Days before the fourth plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party, the political situation in Beijing is once again stirring. Will Xi Jinping be able to firmly hold onto the highest seat of power? Or has the balance of power already begun to shift? Will the fourth plenary session usher in a new era or continue with the old system? Today, we delve into the analysis of this power play that will shape China’s future.
Regarding the personnel arrangements for the fourth plenary session, there have been recent reports.
On September 21st, commentator “Xiaoshuojia” revealed on his YouTube channel that his informant disclosed the finalized personnel arrangements for the fourth plenary session. The Standing Committee will experience a “three up, three down” shuffle with Xi Jinping, Li Qiang, and Cai Qi stepping down, and Wang Yang, Hu Chunhua, and Yin Li stepping up.
Xi Jinping will resign from the positions of Party General Secretary and Chairman of the Military Commission, while temporarily retaining the position of State President. Wang Yang will assume the roles of Party General Secretary and Chairman of the Military Commission, Hu Chunhua will succeed Li Qiang as the Premier of the State Council, and Yin Li will take over Cai Qi’s position on the Standing Committee, but will not assume the role of the Director of the General Office.
Additionally, Hu Chunhua and Liu Zhenli will serve as the second and third-ranked Vice Chairmen of the Military Commission, respectively. Zhang Youxia will remain as the top-ranking Vice Chairman of the Military Commission but will retain actual control over the military.
The decision regarding Xi Jinping is that there will be no investigation, no accountability; he will be allowed to retire peacefully. At the fourth plenary session, there will not be any actions against the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, led by Xi Jinping’s confidant Li Xi, as long as the personnel there remain unchanged, indicating there will be no immediate reckoning for Xi Jinping.
As for why Yin Li emerged as a dark horse instead of the previously discussed Chen Jinjing and Yuan Jiajun, the informant mentioned it was due to Yin Li’s good relationship with Zhang Youxia. These arrangements were made during a secret expanded meeting of the political bureau, with some elders including Hu Jintao in attendance.
The secret political bureau expanded meeting mentioned by “Xiaoshuojia’s” informant is not widely known whether it has been convened before. However, various strange occurrences at the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression held in Beijing on September 17th have made many believe that Xi Jinping has become a puppet, only arranged to make ceremonial appearances and sometimes unable to speak at public events personally.
On September 17th, the Chinese Communist Party held the commemoration event for the 80th anniversary of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in Beijing. Xi Jinping appeared at the event but only formally greeted the attendees, took a group photo, and then left with Wang Xiaohong. Xi Jinping did not deliver a speech at the event; instead, Cai Qi delivered a speech on his behalf.
According to CCTV’s report, Cai Qi conveyed an important speech by Xi Jinping at the Central Political Bureau Standing Committee meeting. In other words, although Xi Jinping was physically present at the commemoration event, he did not personally convey his important speech delivered at the Standing Committee meeting, which contrasts with the previous practices in the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping’s rule.
These peculiar occurrences suggest that at least before September 17th, the high-level of the Communist Party had already set Xi Jinping’s role as a figurehead. He can only be a nominal top leader and cannot attend public events or give speeches as he wishes.
Is this meeting the secret expanded political bureau meeting mentioned by the informant? There are many possibilities that can be inferred from this.
On September 20th, another commentator “A Regular Person Inside the Wall” disclosed that Xi Jinping will step down at the fourth plenary session, and this decision has been informally shared with the members of the Central Committee. Based on Hu Jintao’s suggestion, the adjustments to the fourth plenary session team are necessary, and all positions being changed are interim positions until the 21st National Congress when they will be confirmed.
Analyzing the situation, the conservative faction of the Chinese Communist Party originally planned for Xi Jinping to continue until the 21st National Congress. However, the current circumstances do not allow for any further delays. All four factions wish for Xi Jinping to step down early.
Firstly, Hu Jintao, the leader of the Tuan faction, is aging, and his ability to rally the party under the title of the fourth generation party leader is diminishing. If Hu Jintao were to pass away suddenly, the forces opposed to Xi and his leadership would lose a key figure, making it challenging to remain united. Therefore, the Tuan faction desires for Xi Jinping to resign sooner.
Secondly, leaders like Zhang Youxia in the military are also running out of patience. While Zhang holds military power, he remains wary of potential retaliation from Xi Jinping’s camp, requiring him to remain on high alert continually. In such a tense situation, conflicts can escalate, leading to significant casualties. Hence, the military faction also wishes for an end to the standoff soon.
Thirdly, the reformist faction associated with Wen Jiabao cannot wait any longer. The Chinese economy is on the brink of collapse, and the social situation resembles a volcano on the verge of eruption, at risk of a major explosion. For the reformist faction, removing Xi Jinping from power would at least provide some confidence to the people, serving as the only way to release pressure like a valve on a volcano.
Lastly, even the conservative faction of the Chinese Communist Party cannot afford to wait any longer. Amid intense infighting within the party in recent years, the conservative faction also feels threatened. Since Xi Jinping has lost military authority, it is better to have him step down gracefully and avoid further internal conflicts. Otherwise, the conservative faction’s influence and survival might be at risk.
“A Regular Person Inside the Wall” mentioned that in the selection of a temporary Prime Minister candidate, individuals like Wang Yang, Hu Chunhua, Chen Jinjing, and Yuan Jiajun are considered, with Hu Chunhua being the most probable candidate.
