In the face of being encircled by American and European technology, the Chinese Communist Party is promoting “technological self-reliance”. Geopolitical competition has become the fundamental driving force for China’s technological development. To this end, the CCP has strengthened its control over research institutions. However, experts point out that this poses a long-term risk to the quality of China’s scientific output.
Recently, during an inspection in Anhui, Chinese leader Xi Jinping stated that technological innovation is the path to achieving high-quality development and a key factor in enhancing the country’s overall strength. Technological innovation must rely on its own strength, accelerate the realization of high-level technological self-reliance, rather than relying on external forces.
This reflects Xi Jinping’s anxiety about the technological encirclement of China by the United States and Europe.
On October 7, 2022, the U.S. government issued a series of new export control regulations targeting China’s artificial intelligence and semiconductor industries. This new policy marks a significant reversal in U.S. trade and technology policy towards China over the past 25 years.
Firstly, the new policy restricts exports of advanced semiconductor technology to China based on the entire geographical range of China, rather than whether the exports are related to the military. Secondly, the previous export control policy aimed to allow China to achieve technological progress but constrain its pace, while the new policy significantly reduces China’s peak technological capabilities in the semiconductor industry.
This day marked the beginning of a new era in U.S.-China relations and international politics. Only 10 days after the new policy was issued, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated, “We are at a turning point,” adding, “The post-Cold War world has ended, and a fierce competition is underway to shape the next world. At the core of this competition is technology.”
During the next year’s two sessions, Xi Jinping told the Jiangsu delegation that China must “develop new dynamics and advantages” to “effectively respond to external pressure and containment.” In a speech to United Front advisers, he further stated that “comprehensive containment and encirclement by Western countries led by the United States pose unprecedented challenges to China’s development”.
Around the same time, outgoing State Councilor Xiao Jie stated that the specific motivation for the restructuring of the Ministry of Science and Technology was the “severe situation” of “international technological competition, containment, and suppression”.
These remarks by the CCP clearly acknowledge that geopolitical competition is the driving force behind the formulation of scientific and technological policies. Relations between the CCP and the United States, as well as many other developed democratic countries, continue to deteriorate, especially after Beijing’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
In 2006, the Chinese authorities listed “indigenous innovation” as a key policy focus in the “National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology Development”, but the CCP has never explicitly linked the U.S.-China competition with the innovation process itself.
Due to the importance of technological competition, the CCP has extended its control over scientific institutions, establishing the Central Science and Technology Commission in March 2023. This is a Party institution that ranks higher than the Ministry of Science and Technology.
Anna Ares, former deputy director of the public policy program at the Mercator Institute for China Studies and policy researcher, wrote that centralization aims to promote the aggregation of technical leaders and resources to advance core technologies and research areas quickly and smoothly.
Ares said that the Communist Party is trying to expand its influence in domestic scientific institutions, posing a long-term risk to the quality of China’s scientific output.
Party branches and party secretaries in universities and research institutions, like other public and commercial organizations in China, have been given higher status and decision-making power. The party organization that has always existed in universities and research institutions has become more prominent and powerful recently.
According to Ares, university staff are required to participate in ideological training courses organized by the Party, to a degree not seen since the reform and opening up. Xi Jinping mentioned the old slogan of “both red and expert” in his speeches to students, researchers, and managers.
In January 2024, some Chinese universities officially merged the Party committee with the office of the university president to form a higher leadership body, similar to what is known elsewhere in government as “one organization with two brands”. This unprecedented move vividly reflects the blurred boundaries between party affairs, party member management, and ideological control and academic research management.
Party control has brought various negative influences to China’s scientific innovation.
Ares further stated that since the reform and opening up, the penetration of the CCP and its officials into China’s scientific and technological innovation system has exceeded any previous level. More and more research has documented the Party’s attempts at top-level guidance and micro-level discipline.
While the specific impact on output remains difficult to determine, this politicization will make it more difficult for foreign entities to view Chinese counterparts as entirely professional partners.
Reliance on relationships to get ahead is still a common feature of China’s research environment, according to Han Xueying, a researcher at the Science and Technology Policy Institute (STPI) in Washington, DC. This has led to a phenomenon known as “guanxi”. For instance, when a person within a group achieves success or rises to a position of power, they tend to show favoritism towards those within their group.
Additionally, Han Xueying stated that the bureaucratic institutions for technological innovation established by the CCP have created a complex performance measurement system that combines global indicators with national traditions characterized by extensive assessment and ranking. Over the past two decades, success in the field of technological innovation has been almost entirely measured by internationally recognized publications, patents, and awards. Research organizations have executed this with great vigor, placing enormous performance pressure on their employees.
Based on Han Xueying’s interviews with Chinese researchers, the current research environment in China is not conducive to innovation or original research, as it values publication quantity over research quality. This environment encourages researchers to engage in research activities that bring short-term success rather than long-term, innovative, and riskier research, which hinders scientific breakthroughs.
A respondent from Shanghai Jiao Tong University wrote, “Pursuing publication quantity is short-sighted; no one wants to do long-term research.” A respondent from Sichuan University stated, “There is not enough freedom to conduct original and innovative research,” and “the reward system encourages short-term research.” A respondent from South China University of Technology pointed out, “Research projects lack a ‘big picture’ view, and there is not complete independence and freedom in conducting research.”
A respondent from Sun Yat-sen University believed, “People are doing research because they are forced to do research, people are publishing papers because they must publish papers. People focus excessively on immediate success. Few people are really interested in doing research; they only do so because they are forced. Very few actually solve any (real) research problems or conduct truly high-quality research.”
In conclusion, Ares emphasized that since the reform and opening up, the CCP and its officials’ infiltration of China’s science and technology innovation system has exceeded any previous levels. More studies have documented the party’s attempts at top-level guidance and micro-level discipline.
Although the specific impact on output remains difficult to determine, this politicization will make it increasingly challenging for foreign entities to view Chinese counterparts as entirely professional partners.