After a month since the start of the US-China tariff war, on May 7th, the United States and China each announced that representatives will be sent to Switzerland this weekend for talks. Experts have pointed out differences between this round of talks and the negotiations of the US-China trade war seven years ago, predicting possible scenarios for the talks and analyzing the profound changes in Trump 2.0.
From May 10th to 11th, US Treasury Secretary Besent will meet with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng in Switzerland.
Compared to seven years ago (May 3-4, 2018) during the first round of trade negotiations of Trump 1.0, many aspects have changed, such as the location of the talks and the selection of negotiators. Back then, the Chinese negotiator was Vice Premier Liu He.
Liu He has been involved in formulating various long-term economic plans in China, holding long-term positions in the central government and serving as a “strategic adviser”, drafting economic speeches for Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping. At the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Liu He became a member of the Political Bureau.
He Lifeng previously served as the director of the National Development and Reform Commission of China, became a member of the Political Bureau at the 20th Congress, succeeded Liu He, and became the Vice Premier of the State Council, in charge of economic, financial, and industrial affairs.
On May 8th, American economist Huang David, in an interview with Epoch Times, stated that the biggest difference between He Lifeng and Liu He is not in economic ideology but in their political roles.
He mentioned that Liu He was seen as a technocratic bureaucrat with a certain reform and market-oriented stance, acting as a “translator” and “buffer” between China’s internal and external worlds. On the other hand, He Lifeng is a complete “political executor” and a close confidant promoted by Xi Jinping during his time in Fujian. He is more loyal than professional, and his mission is not negotiation but to uphold “political bottom lines”.
Sun Guoxiang, a professor specializing in international affairs and business at NHU, also told Epoch Times that He Lifeng is a former associate of Xi Jinping from Fujian and a core member of the Zhejiang New Army. Sun stated that He’s style is political loyalty, emphasizing a strong government and party leadership in the economy, and he is unfamiliar with international negotiations. In terms of foreign trade and economy, He Lifeng focuses on domestic demand and self-reliance, implying a more inward-focused approach.
He Lifeng will no longer serve as a buffer in China-US economic and trade negotiations like Liu He did, but instead will play a role in executing and coordinating with Xi Jinping’s economic strategies. He is expected to put more pressure on market-oriented reformists. Sun believes that as a negotiating representative, He Lifeng will have less room for practical compromises but will focus more on political guidance and ideology.
Huang David analyzed that compared to the first round of US-China trade negotiations seven years ago, three changes will likely occur in the negotiations in Switzerland.
First, there will be a significant decrease in negotiation flexibility.
Second, outward statements will place more emphasis on “political correctness” and a hardline posture.
Third, all commitments will depend more on internal power structures rather than market conditions. This is not conducive to reaching a sustainable trade agreement but aligns with Beijing’s current domestic governance needs.
Huang David pointed out that during Trump 1.0’s trade negotiations, it was more of a strategic tug-of-war rather than a designed process to reach an agreement. From 2018 to 2020, events such as “tariff pressure → negotiation pause → Meng Wanzhou incident → Phase One Agreement” gradually confirmed one thing: tactical concessions from Beijing could be forced, but structural concessions were never something to expect. The Trump team underestimated Beijing’s ability to “pretend, delay, and offer tactical promises”.
He suggested that in 2018, Trump still had the fantasy of “forcing Beijing to open up its markets” and wanted to “correct” the way China eroded the global economy through agreements. However, in 2025, Trump and the entire hawkish camp of the Republican Party view China as a system competitor that cannot coexist, not just a trade partner but a rival in civilization.
Trump 2.0 will no longer seek superficial agreements but will further stratify, institutionalize, and prolong economic issues into a segmented exercise of institutionalized cold war.
“The goal of these negotiations is not to ‘regain a fairer market’, but to de-emphasize supply chains from China, stop the outflow of high technology, decouple capital markets, and bring manufacturing back to the United States. The trade war is just a tool, with the goal of institutionally suppressing and technologically blocking.”
He believed this would be a competition lasting ten years or even longer, aiming not for an agreement but for weakening; not for peace but for clearly defined boundaries.
Sun Guoxiang also pointed out that the main goal of Trump 1.0 was to reduce trade deficits and change China’s unfair trade practices, using means such as tariff threats, negotiations, and signing agreements, with the core narrative being that China is a competitor.
On the other hand, the main goal of Trump 2.0 is to accelerate the decoupling of the US and Chinese economies, protect American supply chains and technology security. The approach and strategy are more direct and pressurizing, such as long-term tariffs and combating diversion trade, thus shifting the narrative to China as a strategic adversary. Trump’s focus is not only on reaching agreements but reshaping the global supply chain order.
“Even if the US experiences short-term market fluctuations or pressure from allies, the Trump administration seems less willing to compromise, moving from negotiation pressure to structural decoupling, expanding from unilateral tariffs to restrictions on technical personnel and finance.”
The shift towards a more closed, ideology-driven economic battle system on the Chinese side, “These changes show us low trust in dialogue, limited space for agreement, and a high-risk combative situation,” Sun Guoxiang concluded.