On July 21st, the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China issued new regulations, demanding the “comprehensive elimination of negative influences and reshaping the image and prestige of political cadres in the military.” It called for political cadres, especially leading cadres, to take the lead in “eradicating poison and eliminating corruption,” setting an example and revitalizing political discipline. The document pointed out that political institutions at all levels must integrate daily implementation, accepting strict supervision from officials and soldiers.
Independent scholar Wu Zuolai wrote on X platform, noting that the current cleansing operation within the Chinese Communist Army is not like Xi Jinping’s proactive political rectification, but more like the military actively purging the “Xi family army” of its influence.
He mentioned that after Xi Jinping’s close ally and Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, Miao Hua, fell from grace at the end of last year, the People’s Liberation Army Daily quickly published four consecutive articles emphasizing party principles, collective leadership, and intra-party democracy. These narratives, along with the so-called “cleansing of poison,” are actually interconnected, indicating that there were early signs of a major purge within the military.
Wu Zuolai stated that these divergent “voices” are reminiscent of historical instances where the military influenced high-level power struggles through media discourse.
He emphasized that all indications suggest that Xi Jinping’s chances of a comeback are dwindling.
On the 16th, Wu Zuolai published an article on Radio Taiwan International (RTI) stating that for nearly half a century, the decisive force behind each power transition within the top echelons of the Chinese Communist Party has always been the military. Despite emphasizing “the party commands the gun” during stable periods, in special historical moments, the party’s top leadership is often determined by the gun’s barrel. He analyzed that following the Third Plenum of the 2024 Central Committee, an unofficial “silent coup” may have already taken place within the CCP.
He mentioned that historically, these kinds of “silent coups” – such as the arrest of the “Gang of Four” in 1976, the resignation of Hua Guofeng from 1978 to 1981, and the forced retirement of Hu Yaobang from 1986 to 1987 – while differing in tactics, share common characteristics: internal initiation, a secretive process, lack of party discipline and legal basis, control of the media, and a change in power structure. The public only sees results, and information control and power transfer demonstrate the unique logic of CCP politics.
Wu Zuolai further analyzed that Xi Jinping’s core power, due to his personal autocracy and rapid placement of loyalists within the military, has sparked strong backlash from the elder statesmen and the military, making a coup by these factions a high probability event. These “discordant voices” from the gun may signify that the CCP is about to abandon the path of personal dictatorship and return to a collective leadership model.