On September 7, 2025, the grand military parade of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) drew attention due to estimated spending of 36 billion RMB, coupled with over a hundred billion RMB promised in foreign aid during the previous Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. This extravagant spending contrasts sharply with the minimal livelihood guarantees provided to the Chinese populace.
Former local finance official Li Chuanliang, who had worked within the CCP system, bluntly pointed out four structural issues overshadowing China’s economy. He emphasized that politics takes precedence over the economy, with only a minute fraction of expenditure dedicated to livelihood, leading him to believe that this model will inevitably lead to the “eventual collapse of the Chinese economy”.
Li, born in 1963, had held positions such as Director of the Finance Bureau of Jixi City, Director of the Office of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Jixi City, Deputy Mayor of Jixi City, and Deputy Mayor of Hegang City before resigning from his official positions in March 2017. He has been residing in the United States since November 2018.
On September 3, the CCP held a grand military parade to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the victory in the war against Japan. Analysts estimate the parade’s cost around 36 billion RMB (approximately 5 billion USD), equivalent to 2% of the CCP’s annual defense budget. The CCP’s official 2025 defense budget was reported to be around 249 billion USD, second only to the United States globally.
Simultaneously, during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit held before the parade, the CCP pledged to provide 2 billion RMB in aid to member countries this year, with an additional 10 billion RMB in loans over the next three years. Furthermore, the number of special scholarships will double.
However, domestic livelihood expenditures in China have been severely cut back, leading to a breakdown in the healthcare and elderly care systems. This reflects the dual nature of CCP finances: tightening domestically while dispersing funds internationally.
Li Chuanliang, in an exclusive interview with Epoch Times, expressed that the September 3 parade was more of a display of power than a military necessity. He likened the atmosphere of the CCP parade to the 1935 Nazi propaganda film “Triumph of the Will”, as both represent displays of political authoritarianism.
Regarding the spending on the parade, Li stated, “There is no detailed accounting of the sources because it is more of a political activity.” He dismissed the significance of various estimations from outsiders, emphasizing that the parade symbolizes a reality of “political economy”.
“People fail to understand that ultimate authoritarian rule, economic control, and falsified data, particularly the waste and diversion of substantial funds, are intangible and residual forms of control,” Li explained. Keyly, all of CCP’s economic budgets serve political purposes.
Li Chuanliang argued that China’s economy is no longer a “planned economy” or a “market economy” but has devolved into a thoroughly “political economy.”
Discussing the context of China’s economic development, Li remarked that despite the rhetoric of a “market economy” after the reforms, in reality, China has not aligned with Western standards.
“China had vigorous debates over the planned economy versus market economy. On the surface, the planned economy is seen as collective ownership under the Communist Party, while the market economy seems closer to the West. But looking back now, I believe China’s current economy is truly a form of ‘political economy.'”
Li recalled studying “political economy” at school, essentially a form of indoctrination. He explained, “What is political economy? It means all economic activities revolve around politics, where politics must control the economy, which is today’s Chinese economy.”
Li Chuanliang further summarized China’s economic essence with four terms: aside from “political economy”, he highlighted “financial control,” where finance loses its market-regulating and balancing functions, entirely serving political motives.
Thirdly, he mentioned “propaganda statistics,” stating that statistical data no longer holds scientific credibility, serving propaganda purposes for the regime, making the numbers unreliable.
Ultimately reflecting in the fiscal realm, this becomes “false finance,” masking and embellishing the truths of fiscal income and expenditure, engaging in deceptive financial practices. He stated, “Finance should be authentic, but China’s current financial state is not genuine; it’s falsified, concealing and deceiving.”
Li underscored that these four structural issues are the core behind the parade, surpassing the significance of the spending amounts. As for the various economic regulations, financial regulations, and statistical regulations, they have been undermined.
Western scholars frequently question China’s economic data. However, when asked why Western financial media still quote CCP data when reporting on China’s economy, Li Chuanliang bluntly stated that international institutions lack channels and have no choice but to cite official data, leading to a ludicrous scenario of “false data being truthfully cited.”
