The 20th Fourth Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China (CPC) came to a close on October 23, with the approval of the “Fifteenth Five-Year Plan” proposal. While the meeting completed its routine agenda, behind the scenes, a seismic personnel shake-up sent shockwaves through the top echelons of power. Several political experts pointed out that the large-scale military purge reflected the multiple power struggles facing Xi Jinping.
On October 23, Xinhua News Agency released the communique of the 20th Fourth Plenary Session of the CPC. The meeting was attended by 168 Central Committee members and 147 alternate members. The plenum approved the “Fifteenth Five-Year Plan” proposal and decided to appoint Zhang Shengmin as the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission.
The plenum also reviewed and approved the disciplinary decisions regarding He Weidong, Miao Hua, He Hongjun, Wang Xiubin, Lin Xiangyang, Qin Shutong, Yuan Huazhi, Wang Chunning, Zhang Fengzhong, confirming the expulsion of 14 Central Committee members including He Weidong from the party.
In comparison to the list of alternate Central Committee members of the 20th CPC Party Congress, 7 individuals were not promoted as per tradition. This list included Wang Liyan, Deputy Commander of the Rocket Force; Wang Kangping, Commander of the Logistic Support Force; Fang Yongxiang, Director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission; and Shi Zhenglu, Commander of the Northern Theater Command. Traditionally, not being promoted usually signifies serious problems.
The scale of the military leadership purged during this Fourth Plenum was unprecedented. 9 senior generals were investigated on the same day, involving key departments such as the Deputy Chairman of the Military Commission, the Rocket Force, Armed Police, and the Eastern Theater Command. All 9 generals were personally promoted by Xi Jinping. Since the 20th CPC Party Congress in 2022, a total of 14 generals promoted by Xi Jinping have fallen from grace, an unprecedented high ratio.
Professor Ming Ju, a political science honorary professor at National Taiwan University, analyzed on a political program the language used by the CPC Military Commission in announcing the investigation of the 9 generals, particularly highlighting terms like “disloyalty” and “serious violation of the Party’s command of the gun principle and the Chairman’s responsibility system”, considered the harshest in the CPC’s political discourse.
“The weight of the term ‘disloyalty’ far exceeds that of corruption charges,” stated Professor Ming. “It suggests that these generals may be involved in treason, coup attempts, or at least fundamental disagreements on major policies such as the Taiwan policy with the top leadership.” It is worth noting that those investigated, He Weidong and Miao Hua, were both members of the “New Min River Army”, rapidly promoted but swiftly fallen from grace, setting records for the shortest tenure as members of the Political Bureau and Vice Chairmen of the Military Commission.
The true purpose of this purge is to “strike the mountain and shake the tiger”, Professor Ming analyzed. Dealing with 9 senior generals prominently before the Fourth Plenum is a stern warning to the entire party, especially the military high command, to unquestionably obey. Since the 18th CPC Congress, at least 15 senior generals have fallen from grace due to disciplinary violations, accounting for forty to fifty percent of the active senior generals. This not only reveals systemic issues in personnel appointments but also shows the seriousness of corruption within the military, inevitably weakening the military’s combat effectiveness and cohesion.
Looking at the Taiwan situation, the impact is particularly severe. With successive Rocket Force commanders falling from grace, incidents occurring in frontline units like the Eastern Theater Command have severely damaged their combat readiness and deterrent effect.
In the personnel adjustments made during this session, the promotion of Zhang Shengmin from a member of the Military Commission to Vice Chairman garnered attention. However, he did not follow the usual practice of entering the Central Political Bureau. Regarding the decision-making body behind this military personnel adjustment, multiple experts have divergent views.
China expert Zhang Tianliang stated on a program that this “exceptional” arrangement reflects the leadership’s balance of power concerns regarding the disciplinary system.
Zhang analyzed that traditionally, Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission are usually members of the Central Political Bureau, enjoying treatment equivalent to a vice-ministerial level. Zhang Shengmin, as a military disciplinary official, had previously spearheaded multiple rounds of military anti-corruption campaigns, making significant contributions. His promotion was expected, primarily to share power with another Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, Zhang Yuxia, to avoid consolidation of power in one individual. However, Zhang Shengmin’s exclusion from the Political Bureau carries significant implications.
“Officials from the disciplinary system possess vast sensitive information and leverage, making it easy to form independent power structures,” Zhang Tianliang stated. “Therefore, while Zhang Shengmin received a promotion, his power is clearly restricted, preventing him from enjoying the highest political treatment. This is a precaution against and check on ‘tough officials undertaking dirty work’, preventing the excessive expansion of their influence.”
Furthermore, no potential successor could be promoted to Vice Chairman of the Military Commission during the Fourth Plenum, indicating preparations for the re-election at the 21st Party Congress to maintain the existing power structure.
Political commentator Tang Jingyuan put forward sharper observations on his program.
Tang mentioned that while Zhang Shengmin assumed the position of Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, he reportedly still held the position of Secretary of the Military Commission Discipline Inspection Commission and acted as a substitute for the original Director of the Political Work Department. This indicates that he wields both the “sharp knife” (disciplinary inspection) and personnel authority in the military, making him a realist with high influence. Following the Plenum, the leadership of the Military Commission, excluding Xi Jinping himself, formed a trio comprising Zhang Yuxia, Zhang Shengmin, and Liu Zhenli, considered not among Xi’s core confidants and might have even turned against him.