Given that Hu Chunhua is the most trusted successor of Hu Jintao, the plan is for Hu Chunhua to transition into the role of Prime Minister for two years, achieve some results, build a governing team, and seamlessly succeed as Party General Secretary at the 21st National Congress.
Regarding why Wang Yang can assume the position of acting General Secretary, “A Regular Person Inside the Wall” believes all factions approved of Wang Yang’s candidacy, viewing his interim leadership as non-threatening.
Firstly, Wang Yang is seen as the favored successor of the reformist faction associated with Wen Jiabao. From Wen Jiabao’s perspective, having Wang Yang serve as the interim General Secretary for two years could kickstart political system reforms.
Secondly, the conservative factions acknowledge that Wang Yang’s interim position has a limited lifespan. Wang Yang is not inclined towards sudden changes or power struggles; even if he initiates political reforms or starts reducing the CCP’s power slowly, it will likely be a gradual process. Although such reforms may eventually lead to the CCP losing its grip on power in the long run, it could provide short-term relief from current predicaments.
Thirdly, from the Tuan faction’s viewpoint, Hu Jintao is concerned that he might not survive until the 21st National Congress and worries that Wang Yang might resist handing over power to Hu Chunhua in the future. However, Hu Jintao still trusts individuals like Wen Jiabao and Li Ruihuan. As long as internal unity within the party can be achieved, Hu Jintao could accept Wang Yang’s appointment as the temporary General Secretary.
Lastly, the military factions prefer seeing Wang Yang take over. If Hu Chunhua were to assume the position, the military would need to swiftly transfer military authority to ensure Hu Chunhua’s authority. On the other hand, with Wang Yang in charge, a temporary General Secretary set to retire by the 21st National Congress, he would not require military authority reinforcement to support his leadership. Thus, the military factions do not necessarily need to transition military power to Wang Yang.
In previous episodes, we analyzed the final battle between Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping in September. Reports mentioned that Zhang Youxia had Xi Jinping under soft detention, seeking something from him. At that time, some commentators speculated that Zhang Youxia aimed to acquire personnel appointment authority over the military from Xi Jinping.
Recently, new reports surfaced claiming that Zhang Youxia is waiting for Xi Jinping to hand over control of nuclear weapons, often referred to as the nuclear button briefcase.
In all nuclear powers worldwide, the highest leader has a designated aide who carries a briefcase controlling the launch of nuclear weapons. This briefcase must accompany the leader wherever they go.
If Zhang Youxia were to seize Xi Jinping’s military authority, it would inevitably involve the transfer of nuclear weapon launch rights. This suggests that what Zhang Youxia and others are seeking from Xi Jinping might indeed be the “nuclear button.”
Before Xi Jinping relinquishes the “nuclear button,” negotiations with Zhang Youxia are inevitable. Once a compromise is reached, the personnel arrangements for the fourth plenary session should reach their final stages, indicating that the future composition of the Standing Committee, Military Commission, and actual power distribution within the highest levels of the CCP will gradually become clearer after this final showdown.
The fourth plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party is a critical meeting that will influence the future direction of China’s political landscape. If Xi Jinping continues to wield significant power at this meeting, China’s future is bound to experience more turbulence, increased economic crises, higher risks of war in the Taiwan Strait, and the potential for violent internal conflicts and bloody confrontations within Chinese society.
This is a scenario undesired by many factions within the CCP, which is why these factions, with military support, have formed an alliance to oppose Xi Jinping, urging for his removal, aligning with the desires of the majority of the Chinese populace.
If, at the fourth plenary session, Xi Jinping steps down and Wang Yang assumes the role of interim General Secretary while Hu Chunhua takes over as interim Premier, such a power structure indeed provides room for political transformation within Chinese society.
Upon Wang Yang’s ascension, according to CCP conventions, the General Secretary would also serve as the Chairman of the Military Commission and may additionally become the State President during the next National People’s Congress session. However, as previously discussed, Wang Yang is a transitional leader, lacking a military foundation and the need for military reinforcement. This creates a de facto tripartite separation of powers: Zhang Youxia controlling the military, Wang Yang overseeing party affairs, and Hu Chunhua managing the State Council.
While this separation of powers is theoretically sustainable for only two years, it could still serve as an opportunity for political transformation in China. If grassroots forces within Chinese society can leverage this moment to influence figures like Wen Jiabao, Wang Yang, and advocates in the military like Liu Yuan towards a more open discourse, potentially lifting bans on news publications and political parties, then China’s political metamorphosis might hit a significant turning point.
It is essential to clarify that we are not placing our hopes for China’s political transformation on any specific CCP leader. We analyze from historical and political science perspectives that communist countries tend to experience political transformations when their regimes face severe crises. When progressive factions work towards systemic reforms to navigate through the crisis, it can create a historical opportunity for civil political forces to participate.
The Round Table talks in Poland emerged under similar historical background. The peaceful transition in Poland marked the beginning of the collapse of communist regimes across Eastern Europe.
The personnel arrangements for the fourth plenary session have become the central point of contention within the highest echelons of the CCP. Will Xi Jinping hand over military authority and the “nuclear button”? Can Zhang Youxia genuinely grasp power? Will Wang Yang assume the role of interim General Secretary? The scenario of the tripartite separation of party, government, and military powers might emerge, ultimately shaping China’s political trajectory.
History tells us that transitioning from totalitarianism to a normal society often entails a mix of crisis and opportunity, offering China a chance to break free from Communist authoritarian control, touching the hearts of every Chinese individual.
——Production Team of “Epoch Focus”