【Epoch Times, October 29, 2025】 The purging operation of senior military generals by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership continues. According to multiple sources and foreign media reports, about forty percent of active-duty generals have been under investigation by the military discipline inspection committee, with most cases expected to be transferred for trial in the military prosecution system and military court.
Analysis indicates that this round of scrutiny has been ongoing since 2023, involving high-ranking generals from the Rocket Force, the Strategic Support Force, and the Equipment Development System. Scholars believe that the authorities are using disciplinary reviews to rebuild the chain of command in the military, ensuring that military power remains concentrated at the highest leadership level.
On October 28th, the CCP National People’s Congress Standing Committee appointed Zhang Shengmin as the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, removing He Weidong from his position, demonstrating a reshuffling of power structure within the military. Several insiders close to the military informed Epoch Times that about forty percent of the active-duty generals who did not attend the Fourth Plenary Session have been investigated by the military discipline inspection committee, with the majority expected to be tried in military courts, signaling a deepening phase of the military’s crackdown.
Insiders revealed that in the past two years, there has been frequent internal cleansing within the People’s Liberation Army, with Zhang Shengmin responsible for reviewing senior generals. Those generals who did not attend the Fourth Plenum have either entered the judicial process, while the review of others has not been lifted. A Mr. Wang who understands the military’s judicial process told reporters, “Even if these generals pass the review, many are either reassigned from command positions or retire early.”
Rumors within the military suggest that this round of scrutiny aims at a comprehensive reorganization based on “loyalty” and “discipline.” Preliminary statistics indicate that 22 military representatives in the current National People’s Congress have been disqualified. Military personnel state that those whose representative qualifications were revoked had already been relieved of their military positions before and are typically subsequently transferred to military courts for processing.
On October 23, the CCP’s Fourth Plenum closed in Beijing, where Zhang Shengmin was appointed as the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Six days later, the fourteenth meeting of the NPC Standing Committee closed on October 28, voting to appoint Zhang Shengmin as the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and deciding to remove He Weidong from his post.
Beijing scholar Mr. Chen stated that the CCP’s “Central Military Commission” and “State Military Commission” have always been a system of “two entities with one set of personnel.” “One is the Vice Chairman of the Party’s Military Commission, and the other is the Vice Chairman of the State Military Commission, embodying the CCP’s means of controlling military power through the unity of party and government.” He mentioned that this model may extend to other areas in the future.
Mr. Chen, the scholar, pointed out that military power is highly concentrated at the central level to ensure that the military obeys the political core, also reflecting discontent within the military towards the system.
Military analysts note that the focus of this purification is not on military misconduct or corruption but on political attitudes. “Corruption among serving generals is widespread and known before their promotion, but intentionally ignored. In this environment, political loyalty becomes the only criteria.”
Recent cases of dismissed senior officers include Li Yuchao, Zhou Yaning, Ding Laihang, Li Shangfu, Miao Hua, Wang Chunling, and Yuan Huazhi. According to incomplete data, out of the 34 senior generals absent from the Fourth Plenum, 19 did not attend the NPC Standing Committee meeting, accounting for 56% of all senior generals. Among them, nine have been officially removed, two expelled from the party at the Third Plenum, five expelled from the party at the Fourth Plenum, and two stripped of their NPC representative qualifications. Another eight were absent or did not attend the Fourth Plenum, two were absent from the NPC Standing Committee meeting, indicating ongoing changes in the top military ranks.
Veteran media figure Gao Yu pointed out on October 27 on social media that the attendance rate at the Fourth Plenum hit a record low, with 27 out of 42 military delegates absent, reaching 64%. She asserted that “there are big problems within the military.” She noted that the Fourth Plenum removed 14 Central Committee members and alternate members of the committee, appointing 11 civilian personnel, with no military representatives appointed, reflecting a freeze in military personnel affairs. She believes this demonstrates intense power struggles in the military, with many commanders and political commissars falling in the five major theater commands and three major services.
In contrast to Gao Yu’s observations, Beijing academia believes that the changes in military leadership are part of internal reorganization within the central government and not factional conflicts. The CCP is using disciplinary measures to cleanse the military, aiming to maintain complete control of military power at the institutional level.
Reuters, The New York Times, Financial Times, and other media outlets all note that the CCP is restructuring the military through disciplinary reviews and military discipline cleanup, making purging within the military a primary means of political consolidation.
According to various sources, most cases reviewed by the CCP’s PLA Discipline Inspection Committee are related to fund flows in engineering equipment, logistics procurement, and the Rocket Force system. These officials are expected to be transferred to military prosecution agencies and courts on charges of corruption and bribery.
Insiders in the military stated that this operation is the largest-scale military discipline cleanup since the cases of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou in 2014. Analysts believe that the CCP is consolidating its disciplinary punishment system through judicial procedures, shifting the military purge from political movements to institutional processes, ensuring that military power is long-term controlled by the central leadership.