In a report by Epoch Times on December 6, 2025, it was highlighted that Beijing’s decision to tighten rare-earth exports controls twice this year has raised global concerns. The European Union recently launched a €30 billion plan to strengthen supply chain independence, while Western countries such as the United States, Japan, and Australia are accelerating efforts to find alternatives. Under mounting external pressure, Beijing suddenly announced the issuance of the first batch of simplified “general licenses”. However, experts point out that this move may not be enough to prevent the trend of Western countries rebuilding independent supply chains, as China’s grip on rare earth tools is rapidly diminishing.
The European Union, on December 3, unveiled the “RESourceEU Action Plan”, officially initiating a comprehensive strategy to enhance supply chain autonomy and resist risks associated with China.
For decades, Beijing’s investments in mining combined with lenient environmental regulations have positioned China almost monopolistically in the rare earth sector. Estimates suggest that China accounts for 70% of global extraction and dominates around 90% of processing output worldwide.
Stephane Sejourne, an EU Industrial Commissioner, directly criticized Beijing for using rare earth materials as leverage to prompt nations to accelerate their detachment from dependency on China.
The EU plans to allocate nearly €30 billion to implement the “Critical Raw Materials Act”, with the aim to ensure that by 2030, no single country’s reliance on any strategic raw material exceeds 65%.
The action plan also encompasses initiatives such as accelerating investment in rare earth production, recycling, and permanent magnet manufacturing within Europe; establishing a European Critical Raw Materials Center (by 2026) to coordinate joint procurement and strategic reserves; restricting non-reciprocal participation of foreign entities (including China) in key technology and research projects; and prioritizing European companies in public tenders, with a mandatory consideration for diverse sources of supply.
International affairs expert Sun Guoxiang pointed out to Epoch Times that this marks the EU’s first substantive shift from “risk warning” to “institutionalized reconstruction”, emphasizing the use of legislative, investment, diversification of production sites, coordinated export controls, and other comprehensive tools to reduce China’s monopoly position in rare earths and magnets.
Sun Guoxiang is currently a professor at the Department of International Affairs and Business at the University of Nanhua in Taiwan. He believes that this signifies the EU elevating economic security to a level as crucial as energy and defense, indicating a new framework for controllable risks in EU-China economic and trade relations.
Prior to this, as reported by Reuters on December 2, Beijing issued the first batch of “general licenses” to companies like JL MAG Rare-Earth, Ningbo Yunsheng, and China Northern Rare-Earth Group, allowing specific customers to import rare-earth magnetic materials with a one-year validity. These three companies supply the automotive industry, but China has not officially explained the significance of this move or its policy implications.
The EU Chamber of Commerce in China welcomed the new licenses but expressed caution regarding the lack of transparency in China’s existing export control system.
Beijing imposed rare earth export restrictions in April and October this year, with the controls being expanded in early October. Following the meeting between U.S. President Trump and Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping in Busan, Beijing announced a one-year suspension of restrictions and recently released the general licenses.
Earlier export data on rare earths from Beijing already reflected pressure: Chinese customs statistics indicated a peak in exports to the U.S. in October, yet a 20% decrease compared to the same period last year. Reuters sources also emphasized that the new licenses “supplement but do not replace” existing controls.
Scholar Wang Guochen from the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research, interviewed by Epoch Times, analyzed that Beijing’s relaxation is merely a “discounted approach”: “It’s just a simplified version released, not a complete lifting of export restrictions.” He pointed out that China’s rare earth exports have not significantly increased, demonstrating Beijing’s continued “procrastination” in fulfilling the so-called U.S.-China trade agreement.
Wang Guochen described China’s issuance of rare earth licenses as in line with its habitual operation of “scolding in the street and apologizing in the alley”, projecting a tough stance publicly while compromising privately. Just as Chinese diplomats bid farewell to visiting Japanese representatives with hands in pockets and then turned to appease Japanese enterprises in Northeast China.
