In October, the passenger traffic intensity of urban metro systems in China has been decreasing for 8 consecutive months, with two-thirds of cities failing to meet construction requirements. The passenger traffic intensity is a key reason why many metro construction plans were not approved this year. As the real estate market continues to decline, local finances are tight, and the era of rapid expansion of Chinese metros has come to an end.
According to data released by the Chinese Ministry of Transport, in October 2025, the average passenger traffic intensity of the national rail transit system was 0.804 passengers per kilometer per day, a 5.7% decrease compared to the previous year.
Statistics from the China Business News found that since the beginning of this year, the passenger traffic intensity of rail transit systems in China has been declining for 8 consecutive months. From March to September this year, the year-on-year declines in passenger traffic intensity were 4.3%, 4.3%, 3.5%, 3.8%, 5.7%, 4.9%, and 3.3%, respectively.
Passenger traffic intensity is the ratio of the daily average passenger volume to the length of the operation line, reflecting the daily passenger volume per unit length of the line, to a certain extent, indicating the operational efficiency of the line.
According to the conditions for approval of metro plans by the National Development and Reform Commission, the expected passenger traffic intensity should not be less than 0.7 passengers per kilometer per day. However, in October, among more than 50 cities with operational metros, less than one-third met the overall passenger traffic intensity standard. Only 8 cities had a passenger flow intensity exceeding 10,000 passengers per kilometer per day: Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Beijing, Changsha, Xi’an, Harbin, and Lanzhou.
Since 2024, many cities in China have seen the completion of metro projects planned for the “Fourteenth Five-Year Plan” period, and have begun applying for new rounds of metro plans. However, in many places, the approval of these plans was hindered by low passenger traffic intensity.
According to a report by Panorama Finance on November 19, in the period around 2024, major cities collectively entered a new round of metro plan approval. However, until now, only Chengdu has been approved, while more than 20 other cities, whether first-tier cities or provincial capitals, have pending metro plans.
A review by journalists at Dajiyuan found that in the past year, several cities such as Ningbo, Qingdao, Harbin, Luoyang, and Xining had their metro plans rejected by the National Development and Reform Commission.
On November 17, the Ningbo Development and Reform Commission, responding to inquiries from netizens, stated that the city’s rail transit passenger flow intensity needs further improvement, and currently does not meet the conditions for proposing the fourth phase of rail transit construction projects.
In October 2025, the rail transit passenger flow intensity in Ningbo was 0.45 passengers per kilometer per day, far below the requirement of 0.7 passengers per kilometer per day stated in the State Council’s “Document No. 52.”
In September of this year, Zhang Hongye, Mayor of Pingdu City under Qingdao, mentioned on the program “Livelihood Online” that due to tightened national policies and constraints related to the project’s passenger benefits, commute flow scale, and major passenger hubs, the construction of Qingdao Metro Line 14 has been temporarily suspended.
In the same month, Luoyang Jiaotou, in response to inquiries from netizens, stated that due to constraints such as passenger traffic intensity, the conditions for applying for the second phase of the Luoyang Metro were not yet mature.
Harbin Metro Group, replying to inquiries from netizens in February last year, stated that due to Harbin’s high debt ratio not meeting approval requirements, Line 5 of the metro could not obtain national approval and construction could not proceed.
However, prior to the outbreak of the real estate crisis, metro construction in China was booming. Before 2008, China had only 10 cities with metro systems, including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Changchun, Dalian, Wuhan, Chongqing, and Nanjing.
Subsequently, fueled by massive investments and the real estate boom, the metro system expanded rapidly, covering over 20 cities in 2015 and over 40 cities in 2019.
An industry insider in rail transit operation, speaking to China Business News, analyzed that as the metro network continues to expand, with more new routes extending to the outskirts of the cities, it takes time to cultivate passenger flow on these new lines, resulting in a dilution of the overall passenger traffic intensity. Additionally, the popularity of ride-hailing services, electric cars, and shared bicycles has also diverted some of the metro’s passenger flow.
