After the conclusion of the 20th Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party held in July, it was anticipated by many that Defense Minister Dong Jun would join the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party, but this did not come to fruition. Rumors of strained relations between CCP leader Xi Jinping and the military have been circulating, indicating Xi Jinping’s potential retaliatory actions. Analysts believe there is a significant possibility that Dong Jun may remain in his current position within the military as internal tensions within the CCP’s army continue to rise, making the situation complex.
Before the start of the 20th Plenary Session, there was great anticipation surrounding how former Defense Minister Li Shangfu and others who were reportedly in trouble within the Central Committee would be handled and what personnel arrangements would be made.
The official report released on the closing day of the July 18th meeting stated that the plenary session reviewed and approved the inspection reports concerning Li Shangfu, Li Yuchao, and Sun Jinming from the Central Military Commission of the CCP, confirming the previous decisions made by the Central Political Bureau to expel these individuals from the Party.
However, the report did not mention Dong Jun. It was widely expected that Dong Jun would be appointed to fill the vacancy left on the Central Military Commission after Li Shangfu’s dismissal.
Dong Jun was appointed as the new Defense Minister of the CCP on December 29 of last year, replacing former Defense Minister Li Shangfu who had disappeared from public view since the end of August. Dong Jun, a naval commander, was the first navy officer to serve as Defense Minister in CCP history with the shortest term in office, just two years and four months.
Traditionally, the position of Defense Minister within the CCP has been held by officials of a vice-ministerial rank or higher, often being concurrently held by members of the Central Military Commission, State Council, or even members of the Politburo or Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Yet Dong Jun did not ascend to the Central Military Commission and was not appointed as a State Councilor during the CCP National People’s Congress in March this year.
Commenting on the situation, current affairs commentator Yue Shan noted in an interview with Dajiyuan that Dong Jun’s failure to join the Central Military Commission indicates that Xi Jinping does not consider him a close ally, and reflects a decline in the status of the Defense Ministry and Defense Minister within the military. Yue Shan suggested that in many significant military matters, Xi Jinping may not deem it necessary for Dong Jun to be informed, indicating a likelihood of Dong Jun remaining stagnant within the military.
Since Xi Jinping assumed the role of Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CCP in November 2012, there have been frequent changes in top military officials, with many senior officers subsequently falling from grace. Since July 2023, Xi Jinping has initiated a large-scale purge of the military, leading to the downfall of at least a dozen generals across various branches such as the Rocket Force, the Strategic Support Force, and the Equipment Development Department.
The past two consecutive Defense Ministers of the CCP have been removed from their positions. Last October, Li Shangfu was stripped of his roles as State Councilor and Defense Minister of the CCP. In February of this year, the CCP Defense Ministry website no longer listed Li Shangfu as a member of the Central Military Commission. On June 27, Li Shangfu was expelled from the party and his qualifications as a delegate to the 20th National Congress were revoked.
Prior to Li Shangfu, Defense Minister Wei Fenghe was also investigated. On June 27, Wei Fenghe was expelled from the CCP. Previously, Wei Fenghe had been stripped of his military rank and demoted from his position as a general.
Similarly, all three former commanders of the Rocket Force were investigated. Established in the 2015 military restructuring, the Rocket Force was originally known as the Second Artillery Corps. The former commanders Wei Fenghe, Zhou Yaning, and Li Yuchao of the Rocket Force have all been implicated.
In January 2022, Li Yuchao was promoted to the rank of general and made his debut as the Commander of the Rocket Force. He appeared twice in CCP military parades. In July of last year, Li Yuchao was relieved of his duties as Commander of the Rocket Force, and shortly after, his delegate position to the National People’s Congress was revoked.
Other generals who were stripped of their delegate status included Zhou Yaning, who was also removed from his position as Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress.
Several former Chiefs of Staff of the Rocket Force were also investigated. In recent years, officers such as Li Chuanguang, Li Jun, Li Yuchao, and Sun Jinming have all served as Chiefs of Staff of the Rocket Force. Of these, Li Chuanguang, Li Yuchao, and Sun Jinming have all fallen from grace.
After serving as a Major General, Li Chuanguang was later appointed as the Deputy Commander of the Rocket Force and had his delegate status to the National People’s Congress revoked on December 5 of last year.
Regarding the case of Sun Jinming, his involvement was disclosed for the first time at the recent 20th Plenary Session, where Sun Jinming was expelled from the party. Public records indicate that Sun Jinming, a Major General from Taizhou, Jiangsu province, previously served as the Commander of a training base in the former Second Artillery Corps, and in 2022 succeeded Li Yuchao as Chief of Staff of the Rocket Force.
In addition to the aforementioned commanders, other Rocket Force generals, including former Deputy Commander Zhang Zhenzhong, former Equipment Department Director Lv Hong, and the post-70s Major General Li Tongjian, have also been implicated.
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Some military experts at the time suggested to Dajiyuan that this change could be seen as a correction made by Xi Jinping following the military reforms he initiated in 2017. Meanwhile, Yuan Hongbing, a Chinese liberal legal scholar living in Australia, believes that this move by the CCP is not primarily aimed at military reform but rather represents a significant political cleansing and new operations within the military.
Recent personnel changes within the high ranks of the CCP military have seen adjustments in three out of the five major military regions. Senior General Wu Yanan, who previously served in the Northern and Central Military Regions, has now taken on the role of Commander of the Southern Military Region. The former Commander of the Central Military Region, Huang Ming, has transitioned to become the Commander of the Northern Military Region. The whereabouts of Huang Ming’s predecessor, Wang Qiang, have not been disclosed, with reports suggesting he may assume the role of Commander of the Central Military Region. The CCP has not provided details on the departure of former Southern Military Region Commander Wang Xiubin or the reasons for his removal.
Political analyst Chen Pokong, currently residing in the United States, stated on his self-media program that Xi Jinping’s actions can be seen as a form of retaliation within the military, similar to the approach taken by Mao Zedong during his later years of ill health. Chen Pokong believes that to a certain extent, this indicates internal unrest or resistance within the CCP military ranks, with Xi Jinping sensing a lack of solid ground beneath him.
Chen Pokong perceives that there are various reasons for the discord between the military and Xi Jinping, including the extensive purges and ongoing investigations of senior military officers initiated by Xi Jinping, which have led to pushback from military factions. This scenario may result in resentment and hostility towards Xi Jinping within the military, creating a negative atmosphere.
Yue Shan also pointed out that tensions may exist between Xi Jinping and the First Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia, while another Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, He Weidong, and his subordinates may potentially support Xi Jinping. Yue Shan expressed to Dajiyuan that dissatisfaction within the military towards Xi Jinping mainly stems from individuals who previously aligned with figures like Li Shangfu and Li Yuchao, feeling obstructed in their career advancement under Xi Jinping, leading to grievances. He stated, “This resentment could spread like an epidemic throughout the entire military, posing a major threat to Xi Jinping.”
Former Colonel of the CCP Navy Staff, Yao Cheng, also told Dajiyuan reporters that from current signs, Xi Jinping could be facing strong resistance within the military, with some of his military proposals facing significant impediments at the 20th Plenary Session. While the military has yet to make a definitive stance, the visible sentiment of discontent towards Xi Jinping is evident. Yao Cheng believes that Xi Jinping has now lost his dominance within the military, and the struggle for control over the military has become more intense than ever before.