Recent research released by a German think tank analyzed the current situation of Chinese think tanks, highlighting the trend of internationalization and the increasing dominance of think tanks that support the government’s stance. Scholars believe that both internally and externally, Chinese think tanks are becoming more like mouthpieces.
The Mercator Institute for China Studies is the largest think tank in Germany and Europe specialized in researching China. In March 2021, the Chinese Communist Party imposed sanctions on the Mercator Institute for China Studies and three other entities in response to the European Union’s sanctions against China regarding human rights issues in Xinjiang.
On May 8, the Mercator Institute for China Studies published a report entitled “Whispering Advice, Loud Praise: The Role of Chinese Think Tanks Under the Leadership of Xi Jinping”.
In the United States, there is a “revolving door system” between think tanks and the government. Scholars and officials transition between roles through this mechanism, with think tanks being seen as a source of national policy development.
Chinese think tanks emerged during the reform and opening-up period of the 1980s. According to the “Global Think Tanks Report (2021)”, there are a total of 11,175 think tanks globally, with Chinese institutions accounting for nearly 17%. The “Chinese Think Tank Directory 2022” lists 1,928 active think tanks.
However, the report from the Mercator Institute for China Studies suggests that numbers do not tell the whole story. It is more important to understand the regulatory conditions and level of political integration of Chinese think tanks in order to assess their value as interlocutors and the background influencing their research.
The main types of Chinese think tanks include official think tanks, semi-official think tanks, and private or unofficial think tanks.
Official think tanks are sponsored by central and local government agencies and have the greatest influence on authorities, such as the Development Research Center of the State Council of China. Semi-official think tanks, which are the most numerous and cover a wide range of research topics, are affiliated with public organizations like universities or industry associations, for example, the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China. Private think tanks, on the other hand, are constrained by factors like funding and access to data and information, resulting in the least influence.
The report cited the case of the Unirule Institute of Economics, established in 1993 as an independent and reputable private think tank. However, starting from 2012, the Chinese authorities tightened control over think tanks, leading to suppression and eventual closure in 2019.
In 2013, Xi Jinping proposed the establishment of “Chinese characteristics think tanks” aimed at creating a platform for research and exchange to serve the official goals of the Party and the state. In 2014, Xi Jinping described the establishment of think tanks as a “major and urgent task”.
The report indicates that these think tanks are not merely executors of party will, devoid of agency, and without the power to act independently. Given the changing regulatory environment, the logic tends to favor organizations that demonstrate political utility while suppressing those without political utility, making the think tank field highly politicized.
Internally, officials make requests to think tanks through a system of instructions, providing funding support, and in return, think tanks offer research reports, policy recommendations, and even leadership speech drafts. Externally, their mission is to “voice China’s (CCP’s) voice on the international stage” through the establishment of specialized networks, media exposure, and promoting Beijing-consistent views in interactions with foreign elites.
The report also suggests not to use a single brush to paint all Chinese think tanks with the same political color. The stance of Chinese think tanks and intellectuals on the Russia invasion of Ukraine serves as a good case study. Some think tanks or public intellectuals sometimes express views seemingly different from the political line supporting Russia or indicating a strong alliance between Beijing and Moscow.
For example, Feng Yujun, Vice Dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, Director of the Russian and Central Asian Studies Center, and Director of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Research Center, has consistently held a critical attitude towards Russia’s invasion, Putin, and his policies, advocating for China to maintain a distance from Russia.
In response to this, the report offers several possible explanations: academic courage, useful reverse thinking, and designated negative teaching materials, suggesting that information is deliberately planned and utilized by the Party and the state, following the strategy of “criticize the small to help the big,” where the Party permits friendly actors to voice critical opinions to gain credibility on specific issues.
The report concludes that engaging with think tanks remains beneficial, but it is crucial for European participants to have a clear understanding of the role Chinese think tanks play and the environment in which they operate during exchanges.
Legal scholar Li Yuqing, in an interview with a news outlet, noted that initially, mainland China’s official think tanks included those within universities, where scholars objectively studied and provided suggestions based on academic principles to the authorities, influencing some of their policies. There are also think tanks at the local level, conducting research and writing reports on annual topics funded by the government.
