Recently, the White House released the “National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2025”, emphasizing seeking peace through strength. In the document, the United States made it clear that it “does not support any unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait” and will not accept Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia being “split into two distinct conflict zones”. This signifies that the mission of the US military is to keep the Chinese People’s Liberation Army always confined within the first island chain to prevent it from gaining a “direct access route to the second island chain”.
The “National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2025” addresses Chinese provocations, emphasizing the importance of “leading with strength” and highlighting that the US still holds significant advantages, including the world’s strongest economy and military power, leading innovation capabilities, unparalleled “soft power”, and cooperation with numerous allies and partners.
The goal of the United States is to rebalance its economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore America’s economic independence. At the same time, it must maintain a strong deterrence strategy in the Indo-Pacific region to prevent the outbreak of war.
The document clearly states that Taiwan is of greater concern because if Taiwan is taken by the Chinese Communist Party, it could gain a “direct access route to the second island chain” and divide Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia into two distinct conflict zones. Therefore, containing potential conflicts involving Taiwan is a top priority, ideally by maintaining military superiority and preventing conflicts from escalating.
This to some extent breaks the strategic ambiguity the US has had regarding the Taiwan issue, making it clear that the US cannot accept Chinese occupation of Taiwan. Otherwise, the US defense system in the Indo-Pacific region would face division and be unable to deter direct threats from the Chinese navy to the second island chain.
After the deployment of China’s Fujian aircraft carrier, Chinese experts boasted that it marks a transformation in the Chinese Navy’s “far seas” strategy, but it seems to be an exaggeration. The Fujian aircraft carrier has not yet established a credible naval warfare capability, and its channels through the first island chain are limited, risking possible blockades once a conflict ensues.
The first island chain serves as a natural barrier to China’s “far seas” strategy. Without breaching the first island chain, the Chinese Navy cannot truly implement its “far seas” strategy. For the Chinese carrier fleet to enter the Pacific from the South China Sea, it must first navigate through the Bashi Strait; for entry from the East China Sea, it must pass through the Miyako Strait. While China’s fleet can sail beyond the first island chain, attempting to cross it during a conflict poses a significant risk of being sunk. If deployed beyond the first island chain in advance, it becomes challenging to retreat once a conflict breaks out.
The “National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2025” explicitly states that China must not be allowed to break through the first island chain from Taiwan. The US military’s strategy to close off the first island chain is in sharp contrast to China’s “far seas” naval strategy, aiming to confine the Chinese military within the first island chain.
As long as Chinese naval vessels are accompanied by supply ships, they can sail far beyond the first island chain and remain there for a period. Chinese warships have approached as far as Hawaii and near Alaska, and their carriers have come close to Guam, posing some level of threat despite being limited in scale and endurance. Recently, Chinese warships approached Australia again, raising concerns once more.
While China’s navy has tried to threaten the second island chain, these actions are merely exercises in non-warfare scenarios. In times of actual conflict, it would be challenging for Chinese warships to cross the first island chain. Even if they reach beyond it, their supply lines would be severed, lacking adequate air defenses and making them vulnerable to airstrikes. The Chinese air force would provide limited assistance in such scenarios.
Although Chinese bombers have crossed the Bashi Strait into the Pacific and flown around the southern side of Taiwan through the Bashi Strait, providing fighter escort poses a challenge. Chinese refueling aircraft have been spotted near the Miyako Strait refueling J-16 fighter jets, and have appeared in the southwestern airspace of Taiwan, but conducting such actions during a conflict would be near suicidal.
The Chinese air force faces more challenges than the Chinese navy in reaching beyond the first island chain. This implies that most of China’s aircraft would struggle to offer real support beyond the first island chain, while American and allied aircraft could launch fierce attacks on Chinese warships, and anti-submarine aircraft could track Chinese submarines. Additionally, US bombers could launch long-range missiles from beyond the first island chain to strike Chinese coastal military targets, leaving Chinese fighter jets unable to respond effectively.
The first island chain also acts as a barrier for Chinese fighter jets, with a dense network of anti-aircraft missiles forming a tight blockade. Crossing the Miyako and Bashi Straits is similarly unsafe for Chinese warplanes. US fighter aircraft can also be stationed in Japan and the Philippines, ready to respond at any moment.
China’s navy requires bases like Taiwan for direct access of aircraft carriers, destroyers, and submarines into the Pacific. The Chinese air force, even more so, needs bases like Taiwan, as without them, they would have minimal capabilities beyond the first island chain.
This reflects the advantage of the United States’ strong presence in another key ally in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s recent anti-Japanese propaganda is largely attributed to Japan further joining the US in military deterrence against China, signifying that any conflict involving Taiwan would affect not just Taiwan but also the interests of the US and Japan; and possibly the Philippines. With long-term US military presence in Japan and the deployment of anti-ship missiles in the Philippines near the central part of the Bashi Strait during exercises, a conflict would not be borne solely by the US.
The “National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2025” clearly states that the US will establish a military capable of repelling aggression in any region of the first island chain; however, it emphasizes that this task cannot and should not be undertaken alone. Greater investment from US allies is required, and more importantly, practical action is needed to contribute significantly to collective defense.
