Recently, there have been speculations that Xi Jinping, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, has lost real power. The political atmosphere in Beijing is highly sensitive. Analysts suggest that Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong, who have control over Xi’s life and death, are reluctant to become scapegoats and have now become Xi’s true political nightmare.
Independent commentator Cai Shunkun published a commentary on May 31st on an overseas platform, stating that on the surface, the CCP regime seems stable as a rock, but a covert power struggle revolving around “core security” is quietly unfolding. Xi Jinping’s two most trusted “gatekeepers” – Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong not only hold the keys to protecting the “core,” but also control the lifeline of monitoring the senior officials. However, they are secretly laying out plans for their own future.
According to Cai Shunkun’s analysis, Xi Jinping’s security system revolves around only two units: the Central Guard Bureau, controlled by the Central Secretariat chief Cai Qi, who is well-informed about Xi’s health and family dynamics; and the Public Security Special Bureau, transformed from the Public Security Bureau Guard Bureau, which Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong has crafted, deeply penetrating the Zhongnanhai and monitoring the movements and data of various ministries, local provincial party secretaries, and high-ranking officials.
These two systems are akin to the “New Era Jin Yi Wei” (elite imperial guards). However, the dilemma lies in the fact that Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong, who control these two “swords,” themselves pose the most dangerous double-edged swords to Xi.
The article points out that Cai Qi, a politburo member, secretary of the Central Secretariat, and head of the Central Secretariat, holds a high position of authority, often referred to as the “shadow deputy general secretary.” Although he holds significant power, he is also walking on thin ice and could potentially become a scapegoat at any moment due to his wavering loyalty.
Cai Shunkun believes that Cai Qi is now faced with a choice: to continue as a “shadow” without a future or to seize the opportunity and become a “transitional core” in times of turmoil?
On the other hand, Wang Xiaohong, as the Minister of Public Security, a former subordinate of Xi Jinping during his time in Fujian, is seen as the “most loyal henchman.” However, when Chen Wenqing became the secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission in 2022, he blocked Wang Xiaohong’s path to advancement.
As revealed by Cai Shunkun, once considered a prime candidate for the position of secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Wang Xiaohong suddenly became a “deputy,” which left him extremely dissatisfied. The more Xi Jinping emphasizes security, the more likely Wang Xiaohong may become a “scapegoat.” Wang Xiaohong is now in a more delicate situation: if he remains idle, he will eventually be deserted; if he acts first, he may become the “protector” of the new order.
The article suggests that Cai Qi and Wang Xiaohong, the two key figures holding the reins, are weighing their options: whether to continue guarding Xi Jinping or to push open the door leading to a new order? Xi Jinping’s nightmare had long been foreshadowed. When loyalty turns into a transaction, the endgame of the power game will unfold in the most acute manner.
Last year, Taiwanese media “Up Media” published a commentary article by Du Zheng titled “Seven Key Figures of the Xi Family: Who is the Most Ambitious.” It argued that the Xi family clique is by no means a monolithic entity. Though Xi seems to have no visible political opponents, there is an ominous sense of disquiet within the Zhongnanhai.
The article points out that with the domestic economic crisis in China and the deteriorating geopolitical situation internationally, under immense pressure, Xi himself could experience physical issues at any time. Among Xi’s close confidants, at least seven individuals currently harbor their own ambitions and calculations in terms of power.
These include Li Qiang, Cai Qi, Li Xi, Ding Xuexiang, He Lifeng, Wang Xiaohong, and Chen Yixin. Wang Xiaohong, who established his own power within the public security system after taking office, is not part of the “Xi family clique” but rather the “Wang family clique.” This could potentially stir up trouble in the future within the Zhongnanhai. Cai Qi, on the other hand, seen as having control over the Central Guard Bureau and armed forces, is considered more likely to seize power among the Xi family clique in the chaos following Xi’s death.
The aforementioned article by Du Zheng argues that despite appearances, the situation in Zhongnanhai is not as calm as it seems. The CCP is expected to enter the final phase of Xi’s rule, leading to the eventual disintegration of the CCP regime.
Recently, authoritative sources informed Epoch Times that Xi Jinping had started to lose power since April last year. Although Xi has made several attempts to fight back, they have all ended in failure. While Xi Jinping still appears to be in power on the surface, the tide has turned. Figures such as Wen Jiabao and Zhang Yuxia have become crucial factors influencing the Chinese political landscape.
Recent signs indicate that Xi Jinping’s power structure within the party, government, and military is rapidly being dismantled. Li Ganjie, Xi’s personnel manager within the party, and Minister of the Central Organization Department, was rarely transferred to the United Front Work Department last month. Moreover, there have been widespread rumors that Xi Jinping’s military authority has been sidelined by Zhang Yuxia, the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Xi’s trusted confidants who were personally promoted have encountered troubles, including Miao Hua, Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission, and He Weidong, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission.
During Xi Jinping’s inspection in Henan from May 19th to 20th, two unusual occurrences took place – there was no inspection of troops or convening of meetings. In the past, when Xi conducted local inspections, he always interacted with the local military forces.
Political commentator Chen Pokong pointed out on social media that during previous visits to Henan, Xi Jinping met with senior military officials for briefings, showcasing his control over the military. This time, there was no interaction with the military. This is a significant change: Xi Jinping’s connection with the military is fading, gradually excluding him. Additionally, during previous visits, Xi Jinping always held in-depth discussions with provincial and municipal officials, but this time, during his visit to Henan, no such meetings were held, indicating a significant decline in authority.