On September 23-25, Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping attended the 70th anniversary celebration of the establishment of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in Urumqi.
Xi was welcomed in a “warm” and “grand” manner similar to that of North Korea, perhaps he enjoyed it. However, behind the glossy scenes created by these people, there are many cold, harsh, and shocking truths.
Looking at the truth through the surface, I believe there are at least five suspicious aspects to Xi’s trip to Xinjiang this time:
Normally, it is a legitimate thing for a central delegation led by the head to go to Urumqi to participate in the 70th anniversary celebration of the establishment of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.
Xi is not the head of the central delegation, but he led the central delegation to Xinjiang, which is not right. At the celebration in Xinjiang, Xi, who led the central delegation, did not give a speech, instead, he sat and listened to Wang Huning, the head of the central delegation, give a speech. Who is the “boss” at this event?
In the footage from CCTV, during the visit to the exhibition commemorating the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, there were several instances where Xi was speaking, and Wang Huning, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and Cai Qi, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Director of the General Office of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, were standing with their hands behind their backs.
This situation is very rare in similar past occasions.
The CCP has pushed the traditional “officialdom” to the extreme. In the officialdom of the CCP, there is a saying “an official one level higher can crush people to death.” In the CCP system, subordinates often behave very respectfully in front of their superiors, sometimes even appearing extremely humble and fearful. When the superiors speak, the subordinates either hang their hands or clasp their hands in front of their chest to show respect for their superiors.
When Xi became the “core leader,” designated as “the one and only,” and pursued “three terms in office,” Wang Huning and Cai Qi were always very cautious and respectful in front of Xi, never seen standing with their hands behind their backs listening to Xi speak.
On Xi’s trip to Xinjiang this time, Wang Huning and Cai Qi were seen multiple times with their hands behind their backs in front of the CCTV cameras and Xinhua News Agency journalists, not taking the “people’s leader” seriously. This unusual behavior is thought-provoking. Why?
Xi has always been learning from Mao Zedong, wanting to be the second Mao. Mao, who held great power, had almost no interest in events like celebrations, delegating them to others. Deng Xiaoping, who also held great power, was even less interested in such events and preferred to play a few rounds of bridge at home instead.
Today in 2025, nearly three years into Xi’s “three terms in office,” if Xi truly held great power, whether it was for the celebration in Xinjiang or Tibet, it would have been enough to send a representative, there was no need for him to make a personal trip. Xi visited Tibet in August and Xinjiang in September, which was completely unnecessary.
What does this indicate? It shows that Xi is neither as powerful as Mao nor as Deng. On the contrary, Xi is trying to show that he is the true “top leader” through this rushed approach, but in the end, he is just being clumsy.
On the afternoon of September 23, Xi met with military officers of the rank of colonel and above stationed in Urumqi.
The CCTV footage showed that during the group photo, Xi was seated on the left side with Liu Zhenli, a member of the Central Military Commission and Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department; and on the right side was Wen Dong, the former commander of the Airborne Corps. Wen Dong now holds the rank of Major General in the Army, indicating that he has been transferred to a key position in the Xinjiang Military Region. Sitting on the left side of Liu Zhenli was Qiu Yang, Vice Director of the Office of the Central Military Commission.
During this meeting, three senior generals were absent: Fang Yongxiang, Vice Director of the Office of the Central Military Commission and Director of the Office of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission; Liu Lin, Commander of the Xinjiang Military Region; and Yang Cheng, the Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Military Region.
Since August, Fang Yongxiang has been absent from three meetings where Xi met with military officers. It is speculated that Fang Yongxiang may be under investigation due to a serious corruption case involving Miao Hua, a member of the Central Military Commission and Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission.
Fang Yongxiang is a key figure in Xi’s military, considered one of the most important confidants.
It is rumored that Qin Shengxiang, Xi’s first confidant after he became Chairman of the Military Commission, has been investigated; Zhong Shaojun, Xi’s second confidant after he became Chairman of the Military Commission, has been “disappeared”; if Fang Yongxiang, Xi’s third confidant after he became Chairman of the Military Commission, is really under investigation, it will be another heavy blow to Xi.
