Before the convening of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee, a major military personnel shake-up in Beijing took place, with 9 top generals officially under investigation and another 4 generals reported to have been dismissed. This unprecedented “earthquake in the military” not only revealed the drastic power dynamics at the top levels of the CCP but also triggered deep concerns about Taiwan Strait policy and military restructuring.
The announcement by the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China regarding the handling of 9 top generals including Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission He Weidong and former director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission Miao Hua accused them of serious crimes related to their duties, with the amounts involved described as “especially large,” leading to their expulsion from the Party and the military.
The 9 individuals who were subjected to disciplinary actions include He Weidong, Miao Hua, He Hongjun (Executive Deputy Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission), Wang Xiubin (Executive Deputy Director of the Joint Operations Command Center of the Military Commission), Lin Xiangyang (Commander of the Eastern Theater Command), Qin Shutong (Army Political Commissar), Yuan Huazhi (Navy Political Commissar), Wang Houbin (Commander of the Rocket Force), and Wang Chunning (Commander of the People’s Armed Police Force). Except for Wang Houbin, the other 8 are all members of the 20th Central Committee.
It’s worth noting that the identities of the individuals who have been disciplined are quite significant. Independent analyst Cai Shunkun revealed on October 18 that in addition to the 9 generals already announced, 4 more generals were removed from their positions, including Minister of Equipment Development Xu Xueqiang, Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department Xu Qiling, Rocket Force Political Commissar Xu Xisheng, National Defense University President Xiao Tianliang, along with 9 major generals and 15 brigadier generals being removed.
Cai Shunkun pointed out that there are still hundreds of generals undergoing review, indicating that the scale of this adjustment far exceeds the publicly announced scope.
Most of these disciplined officers were promoted or handpicked by Xi Jinping, with figures like He Weidong, Miao Hua, and Lin Xiangyang having origins in the Fujian 31st Group Army where Xi Jinping was stationed in the early years. This background of personnel has sparked various speculations about the nature of these events.
As for the decision-makers behind this military personnel adjustment, there are differing analyses from various experts.
Cai Shunkun stated to the media that this adjustment was led by Xi Jinping. He emphasized that “without his approval, no officer could have been disciplined.” He sees this as Xi Jinping’s “self-amputating” move, as these disciplined individuals had posed a significant challenge to his ultimate authority within the military.
Cai Shunkun revealed that within the military, the charges against Miao Hua and others were classified as “anti-party cliques” rather than corruption issues, demonstrating the political nature of the event. He insisted that despite the massive scale of this adjustment, “the Fourth Plenum is still under his full control, and no one can pose a threat or challenge to him.”
On the other hand, Chinese affairs expert Wang He holds a different view. He informed the media that the disciplined individuals were all “senior officers and leaders with substantial power,” and their removal involves not only corruption issues but also “political stance problems.”
He judged this as a purge of anti-Xi forces against Xi Jinping’s military influence, indicating that Xi Jinping’s influence within the military has been significantly weakened.
For Wang He, the People’s Liberation Army Daily’s editorial about maintaining a “high degree of consistency with the Xi core” is actually a diversionary tactic to maintain surface harmony. He believes that the current internal chaos and contradictions within the CCP reflect a state of “internal disintegration” within the party.
The host of the Military Aerospace Channel “Marking Time and Space” offered a third analysis perspective. In his view, it is difficult to determine whether this is an “initiative move” by Xi Jinping or a “forced decision,” but clues can be found in his political goals and institutional challenges.
Mark believes that the relationship between the disciplined officials and Xi is not based on traditional “personal trust” but rather on “interest relations.” He pointed out that since Xi Jinping lacks the comradery base like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, the personnel he promotes are essentially products of quid pro quo agreements rather than deep-seated personal trust.
In order to deeply analyze the background of this military personnel adjustment, one needs to understand the underlying power structure issues within the Chinese Communist Party system.
Mark’s analysis highlights the deep contradictions between Xi Jinping’s power goals and the realities within the party and the military. In terms of internal governance, the tension between “upholding the party” and the constraints of the private economy forces present an irreconcilable conflict. Since the start of the reform and opening up policy, the development of the private economy has given rise to influential groups of entrepreneurs who challenge the CCP’s political system. The trend of “the state advances, the private sector retreats” has been present since Hu Jintao’s second term, and Xi Jinping has further strengthened this policy after assuming power to safeguard the party’s power base.
In terms of the internal military dynamics, Mark observes that all promoted officers have climbed the ranks benefiting from China’s economic development, thus inevitably engaging in power-money exchanges, implying that “they all have stains in reality.” This suggests that anti-corruption investigations on any official are technically feasible, but the key lies in whether the highest power deems it necessary. This understanding of official corruption confers a high degree of selectivity and flexibility to power adjustments.
Cai Shunkun’s analysis underscores the specific forms of power threats. He indicated that the influence of individuals like Miao Hua and He Weidong in the military directly challenges the highest authority. According to his information, everyone around Zhang Yuxia has been replaced, their words and actions are under strict monitoring by the highest level, and even approving the appointment or dismissal of a lieutenant colonel requires authorization.
The impact of this military personnel adjustment on the Taiwan Strait situation is a crucial issue of concern for experts.
Regarding the direction of Taiwan policy, Cai Shunkun believes that after experiences like constitutional amendments and reelection, Xi Jinping would not easily resort to military force against Taiwan. He pointed out that “the main goal of military reform is centralization rather than decentralization,” and Xi Jinping lacks the capability or confidence to initiate military action against Taiwan due to the numerous uncertainties involved.
From a personal interest perspective, Mark analyzed the constraints on military actions. He believes that the disciplined military officers, although promoted by Xi Jinping, have their own commercial interests, personal futures, overseas assets, and the future of their children. Engaging in military conflict with the United States would result in international sanctions for them, hence they generally do not support military actions against Taiwan. Mark emphasized that these individuals are not willing to be deeply tied to the Chinese Communist regime, imposing internal constraints against attacking Taiwan.
Mark emphasized the professional value of the disciplined military leaders. Individuals like He Weidong are technical bureaucrats who play crucial roles in command during military operations. Therefore, their removal would have a substantial impact on the cross-strait situation. He believes that removing these technical bureaucrats would weaken the military capabilities against Taiwan on a technical level.