Recently, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced the revised “Regulations on Military Aid and Preferential Treatment” which greatly increased the amount of subsidies paid to the families of martyrs. This move has sparked speculation about preparations for potential external conflicts or domestic crackdowns. However, some believe that this is a routine aspect of military preparedness, mainly aimed at balancing internal interests and solidifying the power of the ruling authorities.
On August 14th, the CCP’s official newspaper “People’s Daily” reported that the new revised “Regulations on Military Aid and Preferential Treatment” were issued on August 5th and will be implemented on October 1st. This regulation, first enacted on August 1, 2004, has undergone three revisions in 2011, 2019, and 2024.
Compared to the 2019 version, the treatment of the families of martyrs has been improved in the current 2024 revision. For instance, for active-duty soldiers identified as “martyrs” upon death, and those confirmed to have sacrificed or died in the line of duty, the authorities have expanded the scope of “additional one-time subsidies” that the families will receive along with the standard one-time aid.
Previously, the regulation stated an additional 5% increase for recipients of “third-class merit,” but it has now been modified to “a 15% increase for those with third-class or second-class merit.” Additionally, in cases where there was no provision for fourth-class merit recipients, the new regulation stipulates a “5% increase for those with fourth-class or third-class merit.”
Furthermore, the category of “additional one-time subsidies” now includes the highest level: “a 40% increase for those who have been awarded medals or national honorary titles.”
Martyrs’ commendation money is provided to their families based on a standard of 30 times the per capita disposable income of urban residents in the previous year of the martyr’s death. The standards for commendation money for martyrs who died in combat may be appropriately increased. For currently serving soldiers who are recognized as martyrs or die in the line of duty, the amount granted is equivalent to 20 times the per capita disposable income of urban residents from the previous year, plus the soldier’s salary for 40 months. These provisions remain unchanged.
Commentator Zhong Yuan expressed to Dajiyuan that the CCP’s increase in subsidies for martyrs’ families raises concerns about war preparations. However, he doubts that the CCP will achieve its intended goals. “Most soldiers now have their own calculations; while they have to chant the slogans, deep down, no one is willing to sacrifice their lives, especially the corrupt officials within the military for whom this amount of money is insignificant.”
Commentator Jintao Pai An recently wrote an article suggesting that observers have long anticipated the possibility of the CCP resorting to a strategy of using poor soldiers to fuel wars, possibly in preparation for conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The various subsidies outlined in this regulation are all predicated on the dedication of serving the Party.
Su Ziyun, the Director of Strategy and Resources at the Taiwan Institute for Defense and Security Studies, told Dajiyuan that the recent revisions to the military aid regulations may not necessarily be an indicator of the CCP preparing for war. He pointed out that both before and after the pandemic, the CCP issued conscription notices in various provinces and cities, as well as requisitions for disaster relief supplies.
“Orders to purchase 1,000,000 bulletproof vests, salary increases, and this aid regulation are all routine aspects of military management and national defense preparedness, which do not necessarily indicate a readiness for war. However, we should remain vigilant,” Su said.
Su Ziyun believes that the adjustments made in the provision of increased subsidies in this latest amendment to the regulation may have been triggered by the 2022 crash of a Yun-8 anti-submarine aircraft in the South China Sea, which resulted in the deaths of seven individuals. This incident possibly sparked some controversies regarding the issue of aid within the authorities, prompting a reassessment post-event. “It’s not necessarily about casualties in wartime; even accidents or incidents during training may fall under the purview for aid. As for the different merit levels, it depends on the difficulty and significance of the mission.”
Zhong Yuan maintains that in recent years, the authorities have strengthened the military’s stability maintenance functions, and the increased benefits for the families of martyrs also apply to internal stability maintenance. With the current poor state of the Chinese economy, the CCP’s human rights abuses have led to rising grievances among the people. In cases where military personnel die while suppressing the populace, they could potentially be recognized as martyrs. After the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the CCP honored a group known as the “Guardians of the Republic.”
In March 2022, Xi Jinping urged the military at a conference with the National People’s Congress delegations from the military and armed police forces to assist in local stability maintenance and promptly “handle various unforeseen situations.”
In 2022, the authorities implemented a “zero-COVID” policy which faced strong dissent both in and outside the system. On May 7th of that year, an editorial titled “Unswervingly Upholding the Overall Principle of Dynamic Zero COVID” was published in the PLA Daily, urging the entire military to align their thoughts and actions with the decisions and deployments made by the Party Central Committee and Chairman Xi.
During the lockdown in Shanghai, the CCP mobilized a large number of military and armed police personnel into the city, with multiple military transport aircraft landing at Shanghai’s airport. As reported by locals, many residential areas had armed police officers participating in the lockdown measures.
The previous version of the regulation specified that the funds for military aid were “allocated by the State Council and local governments at all levels.” The new regulation now clearly states that “the funds required for military aid and preferential treatment will mainly be borne by the central finances” with the aim of “ensuring the accurate distribution of aid funds.”
Hong Zijie, Deputy Researcher at the Taiwan Institute for Defense and Security Studies, told Dajiyuan that a significant change in the revised regulation is that the financial burden will primarily be borne by the central government. Due to financial pressures, local governments often delay the distribution of related aid funds, resulting in widespread complaints from retired military personnel. To prevent potential movements relating to the rights of retired military personnel, adjustments have been made to increase the central government’s share of funding. “To some extent, this also reflects the financial difficulties faced by local governments at present.”
For decades, Chinese veterans have been continuously advocating for their rights. Just before the CCP’s Third Plenum in July, on July 2nd, reports surfaced of veterans from various regions gathering in Beijing to petition for better settlement plans. Videos showed veterans lining a road, holding banners that read “Can’t afford medical treatment, can’t support families,” with authorities deploying armed police to maintain order.
In an article, Jintao Pai An suggested that the revision of this regulation was aimed at motivating soldiers for war and resolving the political crisis caused by the grievances of retired military personnel. Furthermore, the regulation explicitly states that “the funds required for military aid and preferential treatment will mainly be borne by the central finances” to “ensure the accurate distribution of aid funds,” providing reassurance to servicemen. Due to financial challenges faced by local governments, previous promises often went unfulfilled, necessitating the intervention of the central government.
Xi Jinping has consistently increased investment in the military in recent years, significantly raising soldiers’ salaries in 2014, 2018, and 2021. Despite China’s economic challenges stemming from the US-China trade war in recent years, military appropriations have not diminished. In March of this year, the CCP announced a budget allocation of 1.66554 trillion yuan for military expenditures, indicating a 7.2% increase from the previous year.
Su Ziyun noted, “Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, he has been adjusting military salaries every year, reflecting his strategic approach to consolidating military power – cracking down on corruption among higher-ranking officials and then distributing the wealth downward. He is using the money bag to bolster the military.”
However, at the end of last year, sources close to the military informed Dajiyuan that due to financial difficulties, local governments had reduced or completely cut subsidies (not salaries) that were previously provided to the military.
Zhong Yuan remarked that in recent years, given China’s economic slowdown and severe financial constraints, if a war were to break out, both central and local finances would likely be insufficient to meet the demands of conflict, potentially leading to a shortage of funds for aid subsidies.