Due to the lack of a rooted culture in football in Beijing, the control of European elite football teams by Chinese enterprises is considered a matter of time.
On May 22, after China’s owner of the Italian football club Inter Milan, Suning Holdings Group, failed to repay the €375 million loan and interest on time, the American asset management company Oaktree took over the club. The loan was secured by Suning using its shares in Inter Milan.
Suning losing ownership of Inter Milan is part of a larger trend of Chinese companies withdrawing from European football. In 2017, China’s expansion into overseas football peaked with ownership of up to 20 European clubs; by 2021, this number had dwindled to just 10.
Fortune magazine stated that Suning’s forced exit from European football marked the end of a decade-long experiment – whether these flashy deals for elite sports could gradually build a true football powerhouse.
John Duerden, a long-time Asian football journalist, told Fortune, “Looking back, there aren’t many successful examples.”
About a decade ago, China’s current Communist Party leader expressed a dream of turning China into a global football powerhouse. This ambition quickly received support in terms of action and funding.
Chinese conglomerates poured huge sums into the domestic league and actively recruited international football stars. Some companies even spent lavishly to acquire stakes in European clubs to elevate the level of Chinese football.
However, they soon found out that these extravagant acquisitions of European club shares did not bring massive returns or significant victories for Chinese teams on the field. Some Chinese bosses who purchased shares in European professional clubs chose to exit and sell within a few years.
Football is a grassroots sport that must develop from the community, and throwing money at clubs is simply superficial. Tom Byer, a football youth development consultant based in Tokyo, told Fortune that the grassroots atmosphere for football in China is poor and lacks a culture that drives football development.
“The biggest driving force for football is culture, and China lacks that culture. Most Chinese families view playing football as a disturbance to their children’s education, and they don’t want their kids to play football,” Byer said, highlighting his profound observations on China’s football system.
Renowned football commentator Zhang Lu once revealed the reality of China’s football mindset in an interview program. Under the Communist regime’s emphasis on the “nationwide system” and party control over football, even organizing primary school football teams demands intensive adult-like training, leading to a situation where parents are unwilling to send their children to play, resulting in a lack of student interest in football.
Zhang Lu pointed out that the “nationwide system” focuses on selecting elites, turning the cultivation of football athletes into the task of a few, thereby resulting in very few primary school students engaging in football.
In the 1990s, over 10,000 students in 20 football-focused Chinese cities played football year-round, a number that likely dropped to around 5,000 from 2000 to 2004. In comparison, Japan had no less than 600,000 student football players during the same period.
China’s football performance falls far short of the ambitious plans announced in the mid-2010s. The Chinese national team has failed to qualify for the World Cup in over two decades.
On July 4, 2011, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, during a meeting with South Korean lawmakers, expressed three wishes: for China to qualify for the World Cup, host the World Cup, and win the World Cup.
In 2015, the Chinese government officially rolled out the “Overall Plan for the Reform and Development of Chinese Football,” elevating football to a national strategy and establishing a “Football Reform Group.” Subsequently, the war of money in football commenced.
In 2016, Suning announced the acquisition of 70% of Inter Milan’s shares, marking one of the most noteworthy moves by Chinese enterprises in European football. That same year, the Chinese Football Association and other organizations proposed a plan to turn China into a “world football superpower.”
Other Chinese companies leveraged the thriving economy to acquire massive funds and purchase stakes in European clubs.
In 2015, Dalian Wanda Group acquired a 20% stake in Atletico Madrid, with the team signing a five-year naming rights agreement when moving into its new stadium in 2017. Fosun International acquired English club Wolverhampton Wanderers in 2016.
Chinese enterprises also injected funds into the top-tier Chinese Super League (CSL). In 2010, China’s Evergrande Group – then one of the country’s largest real estate developers – acquired Guangzhou Football Club. Starting in 2016, Evergrande lavishly transferred European players to China. Other big bosses who owned European clubs, including Suning, also financially supported their players’ transfers from Europe.
At that time, transfer funds in the CSL rivaled those in Europe’s largest leagues. According to Transfermarkt, a football website aggregating transfer data, CSL spent €418 million in 2016 and €543 million in 2017.
The frenzied football market reached its peak in 2017. With checks waving at major clubs, overseas stars like Oscar, Hulk, Teixeira, and Augusto landed in the CSL.
In 2017, the Chinese Football Association suddenly urged clubs to restrain “irrational spending” on foreign players and limit their appearances in top teams to support local talent.
Under the authorities’ intervention, the era of “money football” quickly subsided. Among the top 10 transferred players in the CSL since 2016, only Oscar remains in China, with some clubs disbanding, including the 2021 CSL champions, Jiangsu Suning. The broadcasting rights fees for the CSL in 2023 shrank nearly 16 times compared to 2015.
In 2020, the CSL required sponsors to remove their brand names from local clubs.
The pandemic may have been the final factor breaking China’s football dream. During lockdown, matches were frequently postponed, leading to further disillusionment. Even when games were held, China’s strict COVID “zero-tolerance” policies mandated playing in empty stadiums and prevented players from leaving for months.
Funding seemed to tighten further. Efforts by Beijing to curb excessive lending in the real estate sector left Evergrande facing liquidity crunches. At the end of 2021, government authorities took over the company’s football pitch.
Suning also faced cash shortages. As its parent company collapsed, the group’s holdings in Evergrande’s subsidiaries plummeted in value. Competing e-commerce giants like JD Limited added pressure to Suning’s core retail business, limiting its operational funding.
As one of Italy’s most successful clubs, the timing of Oaktree’s acquisition of Inter Milan ownership aligns with the team’s upward trajectory. Inter Milan had just won the 2024 Serie A title.
On May 25, Zhang Kanyang, the 32-year-old son of former Inter Milan chairman and Suning founder Zhang Jindong, penned a “farewell letter” on Weibo.
“In life, everything has a beginning and an end,” he wrote. “I always knew that one day I would say goodbye to you all. The simple fact is I wasn’t ready, and I might never be ready.”
In reality, Chinese fans are not concerned whether clubs are owned by Chinese individuals or companies.
“Nationality is secondary. As long as the results are good, fans will set aside these worries,” Duerden, an Asian football journalist, told Fortune.