On August 9, 2025, reports have emerged that senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials are collectively hiding out in Beidaihe. The CCP Central Organization Department’s publication recently released a rare article criticizing the issue of “eager to achieve success” in the rejuvenation of cadres, which is believed to be related to an escalation of internal power struggles within the CCP. At the same time, this release may signal the suppression of young officials and could exacerbate their lack of governance. In recent years, state media has been promoting “the youngest in the country” among high-ranking officials, but these individuals often run into trouble, leading some to believe that being labeled as “the youngest” is now seen as ominous.
On August 8, the “China Organization Personnel News” published an article titled “Cultivating Young Cadres Requires ‘Slow Cooking.'”
The article quoted Xi Jinping’s remarks on cadre cultivation and went on to criticize certain regions for displaying a trend of being overly hasty in cultivating young cadres, focusing solely on the youthful composition of leadership teams and using promotion speed as a key measure of work effectiveness while neglecting the objective laws of young cadre growth. It suggested that while these individuals may meet the “young” standard in their positions, they may struggle to truly handle significant responsibilities.
The article emphasized that the growth of young cadres requires a gradual approach. It stated that young cadres need to steadfastly discard impatience and focus on honing their skills through steady effort. Only through patience, enduring pressure, and continuous refinement in practice can they become suitable for important positions.
Commentator Li Lin explained to Da Ji Yuan that articles with such political implications released by CCP official media are complex. This article can be interpreted in two ways. One interpretation is sending out a signal that young cadres with achievements may face suppression; even if they work hard, they may struggle to advance significantly and have to rely on endurance. Meanwhile, older officials with connections continue to occupy positions. This situation could lead young cadres to lose confidence, thereby intensifying governance issues in the government.
He added that another possibility is that it is related to an escalation of internal power struggles within the CCP, as senior and incumbent CCP officials are currently meeting in Beidaihe. The political layout for the 21st Party Congress may kick off at the Fourth Plenary Session in October this year, and disagreements are likely to arise at the Beidaihe meeting. Various factions are looking to position their own people strategically, including Xi’s potential successors. Some individuals may face suppression based on being deemed too young.
Veteran writer Zek Nizawa of Nikkei Asia stated on January 16 this year that as the decisions for the next leadership team are largely set this year, potential political storms within the CCP are likely to erupt.
The official CCP confirmed the Fourth Plenary Session to be held in October this year. There have been various speculations about potential changes at the Fourth Plenary Session, including rumors about Xi Jinping’s potential successors.
In a speech made public in 2023, Xi Jinping stated, “Outstanding young cadres should not become a special group, waiting to be promoted like crown princes.” This remark is seen as an indication that Xi Jinping dislikes being touted as the successor by higher-ranking officials.
During Deng Xiaoping’s era, the CCP encouraged rejuvenation and the establishment of cadre echelons, opposing lifelong appointments. In September 1982, the 12th National Congress of the CCP saw the candidacy of a cadre under 40 years old – the then 39-year-old Hu Jintao, who later rose through the ranks to eventually lead the Zhongnanhai.
Independent columnist Du Zheng previously pointed out in an article in a Taiwanese media outlet that during Xi’s time, the situation has reversed compared to Deng’s era. The “youngest” leaders at the central level within the CCP now face dual risks. They are either hyped as future successors, attracting unwanted attention and suspicion from political opponents, or they boast about their potential succession, leading to pride, arrogance, and the mistrust of their superiors.
Du Zheng highlighted the cases of Hu Chunhua and Sun Zhengcai, both born in the 1960s, who were promoted during the 18th National Congress of the CCP in 2012. Despite being touted as successors within the CCP, they faced setbacks due to various reasons. The article also mentioned Lu Hao, who was once dubbed a rising star in politics but was later transferred from the position of the governor of Heilongjiang province to a less significant role in 2022.
For instance, Liu Jian was elected as a candidate member of the Central Committee of the CCP during the 18th National Congress in 2012 at the age of 42. He was promoted as part of the so-called “7th generation” of CCP successors but later faced demotion due to allegations of involvement in certain projects.
Du Zheng believed that Xi Jinping has disrupted the cadre development strategy that began in Deng Xiaoping’s era. With Xi removing term limits and his close allies staying active beyond retirement age, being the “youngest” in official circles has become an ominous label. Xi has yet to prepare a clear successor according to CCP practices, leaving his associates to vie for power in the post-Xi period, introducing significant uncertainties. As the crisis of the CCP’s regime deepens, Xi may take down the CCP, leaving no clear successor.
Independent television producer Li Jun has also suggested that due to succession issues, the CCP could potentially face a major internal upheaval at any time. With the current poor economic conditions and challenging international environment, a significant internal upheaval within the CCP could lead to its collapse.