The Chinese Communist Party will convene the Fourth Plenary Session in October. Prior to the Fourth Plenary Session, rumors about high-level personnel changes within the CCP have been swirling both domestically and abroad. Why is this happening? One important reason is the chaotic selection and appointment of officials within the CCP since the 20th National Congress, with batches of senior party, government, and military officials being either dismissed, arrested, or disappeared, leading to a perplexing situation of personnel appointments.
Let’s take a brief look back at the chaotic selection of high-ranking officials in the CCP since the 20th National Congress in 2022.
The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP, formed after the 20th National Congress, is the most peculiar one in the 47-year history of reform and opening up since 1978.
Firstly, Xi Jinping’s “third term” as General Secretary of the CCP broke the convention of no more than two consecutive terms for a total of 44 years.
Secondly, most of the other six Standing Committee members apart from Xi have significant qualifications flaws. For example, the second-ranked member, Li Qiang, was Xi’s designated candidate for Prime Minister. Li Qiang has never held the top positions in the central and state committees, departments, bureaus, or offices, nor has he served as Vice Premier or State Councilor.
The main reason Xi chose Li Qiang is that he was Xi’s chief when Xi was the Party Secretary of Zhejiang.
Similarly, Ding Xuexiang, the designated Deputy Prime Minister candidate by Xi, has no experience as the top leader in provincial party and government positions, nor has he led other central and state agencies besides the General Office.
The crucial reason for Ding Xuexiang’s selection by Xi is his role as Xi’s chief in Shanghai and Zhongnanhai.
Hu Chunhua, a member of the 18th and 19th CCP Political Bureau, and former Vice Premier of the State Council, has worked in Tibet, Hebei, Inner Mongolia, and Guangdong, having both local and central working experience, and is only 59 years old. Following past conventions, Hu Chunhua would have been a suitable candidate for the 20th Standing Committee. However, Hu Chunhua did not even make it to the 20th Political Bureau.
The primary reason for Hu Chunhua’s marginalization is that he is not a trusted confidant of Xi.
Since the 20th National Congress, the Foreign Minister Qin Gang, who was personally promoted by Xi in an unconventional and rapid manner, has been in the spotlight.
From December 30, 2022, to March 12, 2023, in just over two months, Qin Gang achieved a “triple jump” from deputy ministerial level to full ministerial level and then to vice-national level.
On October 23, 2022, Qin Gang was “elected” as a member of the 20th Central Committee. Qin Gang became the first incumbent ambassador to be “elected” as a member of the Central Committee in the 47-year history of CCP’s reform and opening up.
On December 30 of the same year, Qin Gang was appointed as the Foreign Minister.
This appointment also broke with tradition. In March 2023, during the 14th National People’s Congress, where the government transitions, new heads of state ministries, including the Foreign Minister, are appointed. After being “elected” as a member of the 20th Central Committee, Qin Gang was expected to be appointed as the new Foreign Minister during the 14th NPC. However, Xi, with his special favor toward Qin Gang, hurriedly appointed him as the Foreign Minister more than two months ahead.
In March 2023, while Qin Gang was appointed as the Foreign Minister by the 14th NPC, he was also appointed as a State Councilor.
This appointment was also unconventional. Moving from the level of a full minister to vice-national level typically takes at least five years, but Qin Gang only took a little over two months.
According to the rules of the CCP officialdom, officials at the vice-national level belong to the “leadership of the Party and the state.”
By March 2023, the leadership transition of the new central leadership collective of the CCP was completed. At 56, Qin Gang became the youngest “leader of the Party and the state.”
The main reason for Qin Gang’s rapid promotion was his special recognition by Xi.
However, on June 26, 2023, just over three months after becoming the youngest “leader of the Party and the state,” Qin Gang suddenly “disappeared.” He was removed as Foreign Minister on July 25 of the same year, and then stripped of his position as a State Councilor on October 24.
