As the Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Xi Jinping’s most important aide, besides the two Vice Chairmen of the Military Commission, is the Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission. Recently, there have been widespread rumors both in overseas media and among circles of the second-generation reds in China that the Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, Miao Hua, has been taken away for investigation.
Former Chinese media personnel Zhao Lanjian revealed that in the past few days, rumors have been circulating in Beijing’s second-generation red WeChat group that Miao Hua was taken away by several soldiers wearing head covers, and many people in the community witnessed it.
On November 11, former colonel and officer of the Chinese Navy, Yao Cheng, stated on X platform that the infighting within the CPC Military Commission has escalated and become public, with Miao Hua, a member of the Central Military Commission and Director of the Political Work Department, being taken away for investigation.
After the 20th CPC National Congress in 2022, senior CPC military generals were investigated, and the relevant information was not promptly released by the CPC authorities. Often, the news would first circulate within Beijing’s second-generation red circles, then spread to overseas media, and finally be confirmed. Given this pattern, I believe that Miao Hua’s investigation may indeed be true.
Miao Hua was one of Xi Jinping’s most trusted confidants, and he was promoted and trusted by Xi shortly before the suicide of former Director of the Central Military Commission Political Work Department, Zhang Yang, on November 23, 2017.
Miao Hua’s investigation is an extraordinary blow to Xi.
Why? There are four reasons:
Shortly after the 20th CPC National Congress, Xi investigated and dealt with Li Shangfu, a member of the Central Military Commission, State Councilor, and Minister of National Defense of the CPC.
Li Shangfu’s problems mainly stemmed from his time as Minister of Equipment Development of the Military Commission. His investigation led to a group of senior officers in the Equipment Development Department of the Military Commission, as well as senior officials from major state-owned defense companies of the CPC.
Who was the Minister of Equipment Development of the Central Military Commission before Li Shangfu? It was the current Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia.
Zhang Youxia had been the Minister of General Armament Department of the Central Military Commission since 2012. Following Xi’s military reforms in 2015, Zhang Youxia became the first Minister of Equipment Development Department of the Military Commission after the reforms. Li Shangfu and his subordinates in the Equipment Development Department were, in fact, all former subordinates of Zhang Youxia. Xi investigating Li Shangfu and his associates was essentially investigating Zhang Youxia. This way, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xi Jinping, directly clashed with the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia.
Zhang Youxia’s roots in the military are much stronger than Xi’s. Firstly, Zhang Youxia’s father, Zhang Zongsun, was a founding general of the CPC. During wartime, Zhang Zongsun often served as Mao Zedong’s bodyguard and was nicknamed “Guardian General” by military historians, making him well-connected within the military. Secondly, Zhang Youxia had been in service for 56 years from 1968 to 2024, a military career length that Xi cannot match. Thirdly, Zhang Youxia is one of the few high-ranking CPC military officers who participated in the Sino-Vietnamese War and has combat experience.
During the 20th CPC Third Plenary Session in July this year, rumors surfaced that Xi suddenly fell ill and Zhang Youxia took the opportunity to undercut Xi’s military power. Considering a series of “de-Xi-ification” anomalies shown by senior CPC officials after the Third Plenum, this rumor may hold some truth.
A trend in the CPC’s high-level infighting is that if you investigate my people, I will investigate yours, if you move my people, I will move yours. Following the Third Plenum, news surfaced one after another about Xi’s confidants — former Navy Political Commissar Qin Shengxiang (Admiral), Army Political Commissar Qin Shutong (General), being investigated. At the same time, it was reported that the two major confidants who assisted Xi in the large-scale purges in the military — Xi’s chief secretary, Director of the Central Military Commission General Office, Director of the Chairman’s Office, Zhong Shaojun, was reassigned as the political commissar of the National Defense University; and Chen Guoqiang, Deputy Secretary in charge of discipline inspection at the Central Military Commission, Deputy Director of the Military Commission Supervision Office, was reassigned as the political commissar of the National University of Defense Technology.
Now, news has emerged about the investigation of Miao Hua, Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission, reflecting a potential escalation in the power struggle between Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping.
Miao Hua was promoted by Xi to the position of Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission in September 2017. By November 2024, he had served as the Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission for six years. During these six years, all senior officers promoted and trusted by Xi were appointed under Miao Hua’s assessment.
From September 2017 to November 2024, Xi promoted a total of 49 senior generals. During this period, there were even more promotions of lieutenant generals and major generals by Xi. The promotions of these lieutenant generals, major generals, and senior generals were all under Miao Hua’s responsibility for assessment.
When Jiang Zemin was the Chairman of the Military Commission, buying and selling military ranks was widespread within the army. Jiang Zemin’s confidants — Xu Caihou, and Guo Boxiong, during their tenure as Vice Chairmen of the Military Commission, sidelined Air Force Chairman Hu Jintao, engaged in rampant corruption, and military ranks were being exchanged for money at all levels, from lieutenant generals to major generals and senior generals. During that time, many high-ranking military officers bought their ranks with hefty sums of money.
After Xi Jinping took over as Chairman of the Military Commission, although he carried out anti-corruption efforts and investigated many senior military officers, he did not investigate the ultimate backstage mastermind of military corruption, former CPC leader Jiang Zemin. He also did not fundamentally reform the system and mechanisms that led to military corruption, nor did he fundamentally change the fact that the CPC military had become the most corrupt military. Did the aforementioned lieutenant generals, major generals, and senior generals give money to Miao Hua to buy their ranks? There are definitely many who did.