Yang Cheng is a former subordinate of Miao Hua. He was transferred from the Lanzhou Military Region to the Eastern Theater Command, then served as Deputy Political Commissar of the Armed Police Force, later appointed as Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Military Region, became a member of the Xinjiang Party Committee, and was “elected” as a member of the 20th Central Committee, all under the supervision of Miao Hua.
Now, with Miao Hua under investigation, as well as the Commander of the Armed Police Force Wang Chun-ning and the Political Commissar Zhang Hongbing rumored to be under investigation, Yang Cheng may also be involved in the case related to Miao Hua.
Liu Lin has served in the Xinjiang Military Region for a long time. He was appointed as the Commander of the Southern Xinjiang Military Region, promoted to Major General, and then became the Commander of the Xinjiang Military Region, all under the supervision of Miao Hua. It is possible that Liu Lin is also involved in the case related to Miao Hua.
On August 20, when Xi met with military officers of the rank of colonel and above stationed in Lhasa, the Commander of the Tibet Military Region, Wang Kai, was absent. There are suspicions that Wang Kai may have encountered some issues.
Xi visited Tibet in August and Xinjiang in September. While the two events seemed normal on the surface, they actually exposed the internal struggles within the Chinese Communist Party’s military leadership.
During Xi’s trip to Xinjiang this time, no Vice Chairman of the Military Commission accompanied him.
As early as March 20 this year, when Xi met with military officers of the rank of colonel and above stationed in Kunming, there was no Vice Chairman of the Military Commission accompanying him.
From 2022 to the beginning of 2025, whenever Xi inspected the troops, if he was not in Beijing, at least one Vice Chairman of the Military Commission would accompany him, or one Vice Chairman of the Military Commission would rush there to accompany him on the same day to highlight Xi’s important status. The custom was that two Vice Chairmen of the Military Commission would rotate to accompany him, one time for one and the other for the next. For example:
– On January 24, 2025, when Xi visited the Northern Theater Command, Zhang Yuxia accompanied him.
– On December 20, 2024, when Xi inspected the troops stationed in Macao, He Weidong accompanied him; on December 4, 2024, when Xi inspected the Beijing Information Support Force, Zhang Yuxia and He Weidong accompanied him; on November 4, 2024, when Xi inspected the Hubei Airborne Brigade, He Weidong accompanied him; on October 17, 2024, when Xi inspected a rocket force in Anhui, Zhang Yuxia rushed from Beijing to accompany him; on September 12, 2024, when Xi met with military officers of the rank of colonel and above stationed in Lanzhou, He Weidong accompanied him; on May 23, 2024, when Xi met with military officers of the rank of colonel and above stationed in Jinan, Zhang Yuxia accompanied him; on April 23, 2024, when Xi inspected the Army Medical University in Chongqing, He Weidong accompanied him; on March 20, 2024, when Xi met with military officers of the rank of colonel and above stationed in Changsha, Zhang Yuxia accompanied him; on February 2, 2024, when Xi inspected the troops stationed in Tianjin, He Weidong accompanied him.
– On November 29, 2023, when Xi inspected the Coast Guard Headquarters of the Armed Police, He Weidong accompanied him; on September 10, 2023, when Xi inspected the 78th Group Army, Zhang Yuxia accompanied him; on July 30, 2023, when Xi inspected the Air Force of the Western Theater Command, He Weidong accompanied him…
– On August 17, 2022, when Xi met with military officers of the rank of colonel and above stationed in Shenyang, Zhang Yuxia accompanied him; on July 15, 2022, when Xi met with representatives of the troops stationed in Urumqi, Zhang Yuxia accompanied him; on July 1, 2022, when Xi met with representatives of the troops stationed in Hong Kong, Xu Qiliang accompanied him; on June 9, 2022, when Xi met with military officers of the rank of colonel and above stationed in Chengdu, Xu Qiliang accompanied him.
Since Xi’s first close confidant, He Weidong, a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, was reported to have been taken away by the Military Discipline Inspection Commission for investigation in March this year, the specifications of Xi’s inspections of the troops have visibly decreased.
On August 20, when Xi met with military officers of the rank of colonel and above stationed in Lhasa, not a single Vice Chairman of the Military Commission accompanied him.
On September 3, when Xi held the military parade in Beijing, the generals accompanying him were downgraded from senior to major generals.
During Xi’s trip to Xinjiang this time, Ma Xingrui, Xi’s close confidant and former Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, did not accompany him.
