【Epoch Times October 22, 2025 News】The cleaning up of half of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission, is it disloyalty or corruption? From Mao Zedong’s Yan’an cave dwellings to Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, the notion of CCP’s “self-revolution” can no longer hold water.
On the afternoon of October 17th, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense’s spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang announced the long-rumored decision regarding nine senior Chinese Communist generals, stating that they have been subject to investigation and review approved by the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission. These individuals include members of the Central Political Bureau, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission He Weidong, member of the Central Military Commission and former head of the Political Work Department Miao Hua, former Executive Vice Chairman of the Political Work Department He Hongjun, former Executive Vice Chairman of the Joint Operations Command Center Wang Xiubin, former Commander of the Eastern Theater Lin Xiangyang, former Political Commissar of the Army Qin Shutong, former Political Commissar of the Navy Yuan Huazhi, former Commander of the Rocket Force Wang Houbin, and former Commander of the Armed Police Force Wang Chunning.
What are the charges against them? The Ministry of National Defense spokesperson stated that these nine individuals “seriously violated the party discipline, are suspected of serious crimes in their duties, with a particularly large amount, extremely serious in nature, and having extremely negative influence.”
On the following day, the People’s Liberation Army Daily published an editorial providing more information. The editorial stated that their corruption issue is a fermentative variation of the toxic influence of former vice chairmen of the military commission, Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. Clearly, corruption is one reason, but likely not the main or genuine reason. Among the listed charges in the editorial, “betraying their original missions, losing party principles, collapsing beliefs, and seriously failing the trust of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission” could be descriptions of the root of corruption, or perhaps political errors, but “disloyalty, seriously undermining the party’s command of the gun principle, and the principle of the chairman’s responsibilities of the military commission” can only be political offenses and not directly linked to corruption.
Who are these people? They are all senior generals personally promoted by Xi Jinping. Of these, the largest single source is five individuals from the 31st Group Army stationed in Fujian, including Miao Hua and Lin Xiangyang who had direct interactions with Xi Jinping during their time in Fujian, considered to be the main force of Xi Jinping’s Minjiang New Army. Furthermore, although He Weidong, Wang Xiubin, and Qin Shutong only served in this group army after Xi Jinping left Fujian, the 31st Group Army is considered as the only military unit belonging to Xi Jinping’s direct lineage, thus falling under the scope of the Minjiang New Army.
As Xi Jinping never served in the military and lacked a military background, this is the only force that can be regarded as his direct lineage. Even if they didn’t previously work together in Fujian, at the level of military commission members and theater commanders, Xi Jinping had direct personal relationships with them.
The claim of seriously disrupting the principle of the party’s command of the gun and the chairman’s responsibility system, in reality, is a faction attempting military coup. However, in the history of the CCP, the military has only participated in but not led coups, as the principle and practice of the party’s command of the gun have never changed. The Zunyi Conference wasn’t considered a coup, mostly Mao Zedong persuading Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang, and through a Politburo expanded meeting, abolished the position of General Secretary held by Bo Gu and replaced it with Zhang Wentian, conforming to the party’s internal organizational procedures.
The arrest of the Gang of Four could be seen as a coup, with four individuals including Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Hongwen, and Politburo members Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan, without going through any organizational procedures. Several people discussed and then had the Central Security Bureau under the direction of the Director of the General Office Wang Dongxing execute the arrest. Of course, in extraordinary times, extraordinary means are necessary, but the nature of the event was indeed a coup. The army was not the main force behind the coup, strictly speaking, it was not led by the military, even though the Central Security Bureau was part of the military organization, command authority rested with the General Office, making it a political decision rather than a military-initiated coup.
As for this latest purge, could it be a group opposing Xi Jinping? In fact, even if these individuals were removed due to political disloyalty or formed a faction, it is unlikely they plotted against Xi Jinping. This group of people were primarily from the 31st Group Army in Fujian, considered the only unit loyal to Xi Jinping. Any group is formed to gain more power and benefits, and this group, considered a faction, is unlikely to gain more power and benefits than those loyal to Xi Jinping. Factions require leaders, and military personnel cannot become national leaders, especially in China, so what else could be more advantageous for these individuals than Xi Jinping as the party leader?
Another possibility is that they were purged due to corruption, as Xi Jinping sought to appear just. However, corruption within the military is widespread, and if the aim was genuine cleansing, it should have been done evenly, rather than targeting only his trusted confidants. If indeed these individuals were extremely corrupt, it only shows that their corruption relied on Xi Jinping’s power, meaning that Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign not only failed but also led to new corruption through his personal power.
Regarding the toxic influence left by Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, their ousting was over a decade ago. Since the 18th Party Congress, all anti-corruption activities, including the removal and eradication of Guo and Xu’s influence, were carried out under the guidance of Xi Jinping’s ideology, with Xi personally directing. If after over a decade the toxic influence was not eradicated, it suggests that Xi Jinping not only failed in fighting corruption but also proved ineffective in eradicating it.
More broadly, if Xi Jinping couldn’t lead the distinctive anti-corruption campaign during his rule, it raises doubts about his effectiveness in overseeing broader areas. Once a person becomes the General Secretary, they naturally become an all-powerful expert and leader, which is quite unreasonable.
In this light, among the various possibilities presented, the excision of Xi Jinping’s military system seems the most logical explanation. When half of a country’s military commission is labeled as corrupt, as well as the leaders of various military branches, it indicates a system failure.
As the Chairman of the Central Military Commission and possessing real power—without a figurehead controlling from behind the scenes—the Chairman of the Military Commission evidently bears direct responsibility for not knowing what the generals he promoted were up to, or for allowing them to engage in misconduct amid his anti-corruption efforts. This is a characteristic of personal tyranny—holding absolute power but also clear and untransferable responsibility.
On a deeper level, the illusion that the CCP can self-purify has been shattered. In Yan’an and Huang Yanpei’s famous cave dwellings, Mao Zedong initially proposed that the CCP could break the cyclical laws of dynastic corruption, where every few hundred years corruption led to regime change, and believed he found the answer, which was democracy. However, after coming to power, Mao believed there were other ways to prevent corruption, namely through continuous revolution. The experiment ended in resounding failure during the Cultural Revolution. Even though Mao himself was rehabilitated posthumously, his theory of continuing revolution was thoroughly denounced at the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP.
Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign could be seen as the final attempt of the CCP. Rather than proving the determination and intensity of the CCP’s anti-corruption measures, this military cleansing demonstrates the thorough failure of the anti-corruption efforts. If these senior generals were indeed removed due to corruption, it illustrates that new power will inevitably lead to new corruption, or that the speed at which corruption arises far surpasses that of governance.
Hence, another falsehood of the CCP, that it can solve its internal corruption issues, has been completely debunked. Structurally, the CCP has no hope left.