Before the convening of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, there were rumors circulating about Xi Jinping’s unstable power. At the plenary session, a large number of generals promoted by Xi Jinping were dealt with, but their positions remained unchanged. After the meeting, the military continued to express loyalty to Xi. However, some believe that the crackdown itself indicates Xi’s power crisis. The elder statesmen are exerting a “hidden balance of power,” and it may be difficult for Xi to be re-elected in the reshuffle of power at the 21st National Congress of the Communist Party in two years.
Former Democratic Progressive Party Chairman in Taiwan, Hsu Hsin-liang, stated on November 14th that Xi Jinping’s extensive purge may seem to further consolidate his power, but the actual situation could be quite the opposite. According to reports from the Taiwan media outlet Newtalk, Hsu pointed out that most of the recently dealt with military leaders are core figures personally promoted by Xi Jinping. In normal circumstances, a leader would not purge their own loyalists on such a large scale. Hsu believes that this abnormal behavior signifies problems within the system and a loosening of trust from the military towards the leader. He fundamentally believes that Xi’s military power has significantly declined.
At the Fourth Plenary Session, Military Commission member Zhang Shengmin was promoted to Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, but did not receive a position on the Political Bureau. Xi Jinping remains Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, while Zhang becomes the only political bureau member of the military.
Hsu Hsin-liang believes that various factions within the Chinese Communist Party, including the elder statesmen, are unwilling to see the military seize power. “The elders do not like Xi Jinping, but they are even more unwilling to see the military intervene in politics because a military coup would immediately lead to the collapse of the Communist Party, and all factions would pay the price.” He thinks that in such a high-risk situation, all sides tend to maintain surface stability to avoid descending into chaos.
After the Fourth Plenary Session, both Vice Chairmen of the Military Commission, Zhang Yuxia and Zhang Shengmin, expressed loyalty to Xi. Zhang Yuxia even published an article on November 12th in party media calling for the “comprehensive elimination of toxic influences” to prevent being “two-faced” and practicing false loyalty.
Hsu Hsin-liang believes that China is no longer in the era of warlords due to the institutionalization of the modern military, where military officers lack the ability and conditions to stage a coup. Therefore, although Xi Jinping’s control within the military has weakened, it will not immediately lead to a military takeover. However, Xi’s position within the party will gradually be undermined.
Hsu also believes that while the elder statesmen of the CCP no longer openly engage in politics, they still have the ability to form a “hidden balance of power” on major personnel and policy issues. Under Xi’s high-pressure rule, these forces are realigning and may play a critical role in the coming years.
Due to internal and external pressures, Hsu states that “Xi Jinping is unlikely to be re-elected at the 21st National Congress in 2027” and the future may see a reconfiguration towards a structure closer to collective leadership. Xi’s stepping down may not necessarily lead to chaos but could provide an opportunity for institutional reform and even democratization in China because an increasing number of forces within the CCP are realizing that allowing the next leader to walk the path of dictatorship will only repeat the same mistakes.
“Do not think that China cannot move towards democracy; I believe there is even greater potential after Xi Jinping,” he said.
Former professor at the Central Party School, Cai Xia, previously stated on the self-media program “Fangfei Time” that during the Fourth Plenary Session, Xi and Zhang Yuxia temporarily reached a “terror balance” where “neither side can completely overthrow the other, and they can only coexist temporarily.”
Australian scholar Yuan Hongbing, who often reveals insider information about senior CCP figures, told the overseas media outlet “Vision Times” that there are two forces within the second generation reds of the CCP who truly have the will and desire to oppose Xi Jinping. One is represented by the Deng Xiaoping family, aiming to restore the privileged capitalist system of the Deng era. The other force includes Hu Yaobang’s eldest son Hu Deping, former associates of Hu Yaobang, and a large group of intellectuals influenced by Hu Yaobang’s thinking. They hope to revive the liberal path of the Hu Yaobang era and ultimately achieve political reform.
Yuan Hongbing expressed that these two forces are preparing to put forward their political demands at the 21st National Congress of the Communist Party. The extent to which they can influence the development of the political situation remains to be seen.
Yuan Hongbing previously revealed to the Epoch Times, citing sources, that these two factions are preparing major political documents that are expected to be officially released before 2026 with the goal of “preventing Xi Jinping from being re-elected at the 21st National Congress” and attempting to seize leadership dominance.