Qin Gang became one of the shortest-serving Foreign Ministers and a State Councilor in the 76-year history of the CCP.
The reasons why Qin Gang was removed from his position remain undisclosed by the CCP to this day.
If Xi truly is “unconstrained in selecting talent,” appointing a new Foreign Minister after Qin Gang’s removal should not have been difficult. However, it turned out that the 70-year-old Wang Yi, who had served as Foreign Minister for nine years and had stepped down, was reinstated as the Foreign Minister.
Wang Yi’s reappointment should have been transitional, with the possibility of a new Foreign Minister being appointed at the Second Session of the 14th National People’s Congress in March 2024. Yet, as of today in 2025, Wang Yi remains the Foreign Minister.
Liu Jianchao, the Foreign Minister of the CCP who was highly anticipated as a new Foreign Minister candidate, was also in a similar situation.
However, on August 10, 2025, according to reports from The Wall Street Journal, Liu Jianchao was taken for questioning upon his return from a visit at the end of July and has been “missing” for a month and 18 days up until now. It is rumored that Liu Jianchao is involved in leaking secrets, infighting, and scandals.
Despite being removed as the Foreign Minister for over two years, a new Foreign Minister from the CCP has yet to be announced.
At the National People’s Congress in March 12, 2023, Li Shangfu was “elected” as the Minister of National Defense, a State Councilor, and a member of the National Military Commission.
However, on August 30, 2023, Li Shangfu, who had only been in office for just over five months, was put under “isolation review” by the military discipline committee, and he was dismissed from his positions as Minister of National Defense, State Councilor, and a member of the National Military Commission on October 24 of the same year.
Li Shangfu became one of the shortest-serving Ministers of National Defense and State Councilor in the 76-year history of the CCP.
On June 27, 2024, Xinhua News Agency reported that Li Shangfu was expelled from the Party and the military, stripped of his rank as a senior general, and transferred to the military procuratorate for investigation and prosecution.
On the same day, Xinhua News Agency also reported that Li Shangfu’s predecessor, Wei Fenghe, a member of the Central Military Commission, State Councilor, and Minister of National Defense, was also expelled from the Party and the military, stripped of his rank as a senior general, and transferred to the military procuratorate for investigation and prosecution.
The downfall of Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, two successive Ministers of National Defense personally promoted by Xi just before the Third Plenary Session of the 20th National Congress in October 2023, can be described as a “legend” in Xi’s personnel selection.
On December 29, 2023, former Navy Commander Dong Jun was appointed as the Minister of National Defense.
Dong Jun was recommended to Xi by Miao Hua, a member of the Central Military Commission and the Director of the Political Work Department when he was the Commander of the Eastern Theater Command.
In November 2024, Miao Hua was investigated for serious corruption issues.
Had Dong Jun provided money to Miao Hua? According to the unspoken rules of the CCP officialdom, this is quite possible.
Currently, the reason why the CCP allows Dong Jun to continue serving as Minister of National Defense is perhaps to save face, as all three of Xi’s personally appointed Ministers of National Defense—Wei Fenghe, Li Shangfu, and Dong Jun—all turned out to be the wrong choices. This embarrassment has led to a temporary arrangement to keep Dong Jun in place for the time being.
Before assuming the position of Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, He Weidong was not a delegate to the 20th National Congress, nor was he a member, alternate member, or a member of the Central Military Commission of the 19th Central Committee, he was just the Commander of the Eastern Theater Command.
However, Xi was convinced that He Weidong was a capable senior military figure who could assist him in achieving the “unification of Taiwan,” which was considered a “great achievement for generations.” Thus, he was promoted and appointed as a Central Committee member, a member of the Central Political Bureau, and the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission at the 20th National Congress.
He Weidong thus became Xi’s top confidant in the military.
The intention behind Xi’s promotion of He Weidong may have included three aspects: to assist Xi in the unification of Taiwan by force, to supervise Deputy Chairman of the Military Commission Zhang Yuxia, and to succeed Zhang Yuxia as Deputy Chairman of the Military Commission after Zhang Yuxia’s retirement.