“All of China’s data is manipulated at the leadership’s will,” Li explained. “Firstly, China’s statistical digits are deceitful, unscientific, and non-standard, intentionally controlled by higher-ups.”
Additionally, the CCP always treats media as a weapon, strategically releasing manipulated figures for external consumption.
“In recent years, China has significantly increased the confidentiality of data to avoid adhering to the international standard statistical methods. Famous institutions, platforms, or networks cannot acquire authentic data.”
Comparing massive political expenditures to service-oriented spending, Li Chuanliang lamented that China’s finances are almost non-existent for the ordinary citizens.
This July, the CCP announced a mere 2% overall increase in retirement pensions for 2025, the lowest increment in years.
Li noted, “They frequently announce pension increases of a mere 10 RMB per person per month, translating to an annual increase of 100 RMB, which is pathetic. Subsidies for those at the poverty line are calculated penny by penny.”
He estimated, “Based on my experience and rough estimates, if China’s finance can allocate 1% towards livelihood, that would be commendable, while the remaining 99% is not. These expenditures are directed primarily towards military spending, domestic control, public security, law enforcement, political propaganda, and the Belt and Road Initiative, dwarfing funding for livelihood, social welfare, and vulnerable groups, making the latter negligible.”
“Even if this social welfare budget accounts for 10% or 20% of China’s expenditures, that would truly benefit the Chinese people.”
In the realm of livelihood, Li specifically highlighted the plight of public hospitals, considering them a microcosm of China’s impending economic collapse.
He detailed multiple issues within the healthcare system: bloated personnel numbers resulting in heavy organizational burdens, exorbitant drug prices leading to cost escalation, reckless equipment procurement resulting in excessive debt.
“People are now unable to seek medical attention and cannot afford health insurance. The government lacks funds, and individuals are financially strained,” he emphasized. “All those under 50 or 55 in China have lost their retirement insurance; the money is gone.”
“For accurate statistics, China’s public hospitals would have gone bankrupt long ago.”
Li asserted that this predicament represents an economic, political, and social phenomenon, symbolic of a general issue in China today, indicating a prelude to economic collapse.
Li Chuanliang recounted how, during his tenure overseeing city finances, fiscal revenue doubled in three years. “How were we able to achieve this? By focusing on genuine industrial economics. Converting resources into industry leads to tax revenue, and tax revenue generates extensive employment, leading to this virtuous cycle of development.” However, this development model is lacking in contemporary China.
During the peak period in the cities he worked in, fiscal revenue exceeded 10 billion RMB, needing annual growth rates of 15% to 20% to sustain economic, industrial, and livelihood development. This is the reality in China; anything less does not suffice.”
“But now, that’s not the case. Presently, fiscal revenue has retracted to levels seen over a decade ago, plunging dramatically.”
Moreover, under central strict control, China’s local finance is facing unprecedented challenges. “Localities are left to fend for themselves, resorting to various means to ‘make money’… but it’s merely a stopgap measure, like attempting to solve today’s problem with temporary fixes.”
Regarding the recent dengue fever incident in Foshan, Guangdong, Li mentioned how the local government exaggerated a situation that wasn’t severe, mandating compulsory hospitalization for observation to inflate medical and fiscal revenues.
Discussing China’s economic prospects, Li Chuanliang, based on his experiences within the system, confidently stated, “It’s exceptionally perilous. It’s not just risky; the collapse of the Chinese economy is merely a matter of time, a definite certainty.”
He believed that this collapse will ultimately impact the populace. “The most significant hardships will be faced by the Chinese people. People fail to realize that ultimate authoritarian rule, economic control, falsified data, particularly this extravagant waste and diversion of substantial funds, are intangible. It’s residual control.”
Li Chuanliang further pointed out that China lacks institutional safeguards for enterprise longevity. “Check if China has any century-old businesses? If they have any endurance. Many internationally have centuries-old companies, but China doesn’t because the regulatory environment doesn’t foster them. Even those giant real estate enterprises will collapse.”
Li candidly stated, “The true poverty in this vast country lies in China’s treasury; the true poverty is that almost all of China’s citizens have lost their welfare; the true victims are China’s next generation and its future.”