Xi Jinping’s visit to Xinjiang has exposed a shocking scene on CCTV – at the first sight seen by the national audience, it was actually a close-up shot of “Xi Jinping stepping down”! Is this a journalist’s accidental mistake, or a deliberate hint from the higher-ups?
At the same time, the Vice Chairman of the Military Commission was absent throughout the trip, and the Commander and Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Military Region both disappeared, with Xi Jinping’s meeting with the troops being significantly downgraded in terms of protocol. Do these series of abnormal signals indicate that Xi Jinping’s power is gradually being sidelined?
Today’s program will take you behind the scenes to observe the power struggle happening within the walls of Zhongnanhai.
On September 23rd, the leader of the CCP, Xi Jinping, led a central delegation to arrive in Urumqi, Xinjiang, to attend the celebration of the 70th anniversary of Xinjiang’s establishment on September 25th.
Xi Jinping’s trip this time coincided with the heightened internal cleansing and power struggles within the CCP. It was previously rumored that the personnel arrangements for the third and fourth members of the Fourth Plenary Session had been finalized, and Xi Jinping would step down at the Fourth Plenary Session, currently playing a temporary role. His experience in Xinjiang seems to be confirming this rumor.
In the footage released by CCTV, as Xi Jinping descended from the plane, the entire process was omitted except for the moment when he took the final step. A close-up shot captured a minority girl presenting flowers to Xi Jinping.
Following that were scenes of Xi Jinping shaking hands with local officials. Meanwhile, the Military Commission members accompanying him included only Liu Zhenli, with no Vice Chairman of the Military Commission present. This signifies Xi Jinping’s isolation within the military.
The Vice Chairmen of the Military Commission appointed during the 20th CCP National Congress include Zhang Youxia and He Wai Dong. He Wai Dong has been missing for half a year, with his current status unknown to the public. The disappearance of a Vice Chairman of the Military Commission for such a long time without any explanation indicates major events within the CCP military.
Previously, whenever Xi Jinping met with local troops, there would always be a Vice Chairman of the Military Commission present. During Xi Jinping’s visit to Xinjiang in July 2022, Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia was by his side when he met with representatives of the troops stationed there.
Regarding Xi Jinping’s visit to Xinjiang, which coincided with the grand celebration of Xinjiang’s 70th anniversary of autonomy, it seems unlikely that there was not a Vice Chairman of the Military Commission accompanying him. Xi Jinping’s travel companions, including Military Commission member Liu Zhenli, suggest a clear intention to closely monitor Xi Jinping’s actions.
Xinjiang, which was previously firmly under Xi Jinping’s control, has indeed experienced significant upheavals within the Xinjiang Military District.
According to a report by Xinhua, after Xi Jinping arrived in Urumqi on the afternoon of September 23, he met with leaders of the rank of colonel and above in the stationed troops and some soldiers, taking photos with them. However, the absence of the former Commander of the Xinjiang Military District, Major General Liu Lin, and the former political commissar Yang Cheng, is noticeable. This indicates that only colonels and major generals, with very low ranks, were present for Xi Jinping’s meeting with the Xinjiang Military District representatives.
Generally, the absence of senior CCP officials from important events is often seen as a precursor to an incident or as an indication that something has already occurred. The absence of the Commander and Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Military District during Xi Jinping’s meeting raises strong suspicions that something may have happened to them.
Before this, there was no official announcement from the CCP about any changes in the Commander and Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Military District. Last January, both individuals, still holding their positions as Commander and Political Commissar, participated in the 13th and 8th plenary session of the Xinjiang Military District Party Committee according to reports in the “Xinjiang Daily.”
Within 8 months, major personnel changes have occurred in the Xinjiang Military District without any official announcements. This situation is similar to the case of Vice Chairman of the Military Commission He Wai Dong. Over the past two years, many senior military officials have fallen from grace without any public notice from the CCP.
Attention is currently focused on the high-level personnel changes within the Xinjiang Military District, possibly related to the removal of former Party Secretary of Xinjiang Ma Xingrui.
