Under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, the phenomenon of officials manipulating data to boost their achievements, known as “data-driven officialism”, has become increasingly common. Multiple public data sources indicate that some local officials adjust indicators under economic growth pressure, leading to ongoing data distortion that exposes loopholes in the performance evaluation system. Scholars believe that in pursuit of achievements, officials engaging in such practices has become a common operation.
“Data-driven officialism” refers to the behavior of obtaining achievements or promotion opportunities through false reporting or exaggeration of statistical data.
In mid-November, Xinhua News Agency published a commentary titled “Rectifying formalism to curb ‘data-driven officialism'”, using the example of the long-standing overreporting of the output value of a children’s vehicle industry park in Leiyang, Hunan to point out the issue of local statistical falsification. The article has sparked attention, with grassroots feedback indicating that performance pressure has become a widespread phenomenon.
The commentary stated that in Leiyang, the output value has been repeatedly adjusted upward in statistical reports, leading to a long-term disconnect between project progress and data. Following the disclosure, grassroots departments in various regions have successively reported widening gaps between annual tasks and local economic conditions.
A lawyer in Changsha, Mr. Zhao, who has long been involved in bribery cases, informed the reporter that many local officials have annual tasks related to fixed asset investment and industrial output value. When the pressure of quarterly assessments increases, the reported numbers are often inflated. He said, “On the surface, it is a demonstration of capability, but in reality, the progress of many projects does not align with the written data. When inspecting assets, corruption issues are often uncovered, leading to arrests.”
Mr. Zhao pointed out that the reporting of large numbers by local officials is often linked to corruption and bribery. He said, “The authorities are well aware of these situations, and they can easily investigate them.”
An individual familiar with the Chinese Communist Party’s statistical system informed the reporter that many regions routinely adjust indicators related to investment attraction, start-up rates, and investment amounts. He mentioned, “Officials collaborate vertically, tacitly manipulating the reporting process, resulting in a widening gap between local and central government data, causing dissatisfaction at the central level. Many corruption cases in various regions are often triggered by inaccurate data.”
Mr. Liao, a real estate developer in Guangdong, told the reporter that in some areas, enterprises are required to report estimated output values higher than their actual capabilities. He stated, “Private enterprise owners are asked to overreport the quantity and expenditure of projects, as well as understate profits and withhold project funds. Failure to report as required may result in exclusion from priority support lists.”
Previous audit and inspection summaries within the Chinese Communist Party have revealed that statistical falsification encompasses all levels of government, from GDP and consumption data to industrial electricity usage and county-level investment and output indicators. Publicized cases include multiple instances where fixed asset and industrial data were inflated, officials in Inner Mongolia were dealt with for long-term overreporting of industrial added value in 2021, and several provinces reported violations of statistical rules related to output value, investment amounts, and progress reporting after 2023.
Mr. Feng, a retired individual from the statistics department in Beijing, mentioned to the reporter that data falsification has led to successive escalation of fixed investment and GDP tasks, creating an internal chain of pressure. He noted, “Local adjustments have minimal room for maneuver, leading to periodic data discrepancies. A few years ago, Anyang, Henan encountered a similar situation where we missed completing the task by just half a day, and it was ultimately overlooked.”
Regarding local statistical falsification, netizens commented that official data cannot accurately reflect local living conditions, leading to a continuous decline in credibility. Some remarks highlighted that emphasizing performance rankings amidst fiscal austerity and industry contraction would only exacerbate grassroots burdens.
In light of the situation where large numbers are reported in many areas, a scholar from Shandong, using the pseudonym Zou Qiang, stated that despite official media’s calls for rectifying formalism over the years, local officials have generally feigned compliance. He remarked, “Officials, to maintain their positions, push indicators higher, while subordinates further conceal the truth, creating a chain reaction of exaggeration.”
Zou Qiang pointed out that the dominance of performance rankings in the official field has made reporting big numbers a political necessity. He explained, “Although official media reports seem like a warning to officials, if they fail to overreport, they may risk losing their positions.” He believed that long-term reliance on numerical assessments has made falsification a “systemic habitual action.”
This year, there has been an unusual public naming and shaming of local data problems by the authorities. On May 20, the National Bureau of Statistics publicly identified issues of data falsification, interference in statistical operations, and hidden falsification in statistical reports in Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hainan, Chongqing, Ningxia, and other seven provinces and municipalities, as well as three departments under the State Council, such as the Ministry of Science and Technology, the State Administration for Market Regulation, and the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission. They demanded submission of rectification reports within three months.
Public opinion points out that statistical falsification has been a long-existing issue within the Chinese Communist Party’s system, kept as an open secret. The problems listed in this public notification include distorted data regarding enterprises and projects, local interference in the statistical process, and emerging modes of falsification, which reflect the authorities attempting to address years of accumulated data inaccuracies through administrative means, with the severity of the problem surpassing previous instances.