On November 27, 2025, Taiwan’s public policy and think tanks, including several organizations, held a forum to discuss the “Japanese political situation and international situation after Takashi Takamisato’s election as Prime Minister.” Scholars and experts were invited to participate in the discussion. Experts pointed out that following Prime Minister Takamisato’s supportive remarks towards Taiwan, there has been a supportive atmosphere from both the Japanese government and the public, leading to a more friendly relationship between Taiwan and Japan.
Opening the forum, Wang Wenyue, Associate Professor of the Southeast Asia Department at Jinan University, stated that after Prime Minister Takashi Takamisato took office, Japan’s political situation took on a new dynamic, attracting global attention. This has raised curiosity about whether there is a possibility for further extensions or manifestations of “Abeism.”
Guo Meicen, Director of Polling and Public Opinion Center at a Taiwanese think tank, explained that during an inquiry at the House of Representatives Budget Committee, Prime Minister Takamisato stated that if China were to launch an aggression against Taiwan, triggering a “Taiwan contingency,” based on the situation, Japan may enter a “situation of existential crisis” where collective self-defense could be invoked. Subsequently, the Consul General of the People’s Republic of China in Osaka, Xue Jian, openly threatened to “behead the Japanese Prime Minister,” leading to the official suspension of Japanese seafood imports by China and the issuance of travel and study warnings, escalating tensions between China and Japan.
Guo Meicen pointed out that these actions have made the international community aware that China’s tactics of psychological warfare and intimidation extend beyond Taiwan, with authoritarian expansion and threats not limited to Taiwan, but aiming to extend beyond the “first island chain.” There is no longer just a “Taiwan issue,” but rather a “China issue,” where China is becoming a global challenge.
She emphasized that the saying “When China creates trouble, the world has trouble” is gradually becoming a regional consensus. As Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Jialong has remarked, it is essential to continue enhancing the “strategic 3 chains” of democratic values, security alliances, and economic security between Taiwan and Japan to counteract China’s authoritarian expansion and threats to global security.
Consulting Committee Member of the Taiwanese think tank, Lai Yizhong, mentioned that Prime Minister Takamisato announced amendments to the “Three Security Documents” and an early increase in defense budget, indicating a reevaluation of Japan’s role in maintaining peace in the Asian region. Takamisato’s recent statements reflect a clearer personal attitude, which, strictly speaking, does not contradict Japan’s past policies. The Japanese government and public also show willingness to have in-depth discussions on situation assessments and even support Taiwan, a significant difference from the situation in 2021.
Lai Yizhong shared his experience participating in military strategy simulations at a Japanese think tank, highlighting that the actions of the Japan Self-Defense Forces are constrained by the recognition of “existential crisis” and “critical impact” situations, which significantly affect the scope and flexibility of military operations.
He stated that this holds two implications for Taiwan: firstly, Japanese assistance would provide more room for the US military to safeguard Taiwan when dealing with China; secondly, as a political declaration, Japan is willing to support Taiwan even if it means facing direct attacks from China, injecting a sense of solidarity into Taiwan.
Deputy Secretary-General of the Taiwan National Policy Research Association, Xie Wensheng, believed that Takashi Takamisato has shown adept timing by publicly declaring increased military spending and guaranteeing investment in the United States before Trump’s visit to Japan, successfully setting the stage for a “carnival-style” meeting between the US and Japan. However, the lack of a press conference before and after this summit is an important detail to note.
Xie Wensheng stated that Takamisato’s policy towards China is different from the past, representing a relatively “strategically clear” approach. While strategic clarity may pose a disadvantage of revealing one’s cards, Takamisato has not retracted his statements thus far. However, it is apparent that Takamisato aims to reduce tensions between Japan and China. The breakup of the long-standing coalition with the Komeito Party has also granted Takamisato more room to maneuver his China policy.
After the discussion, the host and young participants raised questions regarding the “defense attitudes of the Constitutional Democratic Party and the ruling party,” “consideration of South Korea’s role in defense planning,” and “Japan’s perspective on South Korea’s role in defense planning,” all of which were analyzed and answered in depth by the participants.