Ma Xingrui was removed from his position as the Party Secretary of Xinjiang on July 1st, with the official reason being his “reassignment.” Over a month later, it was revealed that Ma Xingrui had joined the Central Rural Work Leading Group for work, but his new position has yet to be officially announced.
The sudden removal of Ma Xingrui and the absence of the top military leaders of the Xinjiang Military District during Xi Jinping’s meeting, coupled with Xi Jinping’s lack of a Vice Chairman of the Military Commission accompanying him, all suggest a growing possibility of Xi Jinping losing his military authority.
Let’s now touch on the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session.
In a previous episode, we quoted insider information shared with the media by “Xiaoshuojia” regarding possible personnel changes at the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session of the CCP, summarized as “three up, three down.” Those stepping down include Xi Jinping, Li Qiang, and Cai Qi, while those moving up are Wang Yang, Hu Chunhua, and Yin Li.
Some of the details provided by the insider have sparked discussions. For instance, Wang Yang taking on the role of General Secretary and Chairman of the Military Commission, Zhang Youxia remaining the First Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, controlling actual military power, Hu Chunhua becoming the Premier, simultaneously serving as the Second Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, Liu Zhenli as the Third Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, and Yin Li replacing Cai Qi in the Politburo but not assuming the role of the head of the Central Organisation Department.
These personnel arrangements have caused controversy. Some analysts have pointed out two inconsistencies:
Firstly, CCP’s State Council Premier does not traditionally hold the position of Vice Chairman of the Military Commission simultaneously.
Secondly, Yin Li taking over Cai Qi’s Politburo position without assuming the role of the head of the Central Organisation Department is seen as unreasonable. If Cai Qi retains the leadership of the Central Organisation Department, controlling the Central Guard Bureau, would Wang Yang and Hu Chunhua really entrust their fate to Cai Qi?
In assessing the reasonableness of the insider’s revelations, it is essential to consider a variety of sources. CCP’s supposed conventions and rules only apply as long as internal struggles do not intensify to necessitate rule changes. When it becomes necessary to re-establish norms, old rules no longer apply.
For instance, before the 20th National Congress, it was challenging to predict that individuals like Li Keqiang, Wang Yang, and Hu Chunhua would all be sidelined, as Xi Jinping defied CCP traditions and instigated a political coup. At that time, Xi Jinping relied on the military support provided by Zhang Youxia.
Now, with Zhang Youxia seizing Xi Jinping’s military authority and subsequently purging Xi’s loyalists, it is improbable for Zhang to adhere to old norms.
Consider the “three up, three down” revelations. Wang Yang is merely a transitional General Secretary and will retire after the 21st Congress. Hu Chunhua is slated to become the Party General Secretary at the 21st Congress. In the following two years, with Wang Yang as Military Commission Chairman, and Zhang Youxia as the First Vice Chairman, Hu Chunhua can only rank behind Zhang Youxia in seniority, which is a logical arrangement.
Regarding Yin Li not assuming the role of the head of the Central Organisation Department, a holistic analysis in conjunction with other revelations is necessary.
If Zhang Youxia controls the military power in alliance with the veteran factions, sidelining Xi Jinping, it is inconceivable that Zhang would not oversee the Central Guard Bureau. Many previous unverified claims suggested that Zhang Youxia had secured control of the Central Guard Bureau, and Cai Qi had switched allegiance to Zhang Youxia.
By integrating these reports, it becomes evident that Yin Li’s exclusion from the role of the head of the Central Organisation Department is entirely reasonable. Given the Central Guard Bureau’s control within the military establishment, directly managed by Zhang Youxia, it aligns with the conventions within the CCP power structure.
Viewers, from the CCTV footage showing “Xi Jinping stepping down” to the mysterious disappearances of high-ranking personnel in the Xinjiang Military District, and the enigmatic personnel moves anticipated at the Fourth Plenary Session, all point towards a consistent signal: Xi Jinping is no longer the wielder of power; instead, he is a temporary actor being manipulated. The forthcoming Fourth Plenary Session will be a pivotal moment in this power struggle. Will Xi Jinping step down completely, or will he stage a comeback? The storm in Zhongnanhai may have only just begun.