Prior to his latest position, Miao Hua served as the Navy Political Commissar, holding the rank of Admiral. He recommended numerous senior naval officers to Xi. For example, the newly appointed Minister of National Defense Dong Jun, who previously served as the Navy Commander. Dong Jun’s successor and current Navy Commander, Hu Zhongming, also received his promotion during Miao Hua’s tenure as the Navy Political Commissar. The current Rocket Force Commander Wang Houbin, who previously served as the Deputy Navy Commander, was likely recommended to Xi by Miao Hua.
The current Commander of the Eastern Theater Command, Lin Xiangyang, joined the 31st Army in 1983 and held various positions under Miao Hua’s tenure as Political Commissar of the 91st Division and Director of the Political Department of the 31st Army. Lin Xiangyang was most likely recommended by Miao Hua.
Did those recommended by Miao Hua give him money to buy their positions? Most likely.
At the 20th CPC Congress in 2022, Xi achieved “three consecutive terms” and reached the pinnacle of power. However, within less than a year following this, Xi faced at least three significant setbacks.
Firstly, Xi Jinping’s personally promoted and youngest party and state leader, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang, suddenly fell from grace.
Qin Gang served as the CPC Ambassador to the United States for only a year and a half before being promoted and trusted by Xi as the Foreign Minister; although he served as Foreign Minister for less than three months, Xi rapidly elevated him to deputy national-level State Councilor. This kind of rocket-like promotion likely bred resentment among many experienced ambassadors, deputy provincial and ministerial-level officials, and full provincial and ministerial level officials.
Qin Gang’s sudden downfall inflicted a significant blow not only on Qin Gang himself but also on Xi Jinping.
Secondly, a group of high-ranking military-political officials from the Rocket Force personally promoted and trusted by Xi were arrested en masse, involving the Rocket Force Commander, Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, and other senior officers. After a decade of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, this group of high-ranking officers known as the “Xi family army” betrayed Xi, dealing a substantial blow to his authority.
Thirdly, the downfall of the members of the Central Military Commission – State Councilor, and Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu and a group of senior officers under him, despite being subordinates of Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia, their promotion and placement had to be approved by Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xi Jinping. The fall of this group of high-ranking officers dealt a huge blow to Xi’s power.
The fall of these officials shows that Xi’s judgment, selection, and appointment of personnel were flawed.
After the former Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission, Zhang Yang, was investigated for serious corruption issues, Xi should have promoted a relatively reliable individual to take Zhang Yang’s place.
After much consideration, Xi chose Miao Hua. Xi served as the Secretary of the Party Committee of Fuzhou in 1990 and later became the Governor and Deputy Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee of Fujian until 2002. During this period, Xi concurrently served as the First Secretary of the Party Committee of the Fuzhou Military Sub-District and the Deputy Director of the National Defense Mobilization Committee of the Nanjing Military Region. Miao Hua served at the 31st Group Army located in Fujian from 1991 to 2004, overlapping with Xi’s work for over a decade. The fondness and trust Xi had for Miao were believed to have been established during that time.
Xi meticulously selected and ended up choosing a person who followed in Zhang Yang’s footsteps once again.
The downfall of Miao Hua deals a significant blow, not only to Miao Hua himself but particularly to Xi Jinping.
Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin failed to resolve the Taiwan issue, and Xi Jinping is eager to make a name for himself in history by reunifying Taiwan through force. In recent years, Xi has been preparing for the forcible reunification of Taiwan.
However, things do not always go as planned.
Xi initially intended to firmly control the military through anti-corruption efforts and military reforms, creating a “Xi family army” that strictly follows his orders. Unexpectedly, a series of troubles among high-ranking military officers within the military occurred successively, especially prominent among those personally promoted and trusted by Xi.
Before Xi came to power, he had no foundation in the military; Xi himself had not engaged in combat or had any military achievements; through his anti-corruption efforts within the military, Xi targeted over 200 “big tigers,” causing resentment among a group of people in the military; though Xi promoted and trusted a group of senior officers, how many are genuinely loyal to Xi? Even Xi himself has no certainty, trusts no one, continuously shuffles senior military officers, and now, even Miao Hua, considered Xi’s most trusted confidant in the military, has run into trouble. Whom can Xi trust now?
Furthermore, after 12 years in power, Xi made one misjudgment after another in internal and foreign affairs, creating a considerable number of enemies outside the military.
Xi desires to unify Taiwan through force, but before the war even begins, the individuals plotting against Xi from behind may already be taking action.
Zhao Lanjian, a former Chinese media figure, observed that shortly before Miao Hua’s arrest, China Central Television (CCTV) aired an unusual close-up photo of Xi. In the photograph, Xi’s hair was gray, his face appeared “unusually haggard,” and his expression was “distinctly listless and wooden.” “Xi’s eyes seemed slightly swollen, unable to fully open, turning into a mere slit, severe eye bags, and loose sagging skin from his chin to neck.” Those familiar with Xi in Beijing’s second-generation red circles interpreted these subtle features as signaling that China’s political crisis had reached a critical point and the immense pressure was about to crush Xi.
This understanding holds ground. Previously, I have mentioned that Xi bears the burden of all the mistakes from the Mao Zedong era, Deng Xiaoping era, Jiang Zemin era, and his own 12 years of administration. These mistakes, like four towering mountains, are burdens Xi cannot bear.
Miao Hua’s downfall is like another heavy blow to Xi Jinping’s core. How long can Xi hold on? It’s hard to say. One thing is certain: Xi’s suffering intensifies with each passing day.