After the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi’s camp has risen to dominance, leading to an escalation of infighting within the CCP. Analysts point out that as the current term of the Politburo is more than halfway through, the internal power dynamics have significantly shifted, with Xi Jinping’s inner circle, personally assembled by the CCP leader himself, being fragmented in the power struggle. There are intense power struggles and conflicts within the leadership, painting a doomsday scenario in Zhongnanhai.
Following the 24 members of the Political Bureau elected at the 20th National Congress of the CCP in October 2022, including Ding Xuexiang, Xi Jinping, Ma Xingrui, Wang Yi, Wang Huning, Yin Li, Shi Taifeng, Liu Guozhong, Li Xi, Li Qiang, Li Ganjie, Li Shulei, Li Hongzhong, He Weidong, He Lifeng, Zhang Yuxia, Zhang Guoqing, Chen Wenqing, Chen Jineng, Chen Min’er, Zhao Leji, Yuan Jiagun, Huang Kunming, and Cai Qi.
Independent commentator Du Zheng wrote an article in Taiwan’s “Shang Bao” on July 10, stating that Xi Jinping’s personally organized political bureau has witnessed significant changes in power dynamics as their term has passed midway.
Du Zheng first pointed out that Ding Xuexiang lacks the qualifications to lead a faction, as being the Executive Deputy Premier was akin to being set up to fail from the beginning. Currently, Ding Xuexiang’s most noteworthy authority lies in overseeing the so-called Central Regional Coordination.
Incorporated into the Central Regional Coordination in 2023 are initiatives such as the coordinated development of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, the Yangtze River Economic Belt, the Hainan Free Trade Port, the Western Development, the revitalization of Northeast China, and the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area.
He believes that the development of this Central Regional Coordination has not been managed well. Many projects have been delayed or stagnated, leading to empty promises. The so-called “Central Regional Coordination Development” initiative seems to have become a failure, demonstrating Ding Xuexiang’s inadequate capabilities.
On July 1 this year, Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui was dismissed from his position, with the CCP officially stating that he would be “deployed elsewhere.” Du Zheng mentioned that it is uncommon for a member of the Central Politburo to be adjusted midway through their term, leaving Ma Xingrui’s future uncertain. Regardless, Ma Xingrui’s sudden removal from a high position in Xinjiang will impact the internal power dynamics of the CCP, potentially sparking another round of personnel changes within the Xinjiang political scene.
On April 2, the Minister of the United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee, Shi Taifeng, was transferred to the position of Minister of the Organization Department, while Li Ganjie, Minister of the Organization Department, took over as the Minister of the United Front Work Department.
Du Zheng believes that the Organization Department manages core powers. After Li Ganjie’s transfer, there have been circulating rumors about potential investigations against him. While the Minister of the United Front Work Department is considered a less critical role, the CCP has historically relied on the “Three Magic Weapons”: violence, party building, and united front work. In recent years, the CCP has expanded its influence through various deceptive tactics, showcasing the extensive resources the United Front Work Department can mobilize.
Earlier articles by Du Zheng suggested that Shi Taifeng’s transfer to the Organization Department was seen as a need for the CCP elders to regain control of the political situation and was related to the resurgence of the faction called the Tuanpai.
The Vice Chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, He Weidong, has been missing for nearly four months. Du Zheng mentioned that it is almost certain that He Weidong has encountered trouble and will likely only have his fate revealed during the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th National Congress of the CCP. In any case, with He Weidong absent, full military authority has fallen into the hands of Zhang Yuxia, who is already 75 years old. Zhang Yuxia’s domination may signal a situation where the “gun is in command of the party,” rendering the power dynamics within the Politburo abnormal and potentially dangerous.
Additionally, Du Zheng pointed out that among the current members of the Politburo, He Lifeng has been seen explicitly cultivating his own power, while Chen Min’er, once considered Xi’s potential successor, now faces difficulties due to the corruption case involving Guizhou Big Data. Furthermore, the Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Chen Wenqing, has been sidelined by Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong and Minister of State Security Chen Yixin.
He remarked that other members of the Politburo, including Li Qiang, are of little significance, either being technical bureaucrats, literary figures in the CCP’s service, or appearing as submissive followers. Even Cai Qi, since reaching what seems to be the pinnacle of power, has mostly lost real authority, with the majority of effective power being stripped away by his subordinates.
Since the 20th National Congress of the CCP, the first to fall in the internal power struggle was the diplomatic heavyweight Qin Gang, followed by waves of dismissals in the Rocket Force, and lastly the head of personnel in the military, Miao Hua, who was ousted in November last year. Since the review of equipment systems in 2023, the military-industrial clique, once hailed as a new power by Hong Kong media, have crumbled. All of these figures were promoted by Xi despite having various issues.
Du Zheng’s analysis indicates that due to the opaque operations of the CCP leadership historically, it remains unclear about the exact changes occurring in Zhongnanhai. However, from the analysis of the internal power dynamics within the Politburo as presented above, it is evident that Xi’s favored cohort has been fragmented in the ongoing power struggles, engaging in intense conflicts, creating a doomsday scenario in Zhongnanhai.
In conclusion, Du Zheng highlighted that the CCP boasts of having over a billion party members, but this figure is a “false prosperity” as they would scatter at the first sign of real trouble. Moreover, the increasing number of officials being accused of reading prohibited political books indicates the growing dissent and moral decay within the CCP. The CCP’s single-party authoritarian regime has an illegitimate source of power, and given their internal and external challenges, any attempt at military aggression could lead to unforeseen consequences and potential subversion of their regime.