People’s attention to one of the focal points of the Gaza war is the fate of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, and indeed he did not disappoint, exiting in a dramatic fashion. However, his death will not end Israel’s operations against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Israel’s goal is to thoroughly eliminate Hamas to prevent future threats, while Hamas’s goal is simply to survive.
On October 17th, the Israeli military announced that Israeli forces encountered Hamas personnel inside a building in Gaza City, leading to an exchange of fire. Subsequently, Israeli Defense Forces tanks received orders to attack the building. Footage from a first-person view (FPV) drone showed a wounded Hamas commander sitting in a severely damaged room, with his final act hurling an object at the drone before being killed. Minutes later, Israeli artillery completely destroyed the building. Hours later, the man’s body was identified through DNA, teeth, and fingerprints as Sinwar.
Sinwar’s exit may seem accidental, but was in fact inevitable. Analysis from the War Research Institute indicates that Israel’s military operations last year, particularly targeting the underground tunnels in Gaza, set the conditions leading to Sinwar’s killing on October 16th. Sinwar and remnants of Hamas had been hiding in Gaza’s vast network of tunnels at least until August this year. Israel Defense Forces’ cleanup operation attempted to force Hamas leaders, including Sinwar, from underground to the surface by destroying the entire network. These actions had an effect in January this year, forcing Sinwar to leave the tunnels in Khan Yunis and relocate to Rafah, where Israeli forces then destroyed most of the tunnels, pushing Sinwar onto the surface in Rafah.
Forcing Hamas leaders, including Sinwar, to leave their underground hideouts and surface where they can be targeted was a deliberate part of the Israeli military’s operation. While the direct skirmish that led to Sinwar’s death was a chance encounter, it was a foreseeable consequence of Israel’s carefully planned broader operational strategy intended to ultimately eliminate all high-ranking Hamas leaders.
Given the vast disparity in ultimate goals between Israel and Hamas, Sinwar’s death is unlikely to significantly impact the overall situation in the Gaza war. To Israel, Sinwar was just a stumbling block, and Hamas internally is not likely to reconsider its basic strategy because of this event.
The War Research Institute suggests that Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chief Khalil al-Hayya is likely to succeed Sinwar. Al-Hayya was trusted by Sinwar, played a key role in ceasefire negotiations, and has stronger ties with Hezbollah and Iran compared to other Hamas leaders. However, recent reports indicate that former Hamas leader Khaled Mashal has taken over as acting leader of Hamas, handling crucial negotiation matters including those related to hostages and prisoners.
Regardless of who succeeds Sinwar, the primary hope now is for the Israeli military to cease fire and withdraw from Gaza, allowing Hamas to survive the war.
During a gathering to mourn Sinwar on October 18, al-Hayya stated that Sinwar’s death did not alter Hamas’s negotiation stance. He declared that Hamas will not release Israeli hostages until Israeli Defense Forces fully withdraw from the Gaza Strip and release Palestinian prisoners. Hamas’s bottom line has consistently demanded a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, a permanent ceasefire, the release of Palestinian prisoners, unrestricted return of Gaza Palestinians to the northern part of the Strip, and the full reconstruction of Gaza. This stands in stark contrast to Israel’s strategic goals of rescuing hostages and ensuring lasting security.
Israeli and U.S. officials confirmed on October 18 that mediators believe resuming ceasefire talks in Doha, Qatar and Cairo, Egypt remains distant. Israel may have to wait until a new Hamas leader is in place before negotiations can resume. Israeli officials are considering the impact of Sinwar’s death on hostage negotiations, fearing that it may provoke Hamas to start executing the detained hostages. Senior Israeli officials discussed with Benjamin Netanyahu how to prevent Hamas from retaliating against Israeli hostages.
It’s apparent that Hamas realizes the only bargaining chip they have on the path to survival is the Israeli hostages still being held. They may seek to leverage the hostages for breathing room and political gains. In late August this year, Hamas executed six hostages attempting to incite protests within Israel, pressuring Netanyahu to accept Hamas’s ceasefire demands. Hamas mistakenly believed that Israeli society was inherently fragile, thinking that sparking internal protests or societal division could force Netanyahu’s government to yield to Hamas’s ceasefire demands.
Each successive leadership of Hamas seems to harbor a kind of paranoid arrogance, believing that the October 7, 2023 attack could hasten Israel’s collapse, garnering support from allies to decimate Israel. However, they underestimated their opponents and even misjudged their friends.
When Sinwar and his group planned the “grand operation” against Israel in October last year, they chose the timing when Netanyahu attempted to weaken Israel’s Supreme Court and make it subservient to right-wing legislative bodies, triggering internal turmoil in Israel. They intended to exploit Israel’s internal rifts to magnify the country’s divisions through terror attacks, quickening Israel’s collapse.
Hamas’s leadership overestimated their own cognition, underestimating Netanyahu’s resolve to crush Gaza and the power of Israeli unity in times of crisis. Sinwar’s errors not only led to his own demise but also nearly brought down Hamas. In fact, Hamas’s terror attacks and hostage-taking did not widen Israel’s divides but instantly cemented them.
Hamas has thus invited a total war. Israelis felt humiliation and shock due to intelligence failures but quickly rallied to support Netanyahu’s goal of a comprehensive victory. The hubris of Hamas leadership not only brought upon themselves a fatal end but also caused significant harm to Palestinian civilians in Gaza. Hamas’s catastrophic errors also prompted Hezbollah’s involvement, not only bringing disaster upon themselves but also inflicting the pain of war on Lebanese and northern Israeli civilians. The Houthis were targeted by the U.S., UK, and Israel for supporting Hamas attacks on Red Sea crossing vessels. Simultaneously, this escalated direct clashes between Israel and Iran, potentially intensifying regional warfare.
Now, Hamas is using hostages to coerce Israel into ending the war on Hamas’s terms, essentially demanding Israeli surrender to allow Hamas to rebuild its military organization over the next years, posing a threat to Israel once again. This is clearly unacceptable to Israel, as Hamas’s rebuild, no matter how long it takes, will inevitably lead Israel to fight again for security and survival.