On July 1, Ma Xingrui was suddenly removed from the position of Party Secretary of Xinjiang, and the official statement said he was “reassigned” but his new position has not been announced to date. It is rumored that Ma Xingrui has taken up a new position with the “Central Rural Work Leading Group.” In other words, Ma Xingrui has stepped down to a secondary position, on minor duties, heading into retirement.
Ma Xingrui is considered one of Xi’s important confidants. Ma Xingrui’s family has a close relationship with Xi’s wife, Peng Liyuan.
Since Xi took office in 2012, a group of technocrats from the military-industrial system has been brought in. Ma Xingrui was one of them.
Under Xi’s arrangement, Ma Xingrui has had experience working in central ministries, serving as a Deputy Minister of Industry and Information Technology, Director of the National Space Administration, Director of the China Atomic Energy Authority, Director of the National Defense Science and Technology Industrial Bureau, etc., since March 2013; as well as experience in developed provinces and cities along the coast, serving as Deputy Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the Provincial Party Committee, Party Secretary of Shenzhen, and Governor of Guangdong Province starting in November 2013; and in December 2021, Xi transferred Ma Xingrui from the southeast coast to the northwest border, replacing Chen Quanguo as Party Secretary of Xinjiang. Ma Xingrui thereby gained experience as a senior official in the western border region. In October of the same year, Xi promoted and trusted Ma Xingrui as a member of the 20th Politburo of the Communist Party of China.
If there are no surprises, Ma Xingrui might become a member of the Politburo Standing Committee at the 21st National Congress of the Communist Party of China.
However, an unexpected event occurred, as Ma Xingrui served as Party Secretary of Xinjiang for only three and a half years before being suddenly “removed”; the reasons may be related to corruption cases in the military-industrial system, or cases involving his family members.
In 2023 and 2024, with the outbreak of major cases in the rocket force, a group of senior officials from the equipment development department of the Central Military Commission fell from power, followed by a series of senior officials from military-industrial enterprises being arrested or “disappeared.” Ma Xingrui, who worked in the military-industrial system for 17 years, had intersections with many senior military-industrial officials who were arrested or “disappeared.”
Additionally, rumors from overseas sources have revealed that Ma Xingrui’s wife, Rong Li, was taken away by the Discipline Inspection Commission on July 5, 2025. During Ma Xingrui’s tenure in Guangdong, Shenzhen, and Xinjiang, Rong Li allegedly used the name of her close friend Peng Liyuan to engage in profitable activities.
Independent commentator Cai Shengkun also disclosed that Ma Xingrui is currently assisting the Discipline Inspection Commission in investigating his wife, Rong Li.
As a significant confidant of Xi, the senior official guarding Xinjiang, Ma Xingrui’s sudden removal midway is a great blow, not to Ma Xingrui, but to Xi Jinping.
Xi persists in seeking “three terms in office” at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. During this process, Xi promoted and trusted a group of confidants. But just half a year after the end of the 20th National Congress, starting with Foreign Minister Qin Gang, Xi’s confidants have fallen one after another, which is like a series of slaps in the face to Xi. The most resounding slap in the face was the downfall of the member of the Politburo of the Communist Party and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, He Weidong, who was promoted and trusted by Xi personally and unusually. Shortly after He Weidong’s fall, Ma Xingrui, Party Secretary of Xinjiang, was removed from office; Xi’s face was once again marked with a red imprint.
The fact that Xi did not bring Ma Xingrui on his trip to Xinjiang indicates that Ma Xingrui’s career has come to an end, and it is best for him to “retire peacefully,” but it could also be possible for him to follow in the footsteps of He Weidong.
The removal of Ma Xingrui, who Xi personally promoted and trusted as the Party Secretary of Xinjiang, has dealt a blow not only to Ma Xingrui but more importantly to Xi Jinping.
Xi’s visit to Xinjiang has once again focused the international community’s attention on human rights issues in Xinjiang. For Xi, this is an embarrassing situation.
In conclusion,
Considering the above, Xi’s trip to Xinjiang this time may not be so much about Xi demonstrating to the outside world that he still firmly holds power, but more about the fact that Xi’s power has already faded, and he is merely an actor playing his part in the scripted drama of being the titular leader in reality.