More critically, Zhang Shengmin’s exclusion from the Political Bureau is extremely rare within the CPC system. According to the principle of “the Party commands the gun”, Vice Chairmen of the Military Commission typically need to enter the Political Bureau to ensure their loyalty to the Party’s top leadership. Zhang Shengmin’s exclusion could imply a reduction in direct intervention by Xi Jinping’s faction, aiding Zhang’s independent operation within the military.
“This situation is quite similar to the time when Hu Jintao first assumed the position of Chairman of the Military Commission,” Tang commented. “At that time, none of the Vice Chairmen of the Military Commission were Hu’s confidants, essentially sidelining military power. Additionally, the current Central Military Commission consists of only four members, the fewest in CPC history, seen as a direct manifestation of the incomplete military purges.
Therefore, Tang believes that although Xi Jinping seems to have a firm grip on power, the restructuring of the Military Commission and the special position held by Zhang Shengmin could further indicate signs of Xi’s military power being sidelined.
In a program, political commentator Chen Pokong described the overall state of the Fourth Plenum of the CPC as “semi-paralyzed”. He mentioned that the atmosphere of the meeting was peculiar, with almost no personnel appointments filled, and the last-minute venue change from Jingxi Guesthouse to the Great Hall of the People, indicating an abnormal state of top-level power structure.
Chen pointed out that the change in meeting venue became a major focus. Traditionally, the CPC Central Committee plenums are held at Jingxi Guesthouse, but the closing ceremony was suddenly moved to the Great Hall of the People instead. This situation mirrors the 19th Fourth Plenum five years ago when it had to be urgently relocated due to a Central alternate committee member committing suicide by jumping from Jingxi Guesthouse. This sudden change, in combination with rigorous security measures during the meeting, suggests that unexpected events may have occurred during the plenum.
Moreover, the most serious issue is the “incomplete and insufficient” state of the core CPC institutions. With only Zhang Shengmin promoted to the Central Military Commission, the total members are still incomplete; vacancies in the Political Bureau and Central Committee have not been filled, with nearly 20% of the Central Committee running under capacity, an unusual phenomenon since the start of reform and openness. The actual attendance at the Central Committee was only 168 members, with an attendance rate of about 82%, the lowest since 1992.
Chen analyzed that absentees, apart from a few individuals publicly fallen from power or deceased, include a considerable number of high-ranking officials who are “under review” but have not been publicly dealt with, indicating the breadth of the anti-corruption campaign.
The sole personnel change was Zhang Shengmin’s promotion, also reflecting the reality of power balance. Chen believed that Zhang Shengmin’s failure to simultaneously ascend to the Political Bureau reflects the top-level resistance and opposition to the proposal, showing that Xi Jinping’s decision-making power is no longer absolute. Furthermore, the personnel realignment between the Organization Department and the United Front Work Department by Li Ganjie and Shi Taifeng before the plenum is seen as a sign of the sidelining of personnel authority and balancing of power towards non-confidant factions.
In conclusion, Chen assessed: “Although Xi Jinping retains three positions, in practice, he has already lost decision-making power, especially in personnel decisions. The beginning of the third term already shows signs of ‘serious limping’.”
Canadian independent commentator Gongzi Shen analyzed the deeper crisis revealed by the Fourth Plenum from a more macro perspective. He believed that this personnel purge reflected Xi Jinping’s shift of focus from political struggles to the elimination of “incompetent” or “disobedient” individuals. However, such actions are destabilizing the foundation of the regime.
Unlike past political ideological struggles, this purge seems more like a “door-cleaning” exercise. As political opponents and “patrons” have been eliminated, officials who are promoted and later deemed “incompetent”, “neglectful”, “corrupt”, or “hypocritical” are seen as “disobedient.” After the political struggles end, competence and loyalty are elevated to higher positions. However, this sustained purge is leading to grave consequences.
“Although top-level power seems secure, capable individuals are becoming increasingly scarce in middle and grassroots levels,” Gongzi Shen emphasized. “It is becoming increasingly difficult to trust lower-level officials. These officials show loyalty on the surface but harbor discontent privately due to economic setbacks, deteriorating relations with the West, corruption risks, etc., towards key policies.” This “two-faced” behavior has led to a decrease in the number of Central Committee members, reflecting the “disappointment and anger” at the top level, necessitating ongoing “replacement” and “purges” to maintain control.
Gongzi Shen concluded that this situation resembles the logic of activating the Cultural Revolution to cleanse the bureaucratic system during Mao Zedong’s era, indicating that the regime is on the brink of collapse. He predicted: “Internal and external troubles will intensify in the next 5 to 10 years, and China will face a significant political and economic crisis.” While the “Fifteenth Five-Year Plan” emphasized a return to “focusing on economic development”, the core remains on “stability maintenance”, with all propaganda and slogans of “rejuvenation” essentially serving as a deceiving cover-up to “strengthen political stability”.