Recently, the Chinese national security department announced that an employee of a state-owned enterprise was arrested for using circumvention software to access overseas anti-China websites. A scholar familiar with information censorship told reporters that it is rare for the national security department, rather than the public security department, to publicize circumvention cases, and he believed that this method of release seemed somewhat abrupt. Many netizens pointed out that the authorities did not disclose the alleged incriminating information, making it difficult for the public to assess the specific basis of the notification.
On November 10, the National Security Department posted an article on its WeChat public account stating that the state-owned enterprise employee had been accessing overseas websites through circumvention methods for an extended period of time, downloading politically sensitive information related to China. The security authorities have taken criminal measures against the individual. The notification warned that using circumvention software may face legal and information security risks.
The notification mentioned that the employee had repeatedly watched and downloaded politically related videos concerning China, leading the security authorities to initiate a case against them. The article did not disclose specific content, only indicating that the information originated from overseas political platforms.
Another interviewee who researches information censorship told reporters that recent official notifications frequently mentioned terms like “anti-China websites” and “illegal circumvention”, reflecting the regulatory focus shifting towards cross-border information flow. He noted that in the past, cases involving circumvention were mostly reported by the public security department, but now being directly released by the national security department is indeed uncommon, indicating an increased sensitivity of the authorities to this type of information.
In the article, the National Security Department stated that some circumvention software is developed by foreign organizations, which could be controlled by intelligence agencies and contain Trojan programs that can read personal information and remotely control devices. As an example, an employee of a sensitive unit installed problematic software without recognizing its origin, leading to a leakage of research data, and those responsible were held accountable.
Police in Xi’an, Henan, and other places in mainland China, along with several mainstream media outlets, subsequently republished the notification, leading to different opinions in the comment section. Some netizens stated that since the authorities claimed the content was false, specific examples should be provided for the public to judge for themselves, while others believed that by categorizing all content as “politically sensitive information relating to China,” the public was unable to understand the qualitative standards.
Some netizens raised concerns about the scope of law enforcement. They questioned if merely browsing overseas websites through circumvention could make individuals subject to enforcement, pondering whether Chinese people working, studying abroad, or frequently using foreign services might fall into the same category.
Mr. He, a technology service provider in Fujian, told reporters that different units have varying restrictions on circumvention, but overall, the society lacks clear standards. He mentioned that many people are unable to ascertain the specific content referenced by the authorities and are uncertain about which information could be deemed illegal.
Mr. Han, a netizen from Jiangsu, expressed concerns that based on the notification, viewing foreign news could also pose problems. He stated that he often watches analyses of the Chinese situation on YouTube and is unsure if the authorities consider it sensitive content.
A respondent surnamed Huang, who previously managed information in a state-owned enterprise, told reporters that units regularly check terminal software, often requiring the immediate uninstallation of circumvention programs. He noted that many employees believed they were simply viewing foreign websites without realizing the potential risks and some felt that the more restrictions imposed, the stronger the desire to use such tools.
The Shaanxi Business Daily website released a video on November 11 summarizing the National Security Department’s notification and warning about the potential security issues of illegal circumvention. Some netizens in the comment section stated that if the authorities deemed it falsehood, samples should be provided for the public to make their own judgments. Some comments received thousands of likes.
Various local media outlets also reported other related cases, including personnel from confidential units being remotely controlled after installing overseas circumvention software, leading to data leaks and subsequent accountability. Many reports did not specify the content and only mentioned data risks.
Many netizens in their comments pointed out that the lack of information disclosure by the authorities would lead to information gaps, while others believed that if the authorities deemed certain overseas information to fall within the scope of violation, they should publicly provide a list for the public to understand the boundaries.
Since 2017, the Chinese Communist Party has intensified the crackdown on VPNs and cross-border information, with various regions addressing unauthorized circumvention activities successively. Wu Xiangyang from Guangxi was sentenced to 5 years and 6 months in prison on February 20, 2025, by the Yufeng District Court in Liuzhou, Guangxi, for illegally operating and selling VPN services, along with a fine of 500,000 yuan. In recent years, there have been multiple cases involving state-owned enterprises, education, finance, and research units. The authorities stated that some circumvention tools are developed by foreign organizations, capable of accessing terminal data and remotely controlling devices.
A Chinese scholar told reporters that the increased frequency of notifications in recent times reflects a stricter control over cross-border information flows. He concluded by saying, “Originally handled by the public security department, now announced by the national security department, somewhat makes people feel strange, and some even ask, can’t the national security catch spies anymore?”