Not only the EU, but the U.S., Japan, and Australia are all speeding up efforts to establish supply systems independent of China.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Benson warned in October that the world would be ready to “decouple” from China’s critical element markets. That month, JPMorgan announced an investment of billions of dollars to enhance the critical mineral industry needed for national economic security; Apple and U.S.-based MP Materials introduced a $500 million cooperation plan to establish rare earth magnet recycling and manufacturing facilities in California and Texas; Australian company Lynas became the first producer of “heavy rare earths” outside of China, with its Malaysia plant successfully producing dysprosium oxides.
Earlier, the Japanese newspaper Nikkei reported that a large amount of rare earth mud had been discovered near Minamitorishima, estimated to contain over 16 million tons, ranking third globally, with around 50% consisting of rare and heavy rare earth elements subject to Chinese control.
Japanese Prime Minister Souken Takamichi stated on November 6 that Japan will cooperate with the U.S. in jointly developing rare earths near Minamitorishima. Shortly after assuming office at the end of October, Takamichi signed the “Protection of Critical Minerals and Rare Earth Supply” agreement with U.S. President Trump. This collaboration holds significant implications for global rare earth supply and Japan’s national security.
Dr. Shen Mingshi from the Taiwan Institute for National Defense and Security Research told Epoch Times that the U.S. and Japan are no longer treating the rare earth issue solely as a negotiation; rather, they are promoting a “fundamental departure from China”, aiming to avoid dependence on China or future Chinese sanctions.
He believes that Beijing’s gradual opening of some magnet exports indicates that it is “increasingly unable to resist Western sanctions or boycotts”, and even if it progressively relaxes rare earths needed for high-tech weapons and chips, it will weaken its “sanctioning power” over the West.
Experts generally view Beijing’s use of the rare earth supply chain as a geopolitical weapon as a rash move, eventually leading to the blunting of one of its most potent tools.
A Newsweek report from October highlighted that Beijing’s approach of using rare earths as a negotiating chip could be a “misguided gamble”.
Quoting Ryan Kiggins, a political science professor at the University of Central Oklahoma, the report mentioned that the more Beijing leverages rare earths as pressure, the more it will drive Western allies to enhance domestic production, strategic reserves, and recycling technology, thus rapidly diminishing China’s influence.
“In the short term, Beijing may cause pain; but in the long run, it is paving the way for an independent parallel rare earth ecosystem beyond its control,” Kiggins emphasized.
Brian Menell, CEO of TechMet, an investment company focused on critical minerals supply, stated that the U.S. and its allies can significantly invest in more funds and innovation to “make the supply chain faster, cheaper, cleaner, and less reliant on China”, with this change already beginning to emerge.
He revealed that TechMet has received funding from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) and Qatar’s Sovereign Wealth Fund.
Furthermore, experts agree that Beijing’s recent release of rare earth licenses, as mentioned by Wang Guochen, is actually a compromise strategy in response to external pressure.
According to Sun Guoxiang’s analysis, this is a strategic cooling-off move: “On one hand, it moderately relaxes to maintain stable supply and prevent faster detachment by EU and U.S.; on the other hand, it retains high control in the form of general licenses.” He describes Beijing as attempting to find a balance between “not stimulating the West” and “maintaining influence”.
Wang Guochen also points out that even if China were to fully restore exports now, it would not be able to regain international trust: “It is unclear when Beijing might once again restrict rare earth supply, heightening foreign uncertainty and accelerating the establishment of alternative supply chains.”
He estimates that the U.S. and Europe could establish necessary alternative refining capabilities within a year, sufficient to “patch up”, and the impact of China’s rare earth embargo would only be “very brief”.
Dr. Shen Mingshi also believes that while Beijing is attempting to balance pressure through “general licenses”, the global trend of risk mitigation has become established. He fears that Beijing might find it difficult, as in the past, to dictate the global pace of technology, defense, and energy transformation with rare earths.