Nevertheless, the fundamental issue lies in the failure of the traditional profit model of the metro systems. For over two decades, metros have largely relied on the “rail + property” model: boosting land and housing prices through metro construction, then using land profits to finance operations.
Take the Shenzhen Metro for example, in 2022, its ticket revenue was only 3.6 billion yuan, while real estate development revenue reached a staggering 16 billion yuan. However, as the real estate market cools down and land sales become challenging, this cycle is broken, making it difficult for local governments to continue subsidizing metro losses, forcing operating companies to cut costs.
According to reports, starting from May 8, all lines operated by the Foshan Metro Group have advanced their closing times by 30 minutes, and the train intervals have been extended accordingly. Prior to this, complaints were widespread about dim lights, halted elevators due to “energy saving,” and “stuffy” conditions inside trains at Foshan metro stations.
While service quality is declining, metro fares in many cities are quietly increasing. Kunming, Chongqing, and Guangzhou have implemented fare adjustments. Guangzhou achieved an “implicit price increase” by adjusting its billing rules, putting passengers in the awkward situation of paying more for reduced services.
As China’s population declines and the real estate crisis unfolds, tight local finances have become the norm, exposing the issues of metros relying on land finances to sustain themselves.
According to China Housing Network, data from 2024 shows that, after deducting government subsidies, 26 out of 28 major metro companies nationwide are in a state of deficit.
In 2024, the Shenzhen Metro Group incurred a loss of 33.46 billion yuan, despite it being one of the most profitable metro companies nationwide. After deducting government subsidies, in 2024, Beijing Infrastructure Investment Co., Ltd. suffered a loss of 21.6 billion yuan, Tianjin Rail Transit Group a loss of 3.549 billion yuan, Nanjing Metro Group a loss of 5.384 billion yuan, Shenyang Metro Group a loss of 2.372 billion yuan, Qingdao Metro a loss of 8.8 billion, Chengdu Metro a loss of nearly 7 billion, and Ningbo Metro a loss of 7.5 billion.
High levels of debt are also a harsh reality that major city metro companies have to face. According to reports from Wuhan Metro Network, the total debt of metro companies nationwide exceeds 4 trillion yuan, with some companies having debt-to-asset ratios of over 80%, resulting in a heavy annual interest burden. Wuhan Metro’s debt exceeds 200 billion yuan, with annual interest payments reaching tens of billions. The debt-to-asset ratios of most city metro companies range from 50% to 80%, with Lanzhou Metro having the highest debt-to-asset ratio at 82%.
The analysis by the website mentioned that the widespread and substantial losses of metro systems in China are attributed to three main factors: high construction costs, high operational maintenance costs, and blind expansion colliding with the real estate crisis.
High construction costs: The cost of building a metro line can reach around 700-800 million yuan per kilometer, and in complex terrain, it can cost up to 1 billion yuan per kilometer. Taking Shanghai as an example, the construction cost of Shanghai Metro Line 19 per kilometer is as high as 2 billion yuan, far exceeding the costs of other metro lines. When factoring in expenses related to housing demolitions, pipeline re-routing, and other related costs, the overall construction expenses can skyrocket.
High operational maintenance costs: According to a report released by Chongqing Metro, the operational costs have reached 6 billion yuan, with labor costs accounting for 3.2 billion yuan, which is over 53% of the total. Beijing Metro’s annual electricity cost alone reaches 1 billion yuan, with repair costs of 800 million yuan, depreciation costs of 8 billion yuan, labor costs approaching 3 billion yuan, plus other post-operation costs, totaling nearly 15 billion yuan in operational costs per year.
Blind expansion compounded by the real estate crisis: For over two decades of rapid real estate development, metro stations saw increased land prices, leading to the construction of residences, schools, hospitals, and shopping centers, attracting a large population and generating positive returns for the metro systems. However, when the real estate market declines and cities halt massive expansions, the benefits from land and surrounding commercial developments diminish, exposing the downsides of blind expansion.
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