In today’s society, the role of weapons and military forces is endowed with a deeper meaning beyond slaughter. Powerful military strength is often used for deterrence, maintaining world peace, and ensuring human safety. Although wars have become more covert, they have never ceased. “Current Affairs Military” takes you to the forefront, to see the details and truths of the struggle between right and wrong.
At the weakest moment before Ukraine received the latest military assistance from the United States and the West, the Russian military seems to be gaining unprecedented tactical advantages. However, with the restoration of combat effectiveness by the Ukrainian armed forces, this battlefield superiority of the Russian military may soon disappear. From the perspective of strategic trends, Russia’s war resources cannot long resist the support that the US and the West provide to Ukraine. What’s worse is that its weak alliance maintained out of interest with China might crumble.
Recent developments indicate a shift in winds even before the US passed the Ukraine Security Assistance Act. On April 8, during Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to China and meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the tone from China had already changed. Gone is the talk of the “unlimited” partnership between China and Russia, as stated by the Chinese party leader a few days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Instead, the emphasis now is on adhering to the “Three Nos” principle of non-alignment, non-confrontation, and non-targeting of third parties. This seemingly indicates China’s attempt to distance itself from the murky waters of Putin’s war.
Indeed, China’s inconsistent statements are lies, as China hopes for a Europe mired in war and a Russia worn down by conflict. The so-called “unlimited friendship” is to deceive Putin and lead Russia into war; while the “Three Nos” principle is a lie to the international community, depicting itself as neutral and peaceful. In reality, China has supported Russia in the war, though not to the extent of “unlimited.”
A day after Lavrov’s visit ended, on April 11, Feng Yujun, a Russian expert at Peking University, published an article in The Economist predicting Russia’s ultimate failure in the war with Ukraine. He claimed that Russia’s failure was inevitable, foreseeing that the Russian military would be forced to withdraw from all Ukrainian territories, including Crimea.
While these views themselves are not surprising and may align with viewpoints put forth by any NATO country’s think tanks and could be objective, when coming from within the Chinese system, they become particularly notable. Peking University’s School of International Relations has historically served as an unofficial channel for signaling, used to convey hidden intentions when there are discrepancies between official public policy and the views of behind-the-scenes manipulators.
The information released by Feng Yujun could be a step in the evolution of the disagreements between China and Russia, indicating a possible change in China’s support for Putin’s Ukrainian war policy.
The dissemination of doubt about Russia’s chances of victory will help Chinese decision-makers justify their policy failures. People do not doubt that China will continue to support Russia. Even if Beijing’s commitments to Moscow waver, or some concessions are made, China will not condemn Russia’s aggression from a Western standpoint.
If Feng Yujun’s comments represent subtle signals released by China, it indicates Beijing’s dissatisfaction with Moscow’s plans and current progress, signaling a change in China’s description of the Sino-Russian axis. In fact, the shift from a commitment to build an “unlimited” partnership to the “Three Nos” principle of non-alignment, non-confrontation, and non-targeting of third parties reflects a significant change that has already taken place.
Especially after US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to China on April 26, China exhibited a narrow-minded opportunism, making it difficult to see China standing steadfastly with Moscow.
Blinken’s demands on China included not supporting Russia militarily, fair trade, and ensuring stability in the Asia-Pacific region, including the South China Sea and Taiwan. The Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that China and the US should be partners, not adversaries, emphasizing the importance of peace and stability. China even spoke in terms reminiscent of the US, stating they do not seek a new Cold War, changes to the Chinese system, trying to restrict China’s development through alliance relationships, and are not looking to conflict with China. However, Blinken’s statements did not mention the aforementioned “Four Nos.”
China’s admonition to Lavrov about the “Three Nos” principle signifies a slight turning away from Russia, while the “Four Nos” and “one Without” imposed on Blinken serve to cozy up to the US, revealing a soft underbelly – China’s reluctance to confront the US directly. Although China is still strengthening its confrontational stance with the US, Beijing will not choose to fully support Putin by breaking ties with Washington.
In his commentary, Feng Yujun stated that Beijing disconnecting from Moscow will be a major reason leading to Russia’s eventual failure. Just as Blinken stated at the Group of Seven summit on April 19, China is becoming the “primary provider” that Russia’s defense industry base needs.
During the 1990s and 2000s, Russia’s defense industry suffered heavy blows, causing many second and third-tier suppliers to disappear. By the start of the war in Ukraine, the loss of these suppliers left Moscow heavily reliant on Western imports, especially in electronics. This reliance made the sanctions imposed by the US on Russia have a significant impact, especially concerning high-priority dual-use products such as integrated circuits and radio equipment.
By 2022, China had intervened in circumventing sanctions on Russian arms production, leading to some of the sanctioned military or dual-use electronic products being widely utilized in the Russian missiles and drones attacking Ukraine. Beijing has essentially become Moscow’s military supply officer, a situation that increasingly worries Washington. Blinken mentioned at the G7 summit, “We see China (the CCP) sharing machine tools, semiconductors, and other military dual-use products, helping Russia rebuild its defense industry base. China cannot have both, it cannot afford it.” While they are attempting to build constructive relations with European countries, they are also exacerbating the biggest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War.
On April 12, US government officials stated that as of 2023, about 90% of the microelectronics used in Russian missile, tank, and aircraft production come from China. China is also one of the few countries helping Russia address the shortage of nitrocellulose, a key component in manufacturing gunpowder.
Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, wrote in Foreign Affairs that China and Russia are now more firmly aligned than at any time since the 1950s, and their partnership continues to promote the ongoing production of Russian weapon systems. He noted that Beijing gains not only money from the defense trade with Russia but also access to some advanced military technologies that China still needs, including S-500 anti-aircraft missiles, core technology for aviation engines, stealth submarines, and underwater warfare technologies.
While this indicates that the “Three Nos” principle of China is also a lie, it is not contradictory to the possibility that China may abandon the Putin regime at a critical moment because China’s ultimate goal is not to help Russia succeed but to exchange interests by taking advantage of Russia’s war predicament or pushing Russia deeper into the quagmire of war to restrain the US and the West for its own gain. However, this dangerous game might backfire on China.
If China challenges the West, maintains a closer defense-industrial partnership with Russia (even covertly), it will inevitably fall out with the West, inviting international sanctions and ultimately being shamed by Russia’s failure. Alternatively, to avoid the risk of Washington’s sanctions and to manipulate Putin, say by replacing the “unlimited” partnership with the “Three Nos” principle, Moscow will sooner or later turn against Beijing.
This is a precarious balance as Ukraine receives more advanced Western weapons, and Russia, in turn, demands increasingly more compensation from China, this delicate balance will become increasingly harder to maintain.