However, after Xi Jinping strengthened centralized power, a shift occurred where individuals from top to bottom in China no longer speak the truth. Think tanks stopped presenting objective and relatively independent opinions and became mere mouthpieces.
Li pointed out that in the legal field, all national social science projects in China focus solely on researching Xi Jinping’s rule of law ideology, neglecting conventional principles of international separation of powers and judicial independence, leading to superficial research that secures funding. Many universities have established Xi Jinping rule of law research centers, promoting “promoting the construction of new legal think tanks with Xi Jinping’s rule of law ideology.”
“It’s clear that their think tanks have completely become mouthpieces, entirely instrumentalized,” Li said. “Think tanks, in essence, function like advisors providing good strategies, similar to Liu Bei seeking counsel from Zhuge Liang. By conducting research and offering sound recommendations, these think tanks aim to tackle problems and put into practice correct and appropriate policies aligned with reality.”
The report revealed that Chinese think tanks play a pivotal role in formulating and communicating official policies. The top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party highly values controlling political debates domestically while striving to establish a “voice right” internationally, where China (CCP) has the ability to set norms, topics, and language for international discourse.
Chinese think tanks are driving international “exchanges,” which usually follow a communication model of “contesting, promoting, and deterring.” These think tanks have established over ten networks and dialogue forums, transitioning from regional cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative towards a focus on “global development initiatives” and “global security initiatives.”
The report suggests that although the landscape of Chinese think tanks remains diversified, a trend toward clustering can be observed. Think tanks are increasingly converging around four main prototypes: domestic analysts providing policy advice, foreign policy consultants explaining and recommending foreign policy environments to party-state institutions, domestic propagandists steering public opinion at home, and unofficial diplomats conveying CCP policies and positions to foreign audiences, shaping international discourse.
Li Yuqing believes that terms like “rising in the East and falling in the West” and “extraterritorial rights” have emerged from these think tanks. They advocate for seizing the right to speak, holding the moral high ground, formulating rules, and challenging the West. Through the expansion of numerous foreign laws, there are no longer clear boundaries to external national sovereignty.
“As a dictator with centralized power, Xi Jinping seeks legitimacy using think tanks. These so-called scholars and fame-seekers aim to leverage Xi Jinping for power and benefit, showcasing a mutual exploitation,” she explained.
The report notes that Chinese think tanks are active participants in the strategic efforts of the party-state to safeguard national interests, often advocating for a broader narrative consistent with the essential elements of the party-state’s information. Think tanks mainly amplify authoritative information by participating in one-track or half-dialogues (involving exchanges between government officials and non-government individuals) and two-track dialogues (unofficial or semi-official diplomacy) modes and engaging in bilateral exchanges with foreign counterparts to magnify official information dissemination. For instance, information directed at foreign audiences is disseminated through interviews with foreign media.
Li Yuqing observed, “Western observers view them (Chinese think tanks) through Western standards as similar institutions, but in reality, they are not. They are official mouthpieces, akin to CCP media. They may appear as scholars superficially but lack the essence of true scholarship.”
In recent years, Li noted that many policies in China seem contradictory, with the country seeking foreign investment while simultaneously enforcing spy laws and national security laws. It seems that Xi Jinping, reputedly a non-book writer, has others write on his behalf. These individuals, not united, compete to influence Xi Jinping’s voice.
Scholar Da Wei from the mainland believes that China has funds but lacks wisdom. There is no fertile ground for intelligent people on that land, where a few lackeys deceive the master for their pleasure. Various international organizations that attempted to enter China for operations faced insurmountable hurdles due to existing constraints, ultimately retreating, as they were unable to penetrate Chinese society’s internal complexity.
It is worth noting that the activities of foreign think tanks in China are constrained by the Anti-espionage Law and the Management Law of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities within China. The enforcement of the Anti-espionage Law since 2023 presents additional challenges, establishing a legal framework spanning the National Security Law, National Intelligence Law, Anti-terrorism Law, Cybersecurity Law, and Data Security Law to restrict overseas data acquisition.
“Any research must be based on in-depth and extensive research in a specific field. However, these researchers either refuse to conduct research or engage in deceptive studies. Foreign (branch) institutions cannot acquire approval for in-depth research and hence cannot obtain first-hand data. Without data, how can there be persuasive research conclusions?” he noted.