However, on March 11, 2025, just two years and five months after taking office, He Weidong suddenly “disappeared” and has been missing for over half a year now.
Overseas rumors have suggested that He Weidong was taken away for investigation by the military discipline committee right after attending the closing meeting of the National People’s Congress on March 11.
Based on public reports both domestically and abroad, the news about He Weidong being taken away is considered reliable information.
The crux of the matter lies in how Xi, following the investigation and purge of high-ranking CCP officials promoted by Jiang Zemin during his tenure as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, such as Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, experiences a similar pattern with another member of the Political Bureau of the CCP and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission recommended and appointed by Xi personally in violation of norms, He Weidong. How did He Weidong end up in a situation similar to that of Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong?
But the story does not end there. There have been four Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission under Xi’s leadership—Fan Changlong, Xu Qiliang, Zhang Yuxia, and He Weidong. With He Weidong being taken away, Xu Qiliang’s sudden death, a situation deemed highly suspicious by many, Fan Changlong reportedly facing a similar fate with being taken for questioning.
As of now, only Zhang Yuxia remains among the four Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission under Xi’s leadership.
Having served as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission for 13 years, Xi has had four different office directors—Qin Shengxiang, Zhong Shaojun, Fang Yongxiang, and now He Weidong directs the Central Military Commission Office, serving as the director of Xi’s office since 2016.
On October 6, 2024, and July 29, 2025, there were two reports from overseas about Qin Shengxiang being taken away for investigation. On July 31, 2025, Qin Shengxiang was absent from the 98th anniversary celebration of the founding of the CCP, indicating that Qin Shengxiang was likely in trouble.
Qin Shengxiang was the first director of the Central Military Commission Office appointed by Xi since he became Chairman of the Central Military Commission and was the architect of the military reform in 2015. In August 2017, Qin Shengxiang succeeded Miao Hua as the Political Commissar of the Navy. During his five years as the Navy Political Commissar, Qin Shengxiang had many interactions with Miao Hua as the Director of the Political Work Department.
Miao Hua’s investigation might implicate Qin Shengxiang.
Zhong Shaojun, who has had the longest association with Xi and is considered one of Xi’s most trusted military confidants, has been serving Xi for 11 years from 2013 to 2024 in various capacities within the Central Military Commission Office, including as the Deputy Director, the Director, and also the Director of the Central Military Commission Chairman’s Office. Zhong also held roles such as the Director of the Central Military Commission Reform and Organization Office, the Director of the Central Military Commission Leading Group for Deepening National Defense and Military Reform Office, a member of the Military Election Committee, and a member of the 20th Central Committee.
Zhong Shaojun is Xi’s most significant confidant in the military ranks.
However, in April 2024, rumors emerged that Zhong Shaojun was reassigned from his position in the Central Military Commission Office to become the Political Commissar of the National Defense University.
On August 22, 2025, independent commentator Cai Shenkun disclosed that Zhong Shaojun had been removed from his position as the Political Commissar of the National Defense University. Then, on September 11, 2025, Cai Shenkun further revealed that Zhong Shaojun was not only removed as the Political Commissar of the National Defense University but also retired from active service and withdrew from political life.
If these revelations are indeed true, Zhong Shaojun may have been taken away for investigation by the military discipline committee.
Following Zhong Shaojun’s departure from the post in April 2024, Fang Yongxiang took over and has served as the Director of the Central Military Commission Office and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission Office for a year and five months now.
However, from August 20 onwards until now, Fang Yongxiang has been absent three times from events where Xi met with military personnel. There have been rampant speculations that Fang Yongxiang may have run into trouble.
Fang Yongxiang was recommended and appointed by Miao Hua. Fang Yongxiang’s “disappearance” may be related to the case involving Miao Hua.
