Recently, the visit of the Thai Prime Minister to China has once again brought focus to the China-Thailand high-speed rail project. Experts believe that due to the insolvency of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the initiative is contracting, with a main focus on increasing influence in Southeast Asia. This situation is not optimistic for Thailand.
This year marks the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Thailand. Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha conducted an official visit to China from February 5th to February 8th, meeting with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping, on February 6th. Besides agreeing to cooperate in combating telecom fraud, Xi Jinping expressed China’s willingness to coordinate with Thailand on development strategies and “implement flagship projects such as the China-Thailand railway.”
Xi Jinping mentioned the high-speed rail project connecting Bangkok with Kunming in southwest China, and highlighted other areas of potential cooperation such as the digital economy and electric vehicles.
The China-Thailand high-speed rail project has been under negotiation for years, facing several delays since its initiation ceremony in 2015. Prior to the Prime Minister’s visit, the Thai government stated that the first high-speed rail linking Laos and China is set to be operational by 2030, describing it as an opportunity for Thailand to integrate with the global economy.
However, there are doubts from outside observers. Will the Thai government delay the project again? Will the Thai people benefit from the high-speed rail? Will the country fall into a debt trap or compromise its sovereignty?
The Thai Ministry of Transportation’s report on the high-speed rail project confirms a total length of 609 kilometers divided into two phases. The first phase from Bangkok to Hua Hin spans 251 kilometers with an investment budget of 179 billion baht (approximately 5.3 billion USD), and construction is currently 36% complete. The second phase covering Hua Hin to Nakhon Ratchasima has a projected investment of 341 billion baht (around 10.1 billion USD).
This differs slightly from the official Chinese promotion of the China-Thailand railway cooperation project, which was planned to be a 867-kilometer double-track rail connecting various cities, showing a reduction of 258 kilometers.
A key figure in the pro-democracy movement, Fong Ye, noted in an interview that the rail project is a necessary development for Thailand. The existing old rail system is in disrepair, and the success of the China-Laos railway has spurred the Thai government to prioritize this infrastructure project as an achievement for the new Prime Minister’s administration.
He further explained that Thailand’s railway system operates on a meter gauge, which poses challenges for connecting to Laos. The issue of land acquisition for the rail project is also complex due to private property ownership in Thailand. There is resistance within Thailand due to fears of Chinese (Communist) control. For example, the rice-for-high-speed rail deal that led to the downfall of former Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra was seen as a betrayal of national interests by many in Thailand.
However, despite concerns, many Thai people enjoy traveling to Laos. The China-Laos railway facilitates quicker travel times, with a journey from Bangkok to Nakhon Ratchasima taking 12 hours compared to just three to four hours once entering Laos.
While the China-Laos railway officially opened in December 2021, Laos is facing a debt crisis from borrowing billions of dollars from China to construct the railway. To seek debt relief from Beijing, Laos had to allow China to control its power grid and permit Chinese security personnel to operate within its borders, leading to accusations of compromising sovereignty.
Fong Ye highlighted the flaws in the China-Laos railway system, such as limited capacity with only one daily train from Vientiane to Kunming. Laos had hoped the railway would boost its economy, but due to low export volumes to China, the practical usage remains limited.
“Thailand has a much stronger economy and future prospects compared to Laos. Their demands differ, as Thailand prefers technology over financial dependence, wanting to maintain autonomy and avoid Chinese control. China, seeking to enhance its influence in Southeast Asia, may have to make concessions. However, Thailand’s unstable political landscape complicates the situation,” Fong Ye added.
Thailand is divided into three power factions: the monarchy holds significant resources and wealth, the military government wields substantial power, and there have been attempts at democracy, although these regimes have faced challenges and instability.
Dr. Sun Guoxiang, a professor of International Affairs and Business at South China University, analyzed the Thai government’s emphasis on the 2030 high-speed rail project, noting Thailand’s ambition to enhance its regional position through infrastructure development to drive economic growth. However, challenges in funding, technical standardization, and regional political dynamics may impede the project’s progress and effectiveness.
In a meeting with the Thai Prime Minister, Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of consolidating strategic mutual trust between China and Thailand amidst significant global changes. In contrast, the U.S. decided to impose a 10% tariff on Chinese imports, effective from February 10th.
Dr. Sun Guoxiang speculated that amid U.S.-China trade tensions, China seeks diversified international partnerships to alleviate pressures from Western nations. However, China’s strategy predominantly involves multilateral collaborations. By focusing on the Belt and Road Initiative and strengthening ties with Southeast Asia, South Asia, and other regions, China aims to boost its economic and strategic influence.
In recent years, setbacks have affected the Belt and Road Initiative, with only the China-Laos railway and Indonesia’s Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail (142.3 kilometers) ready for operation. Myanmar abandoned a high-speed rail project connecting Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal due to a lack of progress despite a $20 billion investment commitment. Nonetheless, China has not abandoned this project yet.
华烽 expressed concerns over the complex relationships between small countries caught in the middle of two major powers. Thailand oscillating between the West and China, shift in policies under new leadership, and the potential challenges for Chinese dissidents in Thailand amid strengthening ties between the two nations.
He highlighted the plight of Chinese dissidents in Thai prisons, where conditions are dire, with overcrowded cells, minimal nutrition, and reports of deaths and illnesses among activists. The future of these dissidents heavily depends on how the U.S. strategizes against China’s influence.
华烽 concluded that while the Belt and Road Initiative may face obstacles elsewhere, China’s attempt to consolidate influence in Southeast Asia through the so-called “Greater East Asia Prosperity Circle” depicts a strategic shift after setbacks from Belt and Road. This trend highlights China’s focus on East and Southeast Asia, adapting to changing geopolitical dynamics in the region.