During the recent Beidaihe meeting, there have been numerous rumors and analyses regarding the possibility of a shift in leadership at the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session next month. Currently, there are very few officials from the post-70s generation holding ministerial-level positions, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Organization Department has issued two consecutive articles criticizing young cadres, sparking concerns. Analysts point out that since Xi Jinping took office, the trend of rejuvenating the cadre in the CCP has reversed, leading to intensified conflicts between old and new cadres, which may bring instability to the political situation.
On August 17th, Singapore’s Lianhe Zaobao published an article listing the deputy party secretaries who have been replaced in the past six months in eight provinces and municipalities in China. Half of them are post-70s deputy provincial-level officials, bringing the total number of post-70s deputy provincial “number-three” officials nationwide to seven. Analysts suggest that these positions assisting the top leaders in party building are challenging to show achievements. If these individuals do not get promoted in the local party reshuffle before the 21st National Congress of the CCP in 2027, their career advancement opportunities will be significantly restricted. Many of them are not even members or alternate members of the 20th Central Committee or the Discipline Inspection Commission.
The report points out that the promotion speed of senior officials in the CCP has noticeably slowed down, with most ministerial-level officials being born before 1966, indicating significant aging within the group. In the provincial party secretaries, there has yet to be a post-70s official. For example, prominent figures like Guang Weijun and Zhuge Yujie from the Shanghai officialdom have not advanced further in the ranks after several years in the deputy position.
Public information compiled by Epoch Times journalists reveals that there are only a few young provincial and ministerial-level officials in the CCP, such as:
– Lu Dongliang: Born in December 1973, currently serving as the Deputy Secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Governor, alternate member of the 20th Central Committee.
– Liu Jie: Born in January 1970, former Deputy Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Governor, alternate member of the 20th Central Committee.
– Adong: Born in November 1970, currently serving as the First Secretary of the Communist Youth League Central Committee.
– Li Yunque: Born in September 1970, currently serving as the Director of the National Financial Supervision and Administration Bureau, alternate member of the 20th Central Committee.
In contrast to the difficulties facing young officials in advancing, there have been many exceptions where senior officials have extended their retirement age to retain power. In addition to Xi Jinping amending the constitution to abolish term limits, there are many senior officials serving beyond the usual retirement age, such as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office Director Xia Baolong, Taiwan Affairs Office Director Song Tao, Procurator-General Ying Yong, among others. Conversely, some relatively young officials have unexpectedly fallen out of favor or encountered trouble, like the current Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Hu Chunhua, former Foreign Minister Qin Gang, and the recently investigated Director of the United Front Work Department Liu Jianchao.
Chinese affairs expert Wang He stated that Xi Jinping has broken many of the CCP’s past rules to ensure his long-term tenure. He values people he trusts and deems loyal, regardless of age. This has led to a complete restructuring of the cadre ladder that was initially promoted during Deng Xiaoping’s era, resulting in the reversal of the trend for rejuvenating cadres and now promoting older officials.
“Back when the rejuvenation of cadres was promoted, Xi Jinping himself became a provincial and ministerial-level official in his forties, yet few post-70s officials in their fifties have reached the same positions today,” he said.
During the Beidaihe meeting, the CCP Central Organization Department’s affiliated “China Organization and Personnel News” published two articles criticizing young cadres.
On August 13th, an article titled “Strictly Guard Against Young Cadres ‘Stumbling at the Start'” reported an analysis of cases involving officials under the age of 35 in the past five years in Shayang County, Hubei Province, focusing on high-risk behaviors such as drunk driving, online gambling, and illegal lending, and introducing the “Ten Rules for Supervising Young Cadres Beyond Eight Hours.”
On August 8th, the publication released another article titled “Cultivating Young Cadres Requires ‘Slow Cooking,'” criticizing some regions for having a “hasty” approach in nurturing young cadres, emphasizing on the one-sided pursuit of a younger leadership structure which may lead to these individuals meeting the “youth” standard in their positions but struggling to shoulder significant responsibilities, arguing that the growth of young cadres requires a more gradual approach.
Taiwan National Defense Studies Institute researcher Shen Mingshi told Epoch Times that the consecutive publications by the Central Organization Department criticizing young cadres are related to power struggles at the top level. These articles may be critiquing Xi Jinping’s personnel decisions or some of the young officials he promoted. The CCP usually lays down theoretical groundwork before initiating a power struggle.
Shen Mingshi stated that Xi Jinping’s lack of discernment in vetting personnel has resulted in the involvement of young officials in corruption issues, like Qin Gang. However, the root cause of these individuals getting into trouble lies in factional struggles. For instance, when former Central Organization Department Minister Li Ganjie was replaced by the older Shitai Feng, it was clearly a consideration of factions rather than age.
Chinese affairs expert Wang He told Epoch Times that the Central Organization Department’s exaggeration of the issue of young cadres is a form of guidance, at least in defense of the authorities’ personnel policy, with a possibility of shifting blame. However, at the same time, due to the pressure on promotions, young officials who were already frustrated are further agitated by these articles, exacerbating conflicts. Of course, it is also possible that some individuals are deliberately fueling the fire.
Wang He believes that the current ministerial-level positions within the CCP are mostly held by those born in the 1960s, skewing older, keeping this group within the officialdom and generating resentment among post-70s and post-80s individuals, leading to instability in the political situation.