The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has officially announced that the Fourth Plenary Session will be held in Beijing from October 20th to 23rd. A large number of senior officials from the party, government, and military have encountered incidents or gone missing, especially as the internal personnel situation within the military continues to attract international attention. Many of the missing military leaders are known to be close to Xi Jinping, and the unprecedented “double disruption” in both political and military aspects within the military has raised concerns among observers.
Since the 20th National Congress, there has been ongoing turmoil at the top levels of the CCP, with scandals of corruption unfolding one after another. Some individuals have been purged, positions left vacant, and high-ranking officials have gone “missing,” leading to a state of abnormality where vacancies and replacements occur simultaneously. This is not just a series of isolated incidents but a systemic collapse.
Over the past two years, there has been a spate of high-level officials falling from grace and mysteriously disappearing, particularly concentrated in the two core powers of diplomacy and military. What is even more concerning is not just the ousting of these individuals but the selective logic and delays in “replacements” that follow. The speed of replacements and whether they belong to Xi Jinping’s inner circle show a clear inverse correlation. Figures like Qin Gang, Li Shangfu, and He Weidong, considered members of Xi’s faction, have seen their position changes significantly delayed, unlike others such as Liu Jianchao, who was replaced within two months of rumors surfacing. This selective handling of personnel decisions has become a fundamental manifestation of the crisis of power.
It is particularly crucial to pay attention to the rare phenomenon of “double disruption” in both political and military aspects within the military, leading to a near-paralysis of the military commission power structure.
Following the downfall of Miao Hua, the crucial position of “Political Work Department Director” within the military has long been vacant. This vacancy not only signifies a personnel gap but also indicates the loss of the central command for organizational political leadership within the CCP’s military. Vice Chairman of the Military Commission He Weidong has disappeared from public view since March 2025 without any formal announcement.
In this power vacuum, the sole remaining Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, Zhang Youxia, stands alone to support the entire structure. However, this concentration of power in one individual, while appearing stable, harbors potential dangers: should Zhang Youxia undergo changes due to health, political, or trust issues, the military commission structure is at risk of instantaneous collapse, leaving the entire military command system without a successor. This highlights a fatal flaw in the “concentration of power in one leader” political system.
On October 2nd, veteran Japanese media personality Nakazawa Keiji wrote in the “Nikkei Asia” that the upcoming meeting would be held amidst chaos in the CCP military. Many senior military officers have mysteriously disappeared, vanished from the public eye, and are missing. These missing officers are mostly Xi Jinping’s confidants, and several military leaders have either gone “missing” or been dismissed, likely resulting in their absence from the Fourth Plenary Session.
On September 12th this year, Minister of the Central Military Commission Logistics Support Department Zhang Lin, Political Commissar of the Joint Logistics Support Force Gao Guanguang, former Political Commissar of the Army in the Western Theater Command Wang Zhibin, and Commander of the Armed Police Force Wang Chunning were removed from the National People’s Congress.
At 62 years old, Wang Chunning was a key figure in Xi Jinping’s internal security system, having disappeared from the public eye since the “International Counterterrorism Forum” held in Beijing in August 2024.
Wang Chunning is believed to have had a close relationship with Miao Hua. Nakazawa Keiji’s article noted that both individuals originate from the former Nanjing Military Region, and their military connections are closely linked to Xi Jinping’s tenure in Fujian.
Many core members of Xi Jinping’s military faction come from the “31st Group Army,” a group that was stationed in Xiamen, Fujian, before being disbanded. With the cleansing of Miao Hua and the disappearance of He Weidong since March this year, along with the dismissal of other military officials closely associated with them, the power of the “31st Group Army” faction is now in crisis.
Nakazawa Keiji emphasized the importance of closely monitoring any key personnel changes announced at the Fourth Plenary Session, as these changes will significantly impact the future political landscape of the CCP.
Bloomberg reported on August 27th that since Xi Jinping took office in 2012, 14 senior military officers he promoted have either been investigated or directly disappeared, accounting for a high percentage of 17.7%. In contrast, in the administrations of the two previous leaders, no senior officers promoted by themselves were investigated. The report cited Nanyang Technological University scholar James Char, who highlighted that the ongoing purge of senior military officials indicates internal turmoil within the military and is likely to have negative consequences.
As Xi Jinping’s handpicked confidants continue to fall from grace, speculation is rife as to whether it is Xi himself cleaning house or if his faction is being targeted by political rivals within the Party.
Dr. Qin Jin, Chairman of the Democratic China Front, previously told Dajiyuan that he does not believe this is Xi’s so-called “self-revolution,” stating that, “Who would willingly cut off their left arm and right arm? The CCP operates in a black box, and the truth only comes to light in a sudden reveal. However, based on analysis, it is impossible for Xi Jinping, after consolidating power to such an extent, to then cut down his closest allies.”
In an article published by Taiwan’s “Up Media” on October 4th, independent commentator Du Zheng pointed out that individuals elevated by Xi Jinping have been falling from grace, directly undermining Xi’s authority. Some speculate that Xi is taking down his own people, while others argue that he is being coerced to remove them. Regardless of the circumstances, by the time of the Fourth Plenary Session, this situation will be a source of embarrassment for all members of the central leadership, presenting a significant challenge to Xi’s leadership.
These recent developments within the Chinese military have raised concerns both domestically and internationally, and the outcome of the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session may determine the direction of the CCP’s future political landscape.