Recently, the “Yibao” published an article claiming to be authored by Zhang Yingjie, an associate professor at Peking University, but later retracted it with a statement. It was reported that after receiving the article for submission, attempts were made to contact the author to inquire about the use of a pen name or to remove the most sensitive last sentence directly targeting Xi Jinping. However, there was no response, so the decision was made to delete the last sentence before publishing. Subsequently, Zhang Yingjie herself sent a letter requesting the removal of the article, claiming that someone had impersonated her.
From the content of the article, the author seems to have a very intimate knowledge of Peking University and Zhang Yingjie, which suggests a possible connection. However, the possibility of a false submission cannot be ruled out, as the essence of the article lies in its content. Usually, those who oppose the government or have made a firm decision to break away from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and are prepared to face the consequences would not request a retraction.
The author of the article demonstrates a clear understanding of the CCP. She first concludes that “there is no way out of the dilemma, and the system is beyond redemption,” then agrees with Yu Maochun’s differentiation between the CCP and the Chinese people, citing Wen Jiabao’s original words on political system reform. Through the use of parallelism, she leads out her viewpoints in three consecutive paragraphs all beginning with “if the political system is not reformed,” ultimately ending with a repetition of “political system reform” three times.
Regarding political system reform, it has been discussed for many years. According to the CCP’s own claims, political system reform has always been ongoing. As early as 1980 in the early stages of economic reforms, Deng Xiaoping proposed political system reform, with the main suggestion being to abolish the lifelong leadership system for officials and promote democratic centralism.
However, from any perspective, this cannot be considered as political reform. Even in 1986, then-General Secretary of the CCP Hu Yaobang made it clear that “when we speak of political system reform, we are referring to reforming the leadership system, not the political system itself.”
After the crackdown on the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, even such superficial attempts at political system reform disappeared. It took many years before Wen Jiabao mentioned it again, which only serves to prove that there has never been any genuine reform. Wen Jiabao was the Prime Minister, second only to General Secretary Hu Jintao within the Party hierarchy, so who prevented him from implementing political system reform?
If even figures like Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Wen Jiabao – who were considered part of the more open-minded faction within the Party and held the highest leadership positions – were powerless, who within the current top CCP leadership would have the willingness and capability to touch this forbidden area?
This brings us to the first challenge – the issue of who will carry out the reforms. Looking at the current top CCP leadership, it’s not a matter of there being no one, but if there is anyone, they are a minority.
The second challenge is why the system needs to be reformed. Since the establishment of the CCP, its ideology seems to have changed multiple times, from Mao Zedong’s “continuous revolution” to the Cultural Revolution; then from the shift away from class struggle to focus on economic development post-Cultural Revolution with Deng Xiaoping’s theory, which was almost contrary to Mao’s; to Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents,” reminiscent of the Sino-Soviet ideological struggles during Mao’s era; Hu Jintao’s vague “scientific development outlook”; to Bo Xilai’s emphasis on reviving red culture and Xi Jinping’s emphasis on the country’s advancement while people retreat – the theories and practices are full of contradictions and negations.
Attempting to reconcile all these versions of CCP ideologies and reading them one after another would lead to mental disarray.
Yet, despite all these changes, the core purpose of all these reforms has always been to maintain CCP’s rule. This constitutes the biggest obstacle to political system reform, as in all reform efforts, the motivations for political system reform and the maintenance of CCP rule are inherently contradictory and thus cannot be pursued simultaneously.
Thirdly, the CCP has missed the opportunity for political system reform for over thirty years. Even if such reforms were to occur now, it would be too little, too late.
Political system reform requires timing. History does not wait, and once an opportunity is missed, it may never come again. In the late Qing Dynasty, under the impact of the Anglo-French allied forces and the Taiping Rebellion, it was believed that “to govern the country, one must adopt the techniques of the barbarians.” This led to a thirty-year period of the Self-Strengthening Movement. That reform and opening up was purely on a superficial level, without touching the fundamental institutions, and it ended after the defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War.
Several years later, the Hundred Days’ Reform of 1898 could be considered the second attempt at reform. This included political, economic, military, and educational reforms, with economic and military aspects being similar to the Self-Strengthening Movement. What was significant were the educational reforms and the lifting of the press ban, both aspects of political system reform that were genuinely implemented. The result, as history tells us, lasted merely a hundred days.
After the Eight-Nation Alliance entered Beijing, Empress Dowager Cixi, reflecting on her mistakes, began preparing for constitutional reforms in 1901. By 1908, the “Outline of the Constitution” was promulgated, initiating a comprehensive political system reform, marking the third attempt. However, history did not give the Qing Dynasty a chance, as three years later, the Wuchang Uprising led to the downfall of the Qing, echoing the words of Puyi during his ascension, “I want to go home.”
The CCP’s reform and opening up have not even matched the efforts of the late Qing Dynasty. Starting from the Third Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee in November 1978, until the end of Hu Jintao’s term, a span of thirty-three years, the duration of continuous reform was in line with the Self-Strengthening Movement, and the nature of the reforms was similar, limited to material aspects, without any changes to the political system. The crucial difference is that the Self-Strengthening Movement was the first reform attempt by the Qing Dynasty, lacking experience, while the use of modern naval vessels and artillery was a consensus between society and rulers.
In contrast, the CCP deliberately refused political system reform based on the lessons learned from the Qing Dynasty’s later reform efforts. The reforms following the Self-Strengthening Movement, such as the lifting of the press ban in the Hundred Days’ Reform and the establishment of the principle of separation of powers in the constitutional reforms, which stipulated citizens’ rights to freedom of speech, writing, publishing, assembly, association, private property ownership, as well as the right to vote and be elected, far exceeded the CCP’s claims of political system reform.
Furthermore, from the failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement to the preparations for the constitutional reforms, there was only a gap of seven years, with progress continuously made. Even though the reforms ultimately failed, the CCP, from Hu Jintao stepping down until now, has seen thirteen years pass without any advancements.
Since Xi Jinping came to power, it can be deemed that the CCP’s reform and opening up has failed. The CCP has never admitted this, and consequently, has not learned from its failures. In simple terms, as pointed out in the “Yibao” article quoting Wen Jiabao, “without the success of political system reform, economic system reform cannot be carried out to the end.”
The CCP’s reform and opening up has been limping from the start, with the dilemma of whether to implement political system reform being a longstanding issue. Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of turning right with the left signal was a temporary measure, passing on the difficult problems to future generations. Each generation of leaders has followed this line of thinking, accumulating contradictions to a point where they are ready to explode. By the later years of Hu Jintao’s term, signs of the reform reaching its limit became increasingly evident, as described by Liu Yuan’s close friend Zhang Musheng, it was akin to playing a drumbeat with a bomb in hand.
With the failure of the reform, akin to reaching the end of a road where a wall obstructs the view, the only options are to turn left or right. Turning right would entail completely abandoning CCP’s one-party rule and shifting entirely towards a market economy, while turning left would mean reverting back to Mao Zedong’s revolutionary tactics.
The result, from Bo Xilai’s trial in Chongqing to Xi Jinping’s nationwide promotion, unsurprisingly saw the CCP turning left. While there is undoubtedly Xi Jinping’s personal influence in this decision, the broader picture is that regardless of who holds power, the CCP would make this choice.
Much like the historical precedents, at every major turning point, the CCP has consistently made the worst decisions. The CCP hasn’t even managed to achieve political system reform as the Qing Dynasty did.
Hence, the current dilemma is not about whether political reforms should be carried out, but rather a question of when the Chinese people will abandon the CCP.