The Chinese Communist Party has confirmed the date of the Fourth Plenary Session, with attention focused on Xi’s tenure.

Against the backdrop of escalating internal strife within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the official date for the convening of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee has been set. Of greater concern to the public is the final outcomes of the handling of top-level forces purged during the CCP’s internal struggles and the political crisis facing party leader Xi Jinping.

According to reports from the CCP’s Xinhua News Agency, the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee was held on September 29th, deciding that the Fourth Plenary Session will be held in Beijing from October 20th to 23rd.

Hong Kong media outlet “Sing Tao Daily” reported on the 29th that General Miao Hua, the former Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission who was removed last November and stripped of his position as a member of the Central Military Commission, may have his charges announced soon, with the Fourth Plenary Session likely to confirm his expulsion from the party.

Furthermore, the expulsions of former People’s Liberation Army Aviation Force Commander Wang Chunning and former Logistics Support Department Minister of the Central Military Commission, Lieutenant General Zhang Lin, from the party are also expected to be confirmed during the Fourth Plenary Session.

Commentator Yue Shan told Epoch Times that the Fourth Plenary Session declared by the CCP to review the “Fifteenth Five-Year Plan Recommendations” is merely a formality and a distraction used by the authorities to mask the political crisis. The real focus should be on the developments of the CCP’s internal struggles, including whether the final outcomes regarding Xi Jinping’s close associates will be announced before or after the meeting, and the impact on Xi Jinping’s own authority. For instance, the case of General Miao Hua’s expulsion has likely been predetermined, but the official wording regarding charges, expulsion from the party, stripping of military rank, would need to be scrutinized in comparison to previous cases like Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang.

Yue Shan mentioned that it is uncertain whether the case of He Weidong will be publicly addressed, as his prolonged disappearance differs from Miao Hua’s situation with multiple notifications. If He Weidong is not mentioned during the Fourth Plenary Session, it indicates that high-level power struggles within the CCP are ongoing, with the victor yet to be determined.

Moreover, other senior military officials may also be subject to notifications and handling, but given the extensive rumored list, not all names are likely to be disclosed. However, since they were all personally appointed by Xi Jinping, their fates will undoubtedly shake up the entire CCP political arena. It is also not surprising if Xi Jinping’s recent power struggles are indeed causing some turbulence.

Political commentator Chen Pokong previously stated to Epoch Times that there are several key points to watch for in the Fourth Plenary Session of the CCP. Firstly, whether Xi Jinping will relinquish one, two, or all three of his positions, and whether he will step down from the Political Bureau Standing Committee. One possible scenario is Xi relinquishing power without handing over his position entirely to maintain his prestige and vanity.

The second point to observe is the current Political Bureau consisting of 24 members lacking a female representative, and with the incident involving He Weidong resulting in another vacant spot, the appointment of new members will be discussed. Additionally, Xi’s close ally in the Political Bureau, Ma Xingrui, might also be facing trouble.

The third point is that the Central Military Commission of the CCP also needs replacements for vacant positions, as three out of seven seats are currently unoccupied.

The fourth point focuses on the State Council of the CCP, where two out of five State Councillors are missing, including vacancies in the positions of Foreign Minister and Minister of National Defense, which also need to be addressed.

Chen Pokong believes that while the Fourth Plenary Session may seem to discuss economic and social issues on the surface, the most significant problem lies in the personnel changes at the top level. An incomplete Political Bureau and Central Military Commission cannot be dragged into the “21st Congress.” The outcome of the reshuffling of high-level personnel, whether Xi Jinping chooses to “relinquish power and step down” or “relinquish power but stay in position,” will be a heavy blow to Xi either way.

Chen Pokong also mentioned that the fifth major point of the Fourth Plenary Session of the CCP is whether a successor to Xi Jinping will emerge, such as Ding Xuexiang, Hu Chunhua, or Chen Min’er. If such an arrangement is made, it implies that Xi will retire at the “21st Congress.” If no successor appears, it indicates that Xi Jinping still harbors ambitions and aims for long-term rule or behind-the-scenes influence. However, with Xi Jinping’s declining health and waning power, the likelihood of him staying in power for an extended period is diminishing significantly.