In the first three quarters of 2025, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced that they have initiated investigations into 90 provincial and ministerial-level officials, exceeding the total number for the entire previous year. The military system is reported to be a heavily affected area, with around 40% of active-duty generals who did not attend the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee already under investigation. Experts point out that this wave of rectification not only reflects the deepening systemic corruption issues but also highlights the intensification of power struggles within the CCP.
According to a recent report from the CCP’s disciplinary commission, from January to September 2025, the national disciplinary and supervisory organs reviewed and filed 789,000 cases, including 90 provincial and ministerial-level officials, a significant increase from 58 people in the same period in 2024 and 73 people for the entire previous year.
In the third quarter alone, 47 provincial and ministerial-level officials were investigated, accounting for more than half of the total for the previous three quarters and marking the highest single-quarter number in the past two decades. During the first three quarters, 677,000 individuals faced disciplinary actions, including 41 provincial and ministerial-level officials. These figures demonstrate that the anti-corruption campaign has penetrated from the top to the grassroots levels, exposing the systemic and widespread nature of corruption.
The military has become a key focus of the CCP’s anti-corruption efforts, with authorities showing early signs of purging high-level military officials. Independent analysts have noted that the military rectification began in June 2024 at the All Military Political Work Conference in Yan’an.
At that conference, there was a specific emphasis on removing those not absolutely loyal to the Party, clearly signaling the initiation of the purge. The ongoing investigations are expected to continue until June 2026, spanning a full two years, principally aimed at a comprehensive restructuring of the military personnel.
Just a week ago, during the CCP’s Fourth Plenary Session of the Twentieth Central Committee, nine senior generals including He Weidong and Miao Hua were disciplined, involving key departments such as the Military Commission vice chairman, the Rocket Force, the Armed Police, and the Eastern Theater Command. Of the generals appointed by the highest CCP leadership since the “Twentieth Congress,” 14 have been taken down, marking a historically high proportion.
On October 29th, several informed sources close to the military disclosed to the media that around 40% of the active-duty generals who did not attend the Fourth Plenary Session have been investigated by the military discipline commission, with most likely to be tried in military courts, indicating that the military’s purification efforts are entering a critical phase.
These sources further revealed that internal cleansings within the CCP’s military have been frequent in the past two years, overseen mainly by Zhang Shengmin. Some of the generals who did not attend the Plenary Session have already entered the judicial process, while others are still under review.
On October 28th, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee appointed Zhang Shengmin as the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, relieving He Weidong of his duties. Among the military representatives in this session of the National People’s Congress, 22 individuals have been disqualified, and in accordance with tradition, their military positions have already been revoked.
Comparing the list of candidates for the Twentieth Central Committee, seven individuals were not reinstated, including Deputy Commander of the Rocket Force, Wang Liyan, and Commander of the Logistics Support Department, Wang Kangping, typically indicating significant problems. The Fourth Plenary Session dismissed 14 CCP members and candidates, appointed 11 civilian personnel, but no military figures were reinstated, indicating a freeze on military personnel reshuffles.
Chinese affairs expert Wang He analyzed that corruption within the CCP has reached a state of complete coverage, comprehensive collapse, and overall deterioration.
“Corruption is a prevalent phenomenon in the CCP’s bureaucracy, but why do some fall from grace while others remain unscathed? The key lies in political alignment. Anti-corruption is just a pretext; the core issue is political loyalty.”
Wang He emphasized, “As the leadership transition approaches, the political power struggles concerning top-tier personnel become more intense. Unlike previous Party Congresses, the current situation has changed, and the competition for the Twenty-First Congress will be fiercer.”
Analyst Cai Shunkun believes that the ongoing rectifications have dual motivations. On one hand, the accumulation of corruption in the military is challenging to overcome. He stated, “A large amount of military funding is being misused and lost through various channels.” Reports indicate that cases reviewed by the military discipline commission often involve engineering equipment, logistical procurement, and Rocket Force finances.
On the other hand, the core issue lies in political alignments and power balances. He pointed out, “The Director of the Political Work Department, in charge of military personnel appointments, wields the core power. If a particular faction gains dominance, they could sideline the highest decision-making body or influence central decision-making.”
Cai Shunkun’s analysis underscores a critical point: the CCP’s anti-corruption campaign serves as a pretext for purging politically disloyal individuals, with loyalty being the determining factor for one’s fate.
Wang He noted that there is a significant internal divide within the military regarding the reunification with Taiwan. “Currently, the strength to take Taiwan by force is insufficient, and the Taiwan issue is not the most pressing matter.” He believes that the aggressive stance on Taiwan is often a “rhetorical tactic rather than a genuine threat,” and amid power struggles, the strategy towards Taiwan may prioritize form over substance.
Cai Shunkun predicts that there will be a substantial turnover of current generals, with a restructuring on an unprecedented scale. He anticipates new faces emerging in the next session to assume roles as CCP military central committee members, candidate committee members, or military commission members, “the current Vice Chairman of the Military Commission is highly likely to be replaced entirely, unlikely to serve a consecutive term.”
However, the CCP’s large-scale purification efforts come with risks. Wang He warned, “Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign has offended all factions.” He believes that as age and health factors come into play, “if health issues arise and are made known to those around him, there could be intense power struggles at the top.”
Cai Shunkun shares a similar view, stating that when health issues arise among the highest CCP leaders, it will be a crucial turning point determining the future political direction, where whoever can control the situation will shape the future path.