This strategic vision was likely effectively communicated during President Trump’s October visit to Asia. The symbolic event of newly appointed Japanese Prime Minister Katsuyuki Kawai being invited aboard a US aircraft carrier signifies Japan’s willingness to assume more responsibility for the defense of the first island chain, extending beyond Japanese territory. This aligns with the needs of the Trump administration.
China’s actions appear to be more about venting frustrations, inadvertently pushing Japan closer toward the US. China has also employed aggressive tactics towards the Philippines, compelling them to enhance their alliance with the US. China’s belligerent behavior has led to closer military cooperation between countries along the first island chain and the US.
Although South Korea is not traditionally within the first island chain, President Trump recently agreed to South Korea’s request to manufacture nuclear submarines in the US to revitalize its shipbuilding industry. South Korea’s assistance in dealing with North Korea has relied on conventional submarine technology imported from Germany, primarily aimed at preparing for Chinese nuclear submarines, much like Australia’s initiative to procure nuclear submarines.
In August, when the Chinese fleet once again traveled to Vladivostok for a joint exercise with the Russian Navy, at least one Chinese submarine crossed the Tsushima Strait between South Korea and Japan. This event should alert both South Korea and Japan. China’s unintelligent actions have made it difficult to form real alliances with its neighbors, inadvertently fostering antagonism and making enemies on all sides. In contrast, the US continues to strengthen its alliances and consolidate defense along the first island chain, stressing the need for allies to increase military investments and take on more responsibilities.
If China were to breach the first island chain, not only would it fracture the US Indo-Pacific defense system, but Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea could become direct targets of Chinese expansion. Any turmoil involving Taiwan implies a shared concern among all parties.
The “National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2025” urges allies to invest jointly in “the capacity to deter aggression” and generate greater deterrence through collaborative efforts to prevent China from provoking conflicts.
The document calls on Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to increase defense spending and focus on developing capabilities to deter adversaries and protect the first island chain. It also aims to strengthen ties with Australia and India while emphasizing the need for the US to maintain a powerful military deterrent.
Describing the necessity of recruiting, training, equipping, and deploying the world’s strongest, most lethal, and technologically advanced military to protect its interests and deter war, the document emphasizes that US economic strength forms the cornerstone of its global position and military readiness. The US seeks to have the most powerful industrial base globally, as the nation’s strength depends on a robust industrial sector to meet production demands in peacetime and wartime, making nurturing US industrial capabilities a primary task of national economic policy.
This clear expression outlines the Trump administration’s strategic goal of rebuilding American industry, positioning it as not just an economic battle but a crucial aspect of military confrontation. The US is preparing for a possible major conflict to swiftly and abundantly supply military equipment akin to the days of World War II without concerns over supply chain constraints or critical mineral resources.
The “National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2025” also highlights another security challenge where any contender could potentially control the South China Sea, leading to imposing tolls on one of the world’s most critical trade routes or even arbitrarily closing and reopening the passage, both of which would harm the US economy and its broader interests. Therefore, establishing necessary deterrence to ensure unimpeded access to these passages is critical, precluding any country from arbitrarily disrupting trade routes.
The United States not only aims to confine the Chinese military within the first island chain but also prevent it from acting recklessly within it. With China’s Fujian aircraft carrier in service in Sanya, Hainan, it is likely to escalate military confrontations in the South China Sea, potentially prompting more Southeast Asian countries to seek security protection by aligning with the US.
This presents yet another significant misstep in China’s military deployments. China’s recent claims of wanting to “strike Japan head-on” show a lack of strategic coherence in the US Indo-Pacific defense system, where the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea are interconnected and any disturbance in one area affects the entirety. China’s naval regions in the north, east, and south are disjointed, making effective coordination during wartime challenging; and the Taiwan Strait serves as a vital communication route between China’s northern and southern naval regions, posing a risk of containment.
According to the prioritization in the “National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2025”, maintaining relative stability and good governance in the Western Hemisphere is paramount as it directly impacts US homeland security. Consequently, it explicitly aims to prevent non-Western Hemisphere adversaries from deploying military forces or other threatening capabilities in the Western Hemisphere, or from having control over strategically significant assets.
The Indo-Pacific region, ranked second in the document, holds the longest and most detailed description among all strategic priorities; signaling strategic prioritization and focus on addressing challenges posed by China.
Europe, ranked third, sees the US reiterating the need for European self-defense capabilities and committing to mediating in the Ukraine-Russia ceasefire, aiming to rebuild internal stability in Europe and establish strategic stability with Russia. Additionally, it encourages Europe to combat Chinese overcapacity, technology theft, cyber espionage, and other hostile economic activities. The US does not request Europe to participate in joint defense efforts in the Indo-Pacific region but requires them to engage in economic warfare against China.
The “National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2025” places the Middle East in the fourth strategic ranking, noting that Operation Midnight Hammer significantly weakened Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its affiliated organizations, thanks to Israel, and hopes that the Abraham Accords will bring peace to the Middle East. Africa is ranked last.
In essence, the “National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2025” is a comprehensive security strategy that unites global allies to prioritize countering Chinese threats. At a time when internal turmoil is ongoing within the Chinese military, this strategy serves as a powerful external force, likely intensifying the chaos within the Chinese military.
This article is originally published by Dajiyuan.