times that around 2018 to 2019, the ratio might have been around 40:1. Now, it has reached 162:1, meaning that instead of 40 people competing for one position, it has now turned into more than 160 people vying for one spot. Similar to general job recruitment, with high unemployment rates, everyone is scrambling for opportunities. However, in reality, most positions are pre-arranged within the system, such as in tobacco bureaus, PetroChina, and others, where generations have been part of the system. Many candidates are just accompanying the exam process, and many positions are already predetermined.
In terms of recruitment scale, this year’s Chinese Communist Party civil service examination has seen its first “reduction in recruitment” in nearly eight years. The CCP central agencies and their affiliated institutions plan to recruit a total of 38,100 people for the year 2026, a reduction of approximately 1,600 compared to last year. In the previous years, the recruitment of civil servants by the CCP had shown an expanding trend, increasing from 14,500 people in 2019 to 39,700 people in 2025. Only a slight decrease in recruitment scale was observed in this round.
Chinese issues expert Wang He told Epoch Times that the reduction in personnel in the CCP’s civil service recruitment may be related to the pressure on central finance. Because the fiscal pressure at the local levels will eventually be transmitted to central finance. The economic situation this year is particularly dire, with negative growth in tax revenue in the first half of the year.
According to data released by the Chinese Ministry of Finance, in the first half of 2025, the national general public budget revenue decreased by 0.3% compared to the previous year. Among them, tax revenue decreased by 1.2%.
Amid frequent reports of financial difficulties across various regions, the intense competition in the CCP civil service examination has once again drawn attention to the scale of China’s fiscal support.
On October 17, a mainland media outlet, First Financial, published an article indicating that the overall scale of China’s fiscal support personnel has continued to rise in recent years, reaching approximately 68.46 million in 2020.
Regarding the scale and structure of China’s fiscal support personnel, official explanations have always been ambiguous and subject to various interpretations. The data from First Financial stems from a paper published in the Economic Studies Quarterly organized by the China Economic Research Center at Peking University, titled “Estimation and Structural Analysis of China’s Fiscal Support Personnel Scale.”
According to the introduction of the paper, there are different ways to measure fiscal support personnel. If the broadest definition is adopted, it would include personnel within the fiscal support budget, personnel outside the fiscal support budget, retired personnel, and personnel in self-funded institutions. Using a narrower definition would only include personnel within the fiscal support budget and retired personnel. And an intermediate approach includes personnel within the fiscal support budget, personnel outside the fiscal support budget, and retired personnel.
The paper also estimated the scale using the narrow, intermediate, and broad definitions, with the intermediate approach being the core estimation: From 2004 to 2020, the fiscal support personnel measured in this way increased from 52.12 million to 68.46 million. The share of personnel supported by fiscal resources in the total employed population rose from 5.04% in 2004 to 5.54% in 2020, indicating an increasing concentration of employment within the “system.”
In the early stages of China’s so-called reform and opening up, there was a trend of “going to the market” and entrepreneurship. However, in recent years, more and more young people are unwilling to take risks in the market and are instead driven by a mentality of seeking stability to flock into the “system,” leading to the growing popularity of pursuing civil service and solid employment.
As China’s fiscal support personnel scale continues to expand, coupled with the arrival of an aging society, the number of retired personnel within the “system” holding substantial pensions is increasing. This not only pressures the social security system and public finances but also sparks dissatisfaction among many young people and those outside the “system” regarding the unequal distribution of pensions.
In comparison to retirees within the “system” receiving pensions of several thousand RMB, the average pension for retirees outside the “system” who worked in enterprises is only around 3,000 RMB, while the minimum standard for rural pensions is a mere 143 RMB.
Wang He stated that the entire Chinese pension system is highly unequal, and the pension fund surplus is expected to be depleted in a few years. The current Chinese pension system operates on a pay-as-you-go basis, meaning that the pension payments to retirees come from the contributions made by current workers. With China’s aging population and dwindling workforce, coupled with economic difficulties leading to many people discontinuing pension payments, the pressure on the pension system is immense.
He pointed out that in recent years, the CCP has made some reforms to the social security system, but these reforms only serve to delay the collapse of the pension system rather than fundamentally solve the issue. With internal and external challenges facing the CCP, it can only be said that the party is maintaining a deteriorating situation until a potential explosion.
China’s massive fiscal support scale has long been criticized. In 2005, Chinese State Council consultant Ren Yuling stated that China’s ratio of officials to taxpayers had reached 1:26 (meaning every 26 taxpayers support one public servant), which was 306 times higher than the Western Han Dynasty and 35 times higher than the late Qing Dynasty. The proportion of “eating the imperial grain” holders also reached an unprecedented level.
During the “Two Sessions” in 2021, a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and Vice Chairman of the Shaanxi Provincial Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Li Dongyu, revealed in a proposal that in a certain county in 2019, the official-to-civilian ratio was as high as 1:5, meaning five people supported one public servant.
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the spending budget of the CCP has never been seen by the public, yet all party officials from top to bottom are supported by taxpayers.
Political commentator Li Lin told Epoch Times that this is a form of “parasitic” or blood-sucking governance model. In a normal country, taxpayers would not be responsible for supporting political parties and organizations. However, in the unified system of the CCP, Chinese people are not only burdened with an unparalleled number of officials in the CCP, government, military, the National People’s Congress, and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference but also with affiliated organizations, business entities, and retired officials over the years, all with astonishing benefits, creating a massive expenditure placed on the shoulders of the ordinary citizens. Hence, the Chinese people are suffering greatly.
In February 2016, renowned real estate developer Ren Zhiqiang urged the CCP not to use taxpayers’ money for activities that do not serve the taxpayers. Also, in the same year, Beijing University law professor He Weifang posted on social media that the Communist Youth League should not be supported by taxpayers. Both were subsequently censored and silenced on the internet.
During a press conference at the National People’s Congress on March 11, 2016, the spokesman for the National People’s Congress, when responding to questions from mainland media about when the budget of the party departments will be made public, stated that “this question is a bit difficult,” and admitted that the central budget includes the budget of party departments.
Yang Shaoping, a former professor at Guizhou University’s School of Economics, exposed the CCP’s practice of “using public funds to support the party” in an overseas publication in 2017. He pointed out that the CCP occupies tax revenue and state-owned enterprise profits to support a total of approximately 20 million full-time party officials and some non-party social organizations’ staff, causing an estimated loss to society of around 20 trillion RMB. If the situation does not change, society will ultimately collapse.
Yang Shaoping was subsequently sentenced to 4 years and 6 months in prison on charges of “incitement to subvert state power.”