In a recent development from the Turkish intelligence department in early May, seven Chinese citizens suspected of engaging in espionage activities were apprehended on the spot. According to local media reports, the suspects were found in possession of IMSI catchers in their vehicle. This particular device has the capability to simulate fake signal towers, collecting data from nearby phones, which includes call records, conversations, and other information. Their primary targets were Chinese Uighurs fleeing to Turkey and local officials.
This espionage network is considered the most sophisticated one discovered so far. Unlike typical professional spy organizations, this group did not hire agents. Instead, they utilized ordinary individuals to conceal their identities and employed advanced surveillance technology to target their objectives. Officials revealed that some of the members of this group entered Turkey in March. The leader, identified by the initials ZL, arrived in Turkey five years ago to conduct reconnaissance and make preparations, including establishing shell companies for logistics and import-export, as well as studying the Turkish language.
IMSI catchers mimic the signals of legitimate mobile towers. When a targeted phone is approximately 50 meters away from an active “ghost station,” it automatically connects to the device, mistaking it for a regular phone signal tower. The intercepted communication data (including call details and location coordinates) was reportedly directly transmitted to contacts in China, referred to by the suspects as their “boss.” These devices were smuggled into Turkey in batches and then assembled. One person carried the antennas, another transported the batteries on different flights, while the rest of the components were brought in by other members.
Intelligence indicates that this group also targeted Turkish government officials, attempting to identify which officials had connections with Uighurs or Uighur groups and collect other sensitive information. Authorities believe that leader ZL received specialized spy training, but the other members seemed less trained. For instance, one Chinese citizen, known as ZYB, who only completed primary school education, was responsible for driving and operating the ghost stations near the targets, executing basic device operation tasks.
All seven suspects have denied being members of the criminal group and claim not to know each other. However, investigators have evidence to suggest that they held regular meetings and maintained contact.
Turkey is home to a significant population of Chinese Uighurs who have fled abroad. Human rights organizations have accused Chinese authorities of implementing policies of ethnic cleansing against the Uighur people, with hundreds of thousands of Uighurs detained in so-called “re-education camps” in Xinjiang. The Chinese government denies these allegations.
In 2024, Turkey arrested seven Chinese citizens of Uighur descent, accusing them of monitoring other Uighurs and organizations. The defendants claimed they were forced into espionage activities because Chinese intelligence officers threatened to harass their families in China.