The ongoing Ukrainian counter-offensive against Russia continues, with the Russian military temporarily unable to organize an effective counterattack. This successful operation has sparked optimism among observers, who believe that the days of sitting down at the negotiating table to end the war are not far off. The Kremlin failed to anticipate the Ukrainian military’s plans, which have also caught Beijing off guard. The People’s Liberation Army of China is currently formulating plans for an attack on Taiwan and now must consider the possibility of a Taiwanese counterattack. During Chiang Kai-shek’s era, Taiwan had once devised various plans for launching counterattacks on the mainland.
On August 6th, Ukrainian forces penetrated the Kursk region in Russia, and the various reinforcements mobilized by the Russian military have struggled to effectively resist. The Russian military’s most capable forces are currently deployed on the eastern front in Ukraine, and the Kremlin, for now, has no plans to shift these forces back for defense but rather aims to maintain its original high-paced offensive posture.
Moscow aims to foil Ukraine’s strategy of drawing the Russian forces away from their positions but is finding it challenging to quickly amass elite troops to drive the Ukrainians out of Russia. The Kremlin has mandated the expulsion of Ukrainian forces by October 1st. Ukrainian forces have seized control of 1,263 square kilometers of land, including 93 settlements in the Kursk region. Moscow may tolerate this situation for at least another month, as making a decision is proving to be a difficult choice.
Russian airborne troops from the Zaporizhia region of Ukraine’s 56th Regiment have been redeployed to the Kursk region, as well as multiple units, such as the Russian Navy’s 810th Marine Infantry Brigade, previously stationed in the Kharkiv direction of Ukraine.
While the Russian military can currently maintain its offensive in eastern Ukraine, the assault on Kharkiv in the north is heavily impacted. The frequency of Russian fighter jets dropping glide bombs in the direction of Kharkiv has significantly decreased from 30-40 times per day to approximately 1-4 times per day. This reduction has relieved pressure on the Ukrainian defense in the northern region, enabling them to adjust their deployments and reinforce their defense line in the east.
Ukrainian drones continue to conduct deep attacks on various targets inside Russia, including airports and railway ferries. Ukraine is seeking leverage for future negotiations, as the White House has continued to give the green light, announcing a new round of $125 million in military aid on August 23rd.
The Russian military’s inability to quickly drive out Ukrainian forces has put them under dual political and military pressure. Indian Prime Minister Modi visited Kyiv on August 23rd, expressing hope for an opportunity to exchange views on peacefully resolving the current conflict in Ukraine. Given Modi’s past visits to Moscow and now to Kyiv, it is unclear whether he intends to act as a mediator. With Modi’s relationship with Putin, India may be an effective mediator compared to China’s pseudo-mediation, garnering support from various countries.
On August 21st, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited Moscow. The Xinhua News Agency’s statement made no mention of the Russia-Ukraine conflict or the recent Ukrainian counteroffensive.
Li’s visit comes at a sensitive moment, with speculation that Moscow may face unexpected challenges. At this time, Beijing is not willing to lose the opportunity to provide military assistance to Russia, especially as the United States has recently expanded sanctions to 42 Chinese companies. China is also reluctant to align itself with a potentially failing alliance. Putin has expressed anticipation for Xi Jinping’s participation in the BRICS summit hosted by Russia in October.
The Kremlin’s statement translated the opening remarks of Li’s meeting with Putin. Li mentioned feeling the “optimism of the Russian people.” Ukraine’s counteroffensive has put Moscow in a difficult position. While Li outwardly avoids direct comments, his mention of feeling the “optimism” seems subtly ironic. Moscow urgently needs more support from China and likely cannot afford to prioritize these nuances.
Chinese Army Commander Li Mingqiao has also arrived in Russia, a similarly delicate situation for the Chinese military. The failure of the Russian and Chinese military to anticipate and prepare for the Ukrainian counteroffensive suggests that China may have also been unaware, as they would have at least alerted Moscow if they had known.
The Chinese military has been closely monitoring changes on the Russia-Ukraine battlefield, but their intelligence capabilities appear insufficient. Despite launching several military satellites in recent years, China has not been able to fully ascertain the battlefield situation. China offers satellite services to Russia, a move which has been sanctioned by the U.S., revealing the limitations of China’s satellite capabilities in actual combat scenarios. Additionally, Beijing likely faces other challenges at home.
On August 22nd, China commemorated Deng Xiaoping with high-profile events. The Chinese leadership emphasized the necessity of not abandoning non-peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan issue. The Chinese Military Commission is still preparing plans to attack Taiwan, but now must reassess the possibility of Taiwan emulating Ukraine in launching a counteroffensive.
On August 23rd, Lai Ching-teh arrived in Kinmen to participate in the 66th anniversary commemoration of the “823 Artillery Battle.” He stated, “Our goal is to promote peaceful development across the strait… We no longer seek to attack the mainland, but we are not willing to be ruled by the Communist Party and will continue to lead a life based on democracy, freedom, human rights, and the rule of law.”
On the same day, a large number of Chinese military aircraft provocatively crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, displaying hostile intentions. While Lai emphasized a reluctance to attack the mainland again as a means to eliminate hostility and preserve peace, the Chinese leadership may interpret his words differently.
Both Moscow and Beijing had believed that Ukraine would not counterattack Russia, a severe misjudgment now evident. Likewise, China had assumed Taiwan would not launch another attack on the mainland but likely dares not think the same now.
