Recently, the Chinese state-controlled media reported on Xi Jinping’s “requirements for the formulation of the plan for the next five years,” emphasizing the need to uphold the so-called “scientific decision-making, democratic decision-making, and decision-making according to law.” This slogan was a common phrase used by Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, but had largely disappeared since Xi took office, making its resurgence now a topic of interest. Experts believe that this is another example of Xi’s diminishing power, indicating that significant changes may occur in the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in the near future, which is worth paying attention to.
On May 19th, the Chinese Communist Party mouthpieces People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency published significant articles, stating that Xi Jinping made “important instructions” regarding the formulation of the “14th Five-Year Plan” (for the 2026-2030 period), emphasizing the need to “adhere to scientific decision-making, democratic decision-making, and decision-making according to law.”
Data on the internet shows that during Hu Jintao’s tenure (2002-2012), his reports and the party media frequently mentioned “scientific decision-making, democratic decision-making, and decision-making according to law.” However, after Xi Jinping came to power at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012, this terminology gradually faded from the party media and almost disappeared, with Xi shifting his policy discourse towards “core consciousness” and “top-level design.”
Official reports in the past have indicated that Xi Jinping is particularly averse to “intra-party democracy” within the CCP.
On June 29, 2021, Xinhua News Agency publicly released Xi Jinping’s speech from a meeting of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in January 2018. At that time, Xi stated: “There has been noise within the party, with some saying that ’emphasizing party centralization and unity is sufficient, and the focus should be on developing intra-party democracy,’ which is ‘unusual talk’ and some have ‘ulterior motives’.”
In recent years, the party media’s articles on high-level Chinese Communist Party meetings have emphasized “centralized unified leadership,” with very little mention of “democratic centralism.”
Chinese affairs expert Wang He analyzed for Epoch Times, stating that the Chinese Communist Party is very particular about the political discourse of its leaders, deliberately arranging when to emphasize what according to political needs.
Wang He stated that in fact, after the Cultural Revolution, starting in the 1980s, the CCP began promoting “democratization and scientification” of decision-making, with more emphasis during the Hu-Wen era. Of course, this is also a long-standing issue that the CCP has been unable to resolve. After Xi Jinping came to power and established personal rule, these terms were essentially shelved, and now re-emerging from Xi’s mouth indicates that significant changes have occurred in the power structure of the top leadership of the CCP, necessitating a return to the collective leadership system of the CCP, further evidence of Xi’s declining power.
“According to the CCP’s usual political struggle practices, each generation of leaders has their own new set of terms. Xi is now reviving Hu Jintao’s discourse. This is a continuation from the military media last year calling for the implementation of collective leadership.,” he said.
At the end of last year, the Chinese Communist Party’s military media shifted from its previous strong praise for Xi Jinping’s “core leader” status and began emphasizing the importance of “collective leadership” and “intra-party democracy” in consecutive articles. This situation has raised many speculations.
As early as on the day of the Third Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee in July last year, Xinhua News Agency published a lengthy article “Reformist Xi Jinping” praising Xi Jinping’s personal supremacy, but the article was swiftly deleted from the entire internet less than a day after its release.
Epoch Times recently learned from authoritative sources that although Xi Jinping appears to be in power, the situation has actually shifted, with former Premier Wen Jiabao and current Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia becoming key factors in shaping the political landscape of China.
An article by Zeke II published in Nikkei Asia on May 29 pointed out that upholding “scientific decision-making, democratic decision-making, and decision-making according to law” was Hu Jintao’s “farewell gift” when he presided over the party congress for the last time as the leader of the Communist Party in 2012.
The article by Zeke II pointed out that it is intriguing that Xi Jinping is now using the slogan of Hu Jintao whom he was contending against, as Hu’s “farewell gift” and Xi’s strongman leadership style are fundamentally incompatible. Has there been some change in the internal political landscape of the party? It has been nearly 15 years; has there been some change in the power structure within the party? This indicates that the future direction of Chinese politics will face a critical moment in 2025.
At the closing of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2022, Xi Jinping personally ordered the forcible removal of the head of the Communist Youth League, the nearly 80-year-old Hu Jintao. Meanwhile, Hu Chunhua, who was once considered Hu Jintao’s designated successor, was excluded from the Politburo by Xi Jinping.
Zeke II believes that in the Chinese political arena, it is not impossible for the pendulum to swing suddenly in the opposite direction. The cleansing of the senior military ranks is still ongoing, with many generals who were promoted with Xi Jinping’s support facing purge. The activities of members associated with the Communist Youth League faction, including Hu Chunhua, who have been purged by Xi Jinping, are now receiving more coverage from official media sources. What does this imply?
The “14th Five-Year Plan” of the Chinese Communist Party extends beyond 2027. If the CCP convenes the 21st National Congress in 2027, there will be significant attention on whether Xi Jinping can continue to serve as the top leader.
Rumors of Xi Jinping stepping down have recently been circulating frequently in China. Overseas social media platforms have been reporting that on May 14, the Central Committee of the CCP held an expanded Politburo meeting in Beijing to discuss whether Xi Jinping will step down at this year’s Fourth Plenary Session or wait until the 21st National Congress.
Shen Mingshi, a researcher at the Taiwan Institute for National Defense and Security Studies, told the Epoch Times that rumors about Xi Jinping losing power within the party have been increasing. On the surface, the term “the Central Committee with Xi Jinping as the core” used by the party media is gradually diminishing, indicating a weakening of Xi Jinping’s power. Combined with the cleansing of senior military leaders associated with the Xi faction, it is likely a result of the purging by anti-Xi factions. Despite the situation in Zhongnanhai appearing to be normal, the struggles behind the scenes are very apparent.
Wang He stated that the factional struggles within the CCP are currently fierce. If a consensus is reached, the Fourth Plenary Session could make adjustments to Xi Jinping; if no consensus is reached, Xi will likely continue to perform. If Xi himself cooperates, by the time of the 21st Congress, Xi’s third term should quietly end. However, the outcome currently is difficult to determine.
Shen Mingshi believes that the timing of the Fourth Plenary Session of the CCP is yet to be confirmed, and the longer it is delayed, the more variables there will be. Because Xi Jinping may also provoke disputes in other ways, causing delays or preventing the Fourth Plenary Session and disrupting the power layout arranged by the anti-Xi factions.
He believes that neighboring countries should pay attention to possible changes in the internal political situation within the CCP in the coming months, make preparations in advance, such as: What to do if the CCP suddenly provokes external conflicts? What if Xi Jinping insists on continuing his tenure more forcefully in the future? Or even if there is a change in leadership, what policies might the next leader adopt, requiring comprehensive preparations internationally.