The Chinese Communist Party Builds “Shadow Navy” to Seize Taiwan: Expert Analyzes Challenges and Success Factors

A recent investigation has revealed that a “shadow navy” composed of civilian ships from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) participated in this summer’s annual military exercises, apparently preparing for the invasion of Taiwan.

Strategic experts believe that the CCP aims to utilize amphibious landings at multiple points to invade Taiwan. However, without naval and air superiority, Taiwan could easily destroy the Chinese civilian ships using weapons like the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and drones. This is seen as a form of cognitive warfare and psychological manipulation by the CCP, especially as even the United States, which had naval and air superiority during World War II, abandoned plans to occupy Taiwan.

During the summer, Reuters tracked over 100 Chinese civilian ships participating in the exercises, revealing that Beijing is accelerating the development of a “shadow navy” composed of roll-on/roll-off ferries and deck cargo ships to simulate an operation to seize Taiwan.

Reports indicate that in this summer’s exercises, civilian cargo ships directly conducted beach landings for the first time, indicating that the CCP has entered a phase of formulating “specific plans” for landing operations on Taiwan.

Former Chief of Staff of the Taiwan military, Li Ximing, stated that satellite images show the CCP developing the capability to conduct “multi-point small-scale amphibious landing operations” using numerous small civilian ships for logistical support during an invasion.

In response, Su Ziyun, Director of National Defense Strategy and Resources Institute in Taiwan, acknowledged that the CCP indeed has the capability to carry out a blockade or landing operation on Taiwan using civilian ferries and cargo ships. However, he emphasized that these civilian ships would likely support the landing operation as a second line of defense, requiring artificial piers for landing assistance.

Regarding the feasibility of the CCP using civilian ferries and cargo ships for a military invasion of Taiwan, a senior Taiwanese defense official who requested anonymity expressed reservations. He noted that deploying these civilian landing craft during an invasion would make them vulnerable to attacks from shoulder-fired missiles and other lightweight weapons.

Michael Damm, a former US Navy intelligence officer and senior researcher at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, stated that before the CCP successfully invades Taiwan, they must overcome several tactical challenges.

Joseph Wen, an open-source intelligence researcher who has marked PLA facilities on Google Maps, explained that while the PLA has a history of concealing troops among civilians, using this tactic in an amphibious operation against Taiwan presents difficulties.

Wen noted that civilian ships have slow speeds, no defense capabilities, and prolonged time at sea, making them unsuitable for amphibious operations. It would require significant escort resources if they were to be used in such operations.

Therefore, these ships would likely not be part of the initial landing force, but rather play a supporting role after the CCP has secured a beachhead or port. This strategy is essential considering the vulnerability of civilian ships in an actual combat scenario, points out Wen.

Su Ziyun mentioned that Taiwan has previously prepared a strategy known as the “Gu An Operation Plan” to counter surprise airborne or seaborne assaults on the island. Such a plan involves various anti-ship missiles as deterrents against potential threats.

Furthermore, Yu Zongji, former Dean of the Political Warfare Institute at National Defense University in Taiwan, highlighted the significant advancements in technology, such as unmanned aerial, naval, and ground systems, that have transformed modern warfare. These advancements pose a grave threat to amphibious landing forces.

Yu Zongji emphasized Taiwan’s establishment of a national team for unmanned aerial systems and the acquisition of HIMARS with a range of up to 300 kilometers, providing the capability to target maritime moving targets effectively. These developments significantly enhance Taiwan’s countermeasures against the PLA.

Matt Pottinger, former US Deputy National Security Advisor and current visiting scholar at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, pointed out in his book “The Boiling Moat” that whether the CCP attempts multi-point landings, conventional landings, or uses civilian dual-use roll-on/roll-off cargo ships for deception, they will likely become targets at sea, waiting to be destroyed in a conflict.

Yu Zongji reiterated that Pottinger’s analysis suggests that if the CCP persists in traditional landing operations, the Taiwan Strait will become a graveyard for the PLA’s maritime forces.

In a recent annual report submitted by the bipartisan US-China Economic and Security Review Commission on November 18, it warned that the CCP continues to rapidly enhance its capabilities to invade Taiwan and could transition from routine exercises to actual invasion almost without warning.

Su Ziyun indicated that the threat of a surprise attack on Taiwan by the PLA through strategic deception, a tactic that has been common in warfare for over two thousand years, should not be underestimated. He cited historical instances like the Persian Gulf War, Yom Kippur War, and the 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict as examples of successful strategic deception in warfare.

Yu Zongji highlighted the stark contrast between the D-Day Normandy landing during World War II, where the US had complete naval and air superiority, and the current situation in the Taiwan Strait, where the CCP cannot control sea and air dominance due to the naval alliance between Taiwan, Japan, and the US.

He argued that under these circumstances, a surprise attack or strategic deception by the CCP is nearly impossible.

An analysis by “Business Insider” last year mentioned that during World War II, the US considered occupying Taiwan, then under Japanese colonial rule, but the high command deemed it a costly nightmare. If the CCP attempts to invade Taiwan today, they may face similar challenges.

Yu Zongji elaborated that the US military, with five times the troops of Taiwan at the time, intended to use traditional amphibious methods, along with surprise and multi-point landings to occupy Taiwan. However, due to the high expected casualty rates and the logistical challenges, it was deemed more difficult than the Normandy landings and eventually abandoned.

From a military perspective, Yun Zongji stated that the CCP’s intended multi-point amphibious landings on Taiwan are practically unachievable.

Su Ziyun also noted that regardless of whether the CCP intends to engage in strategic deception or actually use civilian ships for landing operations on Taiwan, their exercises serve a dual purpose of signaling their capabilities and exerting psychological pressure on their adversaries.

He emphasized that the CCP’s publicized landing exercises and amphibious attack-related reports are part of an effort to launch a “cognitive warfare” campaign against Taiwan and its allies. Such maneuvers aim to create a mental sense of intimidation and threat in the minds of their adversaries.

In response to recent developments, including visits by Taiwan’s Vice President and former President to Europe and Japan’s Prime Minister’s public remarks on Taiwan’s security, which prompted strong reactions from Beijing, Taiwan has called for an end to such aggressive actions. Efforts to undermine regional security in the Indo-Pacific region must cease immediately to avoid escalating tensions, according to Taiwan’s Presidential spokesperson.

Yu Zongji highlighted Beijing’s combined efforts to pressure both Japan and Taiwan under the guise of a “composite attack.” This approach involves leveraging tactics across economic, diplomatic, and political fronts, accompanied by live-fire military exercises. The CCP firmly believes that without concrete military preparedness, deterrence efforts would be ineffective, Yun Zongji asserted.

Therefore, Beijing’s current actions towards Japan and Taiwan encompass a comprehensive strategy that combines economic coercion, political pressure, and military demonstrations to achieve its objectives.

In light of Beijing’s actions, Taiwan’s Presidential Office spokesperson, Guo Yahuai, emphasized that the Chinese regime’s multifaceted threats against Japan pose a significant challenge to regional security in the Indo-Pacific region. Taiwan expects China to live up to its responsibilities as a major power and immediately cease these inappropriate unilateral actions to avoid becoming a source of trouble in the international community.