In late October, following the conclusion of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party, a significant shift in Beijing’s policy towards the United States has emerged. Swift consensus was reached in the China-U.S. negotiations, with Beijing’s attitude transitioning from strong to weak. Informed sources indicate that this passive adjustment by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a result of the intertwining pressures of economic downturn and internal party dynamics, leading them to abandon their previous hardline confrontational strategy and instead emphasize “economic development as the center”.
Several scholars have observed a notable shift in official rhetoric following the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP. Despite Xi Jinping’s repeated references to “daring to struggle and being good at struggling” during the session, academia in Beijing notes that while this tough language is still retained, it has lost its previous aggressive connotations. This includes Xi Jinping’s willingness to meet with U.S. President Trump and reach a series of compromising agreements, including those covering rare earth exports.
Mr. Tang, a political observer in Beijing, stated during an interview that this shift by the CCP reflects a repositioning of its policy focus. “‘Struggle’ is no longer the main axis for external affairs,” he said. “This shows that the CCP leadership has realized that a hardline foreign policy is no longer sustainable given the economic realities. The domestic economy is in a mess, and some ordinary people are struggling to put food on the table.”
On October 23, the Fourth Plenary Session concluded, and five days later, the “Suggestion by the Central Committee of the CCP on Formulating the 15-Year Plan” was announced, along with Xi Jinping’s drafted explanation. Xi mentioned in the document the coexistence of “strategic opportunities and increasing risks and challenges, as well as growing uncertainties” with a cautious tone. Mr. Tang stated that this cautious wording indicates a severe situation, implying that the top leadership at the meeting has reached a consensus on the actual economic conditions, which Xi Jinping has clearly perceived.
Mr. Ge, a scholar of literature and history, pointed out that the reappearance of the expression “adhering to economic development as the center” in the fourth article of the report of the Fourth Plenary Session attracted the most attention. “This term has faded since the era of Jiang Zemin, and Xi Jinping has been more inclined to put forward political slogans like ‘Chinese-style modernization’ and ‘high-quality development’ since taking office.”
He further indicated that the reemergence of the centrality of the economy implies a forced adjustment in power structure, “This is a strategic retraction, marking the loosening of Xi Jinping’s dominant position within the party.”
According to sources from various channels, on the eve of the Fourth Plenary Session, Xi Jinping requested the negotiation team to “maintain a hardline stance” and imposed rare earth controls as a countermeasure. However, the situation changed drastically after the meeting, with China quickly reaching agreements with the U.S. The Chinese side agreed to ease its rare earth strategy, approve the TikTok deal, increase the purchasing of American soybeans, while the U.S. only promised “not to impose new tariffs.” Informed sources revealed that the pace of the negotiations was “abnormally rushed,” indicating Beijing’s urgency to mitigate losses.
Analysts suggest that these quick concessions are the result of a reevaluation by the political decision-making layer. The Fourth Plenary Session of the CCP might serve as a watershed for internal compromises. Some officials are inclined to stabilize the economy and oppose further external resource drain through aggressive confrontations. “This shift is not just a tactical adjustment but a rewriting of policy logic, reflecting Xi Jinping’s need to bow to reality.”
Meanwhile, domestic media reports on the negotiation details have been significantly compressed, with external propaganda shifting focus to “economic livelihood”. Mr. Ge analyzed that the internal reasons for this turnaround also include internal disagreements on future directions within the party. He stated, “Some senior party members believe that continuing a hardline approach will trigger more severe external blockades and capital outflows.”
Scholars state that “a political consensus was not reached at the Fourth Plenary Session, leading Xi Jinping to proactively make concessions in diplomacy to avoid further upheaval.”
Political observers in Beijing point out that the reintroduction of the phrase “adhering to economic development as the center” in the CCP document is not only a policy regression but also a form of political defense. One scholar remarked, “This is not just a pivot but a form of repair. Beijing needs to use a stable facade to cover internal turmoil.”
According to reports from official Chinese and foreign media, there have been frequent personnel changes among the military and local officials after the Fourth Plenary Session, interpreted by outsiders as a part of the rebalancing of power. Observers believe that this round of changes reflects signs of Xi Jinping’s diminishing control over the system. “From softening towards the U.S. to internal adjustments, the entire political situation is entering a defensive phase.”
Analysts believe that following the Fourth Plenary Session, the Chinese authorities are attempting to make “economic stabilization” the political core, setting the tone for the power structure within the party for the coming year.