In the past month, during the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a group of military leaders have been dealt with. Following the meeting, more senior military officials have been confirmed to be in trouble. Currently, there are some key positions within the CCP’s military that have seen temporary or lowered level appointments. Experts believe that this is a lingering effect of internal strife within the CCP’s military, stemming from problems in the power structure. With ongoing power struggles, it is difficult to bring this chaos to an end.
The CCP aircraft carrier Fujian was commissioned in Sanya on November 5. In comparison to the debut ceremony of the Shandong carrier in 2019, where many senior generals appeared, the commissioning of the Fujian carrier only saw one senior general in attendance, the new Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Shengmin, while the rest were all vice admirals.
It was noted by observers that four senior admirals who were expected to attend the ceremony, including Navy Commander Hu Zhongming, Southern Theater Commander Wu Yanan, Southern Theater Political Commissar Wang Wenquan, and Equipment Development Department Minister of the Central Military Commission Xu Xueqiang, were all absent.
Hu Zhongming, Wu Yanan, and Xu Xueqiang, who are members of the Central Committee of the CCP, were absent from the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee last month, while Wang Wenquan was present at the meeting. The former Navy Political Commissar Yuan Huazhi had already fallen from grace before the Fourth Plenary Session.
Under the CCP’s anti-corruption campaign, senior generals in the military are dwindling. Present at the commissioning ceremony of the Fujian carrier were Vice Commander of the Navy Cui Yuzhong and Deputy Political Commissar Leng Shaojie, both vice admirals. There are speculations that these two individuals may be acting as the Commander and Political Commissar, respectively, overseeing the Navy’s operations.
Previously, the Commander of the Armed Police Force, Wang Chunning, had fallen from grace before the Fourth Plenary Session, while the Political Commissar of the Armed Police Force, Zhang Hongbing, was also absent from the meeting. According to Caixin’s report, in July 2025, Cao Junzhang had been promoted to Acting Commander of the Armed Police Force.
Cao Junzhang had served for a long time in the former Chengdu Military Region, holding positions such as Deputy Commander of the 13th Army and the 76th Army, as well as Vice Commander of the Logistics Support Forces and the Armed Police Force.
During the Propaganda Meeting of the Fourth Plenary Session of the entire military on November 3, there were nine vice admirals from the Central Military Commission sitting in the second row, including Deputy Directors from various departments such as the Logistics Support Department, Training Management Department, National Defense Mobilization Department, Joint Staff Department, three Deputy Directors from the Political Work Department, and two Deputy Directors from the Joint Operations Command Center.
Except for Wang Chengnan and Dong Li, the other seven individuals were promoted to the rank of vice admiral in the past two months.
Independent commentator Du Zheng pointed out on November 9 in Taiwan’s media, “Lianshangbao,” that since Vice Minister of the Logistics Support Department Zhang Lin had been relieved of his position as a National People’s Congress deputy, it is likely that Chen Chi had taken over the Logistics Support Department. Former Vice Minister of the National Defense Mobilization Department Liu Faqing, who is a member of the 20th Central Committee, was absent from the Fourth Plenary Session, so Zhang Like should have taken charge of the National Defense Mobilization Department. During the military training site inspection event held in May this year, Zhang Yuxia attended, while the Minister of the Training Management Department Wang Chunchun did not appear, suggesting that Liu Di may have taken over the Central Military Commission’s Training Management Department from Wang Chun.
However, official announcements pertaining to these adjustments have not been made, and it is unclear whether an acting model is being used.
Vice Admiral Fang Yongxing, Director of the Office of the Central Military Commission, did not accompany Xi Jinping to Xinjiang before the Fourth Plenary Session, an unusually absent scenario. He was represented by Deputy Director of the Central Military Commission’s Office, Major General Qiu Yang. At the Fourth Plenary Session, Fang Yongxing, as an alternate member of the Central Committee, was supposed to be promoted to full membership, but he was skipped, leading to speculations that he is under investigation.
Qiu Yang recently published a signed article on military governance. Du Zheng suggested that Qiu Yang may actually be in charge of the affairs of the Office of the Central Military Commission.
Regarding the use of the acting system within the CCP’s military, Shen Mingshi, a researcher at the Institute of National Defense and Security Studies in Taiwan, told Dajiyuan that this situation arises out of necessity or due to ongoing investigations involving those senior generals that have not been conclusively resolved, prompting the temporary appointment of proxies. While the acting model allows the ruling authorities to observe the capabilities of the acting individuals, the drawback is that the individuals may feel a lack of trust, leading to a reserved approach to their work.
Shen Mingshi further explained that currently Xi Jinping is the nominal Chairman of the Central Military Commission, while Zhang Yuxia is the de facto wielder of power as the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. The opinions on personnel adjustments between the two may not necessarily align, causing the need for the use of acting models or delays in the promotion of relevant officials. However, the acting model is not sustainable in the long run, as negative impacts would become evident once a regional conflict arises.
It is noteworthy that the use of the acting system in key military positions has indirectly led to the “downgrading” of these positions, such as positions originally held by senior generals now being filled by vice admirals, and those by vice admirals now being filled by major generals.
In some cases, rather than the acting model, some critical positions have directly been “downgraded.” For example, Zhang Shengmin’s promotion to Vice Chairman of the Military Commission did not come with a new position in the Political Bureau, and Dong Jun’s appointment as Minister of National Defense did not include a seat on the Military Commission.
Su Ziyun, Director of the Strategy and Resources Department at the Institute of National Defense and Security Studies in Taiwan, told Dajiyuan that this phenomenon reflects the power struggle within the upper echelons of the CCP, which is manifested in the military as a struggle between Xi Jinping and Zhang Yuxia. The use of acting models for important positions within the CCP’s military signifies the emergence of strongman politics within the military, with Zhang Yuxia being the strongman. Zhang Yuxia is promoting newcomers, but only allowing them to act, similar to a probationary period in a company, observing their words and actions, while the principles of “downgrading” are also similar.
In response, current affairs commentator Li Linyi told Dajiyuan that whether it is the acting model for key positions or the deliberate “downgrading,” it all boils down to the lingering issues of high-level infighting within the military, which are indicative of problems within the power structure. The compromises made during the Fourth Plenary Session are only temporary, and the power struggles continue, indicating that these internal military upheavals may be difficult to resolve, becoming more of a regular occurrence.