Xi has placed a strong emphasis on “political reforms” since coming to power, aiming to make senior military officials “politically loyal” to him.
Who did Xi rely on to carry out these “political reforms”? Initially, he relied on the General Political Department and later, after the 2015 military reforms, on the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission.
In his 13 years as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xi had appointed two key figures for “political reforms”: Zhang Yang (2012-2017) and Miao Hua (2017-2024).
Zhang Yang committed suicide on November 23, 2017. The CCP classified his death as “dying from fear of punishment.” Xinhua’s report on expelling his party and military memberships, and revoking his rank of senior general stated:
“After investigation, Zhang Yang seriously violated the Party’s political discipline and rules, organizational discipline, integrity discipline, and national laws and regulations, and is suspected of bribery, corruption, and serious crimes of possessing assets of unknown origin. The situation was very serious, with extremely negative effects.”
“Zhang Yang was disloyal and dishonest to the Party, playing both sides, being two-faced, undergoing political transformation, being greedy for wealth, leading a corrupt life, having poor conduct, and after the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, he did not correct his ways and continued to break the rules brazenly, eventually attempting to evade Party discipline and national law through suicide, severely damaging the Party and military causes, severely tarnishing military political work and the image of leadership cadres.”
In August 2018, Liu Yuan, the son of former CCP State Chairman Liu Shaoqi, revealed in an interview with “Political Matters” by Xin Jingbao: “Zhang Yang’s problems were more severe than those of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. Zhang Yang was involved in criminal cases involving huge amounts of money; as the Director of the Political Department, he had all the vices.”
In August 2017, Xi promoted and trusted Miao Hua as the Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, making him a member of the Central Military Commission the same year. At the 2022 20th National Congress of the CCP, Xi allowed Miao Hua to continue as a member of the Central Military Commission and the Director of the Political Work Department.
From August 2017 to November 2024, for seven years, Miao Hua served as Xi’s overall director for “political reforms.”
However, in November 2017, Miao Hua was brought down for investigation. On March 14, 2025, due to suspected serious violations of discipline and the law, Miao Hua was relieved of his role as a representative to the National People’s Congress. By the end of May of the same year, the official website of the Ministry of National Defense removed Miao Hua from the list of Central Military Commission members, indicating that Miao Hua had been dismissed from the position as a member of the Central Military Commission of the CCP. On June 27 of the same year, Miao Hua was removed from his role as a member of the National Military Commission by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.
Miao Hua, who was considered Xi’s second confidant in the military, became one of Xi’s severe corrupt officials within just two years of the closure of the 20th National Congress.
Xi emphasizes “absolute loyalty.” Looking at the case of He Weidong, Miao Hua, and other severely corrupt figures appointed by Xi, who would truly feel “absolutely loyal” to Xi?
Xi once said, “Corruption of officials is the most significant form of corruption.”
From the selection of He Weidong, Miao Hua, and other severely corrupt officials, it is clear that Xi’s statement has substantial merit.
From the Political Bureau Standing Committee to the role of the Central Party School Principal, Xi has indeed broken many norms in the selection and appointment of key officials, but all decisions have been based on personal preferences, likes, dislikes, and imaginations of Xi. All the high-ranking officials selected and appointed by Xi were not chosen based on their virtues and talents but based on whether they were “Xi’s people.” In practice, this kind of personnel selection by Xi has not only failed to gain respect but has also caused a global exposure of Xi’s “wrong judgment, improper selection, and mismanagement” as these officials tumbled down like dominoes, severely damaging Xi’s reputation.
Xi repeatedly emphasizes “absolute loyalty.” However, looking at the selection and appointment of officials like Qin Gang, Li Shangfu, Wei Fenghe, He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others by Xi, who among them would truly offer heartfelt “absolute loyalty” to Xi?
Xi also said, “Corruption of officials is the most significant form of corruption.”
Looking at the corrupt officials appointed by Xi, such as He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others, these words indeed ring true.
Summing