Lai’s statement of “no longer attacking the mainland” may be intended to clarify his stance and avoid misunderstandings, yet China might perceive it differently. China’s logic and actions are consistently abnormal, making it challenging for them to comprehend normal thinking and statements. China continues to promote laws on confidentiality and espionage, along with heightened emphasis on security, leading to a growing sense of crisis that they may not believe Taiwan’s declaration of no longer attacking the mainland.
If the Chinese military intends to concentrate its forces for a quick assault on Taiwan, theoretically, they could temporarily forgo spreading forces to attack Kinmen. However, in light of lessons from the Ukraine situation, if China decides to go to war, they would likely target Kinmen first but cannot completely prevent a Taiwanese counteroffensive.
At the end of 1949, after Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan, he outlined clear goals for a counterattack on the mainland. In 1953, the Taiwanese military devised the “Guang Operation Plan,” including two scenarios A and B. Plan A treated Fujian Province as a base for counterattacks, advancing towards Guangdong to secure the southern region within 4-6 months; Plan B envisioned a counterattack with U.S. assistance.
In 1957, Chiang ordered the establishment of the “Zhongxing Operation Office” to draft a new counterattack plan, the “Huanglong Plan,” which included armed assaults, airborne operations, sabotage, economic warfare, psychological operations, and 16 action plans.
In 1958, the U.S. confidentially shared plans for nuclear attacks on mainland China with Chiang, targeting areas to drop atomic bombs upon enemy gathering spots, amplify the atomic bomb impact zone in front of Kinmen, and predict areas for recovery after landing by the Nationalists, following a potential nuclear bomb drop. However, these plans were in response to a Communist military offensive, not actively supporting Taiwan’s initiative for a “counterattack on the mainland.”
Back then, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Chiang issued a joint communique pledging not to reclaim the mainland by force to maintain “world peace,” stressing that the treaty between the two countries was “defensive.” Still, Chiang secretly devised various counterattack plans.
At the end of 1958, Chiang ordered preparations for the “Wuhan Plan,” deploying airborne forces for sabotage behind enemy lines and promoting anti-Communism; the plan covered areas such as the borders of Fujian, Jiangxi, and Guangdong provinces as well as key coastal towns, and strategies like disrupting communication links and ambushing. Chiang also focused on guerrilla forces in northern Myanmar and formulated plans like the “Rainy Season Plan” and “Kangding Plan.” In 1957, the “Anxi Plan” was executed, sending 3,000 troops to launch a surprise attack in southern Yunnan. In the winter of 1958, a special Taiwanese force of 1,200 personnel headed to northern Myanmar. In April 1959, operations like the “Xinghua Plan” and “Black Flag Plan” were implemented, aiming to airdrop weapons and ammunition to the troops in Myanmar to reclaim Yunnan as the second base for anti-Communist restoration efforts. Subsequent plans aimed to open new battlefronts in Laos and Thailand but faced logistical challenges and opposition from the U.S., leading to the return of several thousand troops and civilians from Myanmar to Taiwan.
In 1960, Chiang secretly drew up the “Tianma Plan,” later revised to the “Yelong Plan,” dispatching intelligence officers to infiltrate southern, southwestern, and northwestern China. During the planned airborne operations in 1961, bad weather forced a delay. Later, Taiwan’s U-2 reconnaissance aircraft piloted by Taiwanese pilots was shot down, halting the airborne program.
In 1961, Taiwan developed the “Haiwei” Plan, aiming to airdrop special operations teams and intelligence personnel into mainland China. Chiang believed that by dropping a 3,000-5,000-strong assault force, it would effectively ignite a revolution to overthrow the Communist regime.
In 1962, as mainland China faced a total failure in the Great Leap Forward, Chiang saw an opportunity for a counterattack, formulating five categories with twenty-six action plans and 214 staff research cases. Bold landing operation concepts included counterattack forces disembarking from Taiwan by ship to landing points like Jiangmeno, Dache, Hulai, and Shishiqiutou, and launching attacks from Kinmen to Xiamen, utilizing about four field infantry divisions and one Navy Marine Infantry Regiment. Later plans also involved landing from Shantou in Guangdong. However, internal assessments suggested significant logistical challenges even if Xiamen were captured, highlighting the difficulties in supply routes.
By the end of 1962, the “Haiwei” operation began, with nine Taiwanese units air-dropped along the Guangdong coast; near the end of 1963, two groups landed in Xiapu, Fujian, and Nanzu Dao. Chinese data indicated that between October 1962 and January 1965, a total of 40 groups and 594 Nationalist fighters were eliminated. By 1965, the total Taiwanese involvement in the “Haiwei” operation was 1,800 troops, with less than a third surviving.
In 1965, two Taiwanese naval operations met with Chinese speedboat ambushes, leading Chiang to reflect on severe leaks in his diary. After Chiang’s death, Chiang Ching-kuo essentially abandoned the counterattack plans. In 1991, Lee Teng-hui announced the termination of mobilization during the suppression of Communist factions. Over the next three decades, few dared to resurrect plans for a counterattack on the mainland.
Today, as Ukraine counterattacks Russia, China’s plans for an attack on Taiwan face concerns about potential counterattacks. If China decides to wage war recklessly, the U.S. and its allies may support Taiwan’s participation in counterattacks. Hence, the Chinese military’s plan for attacking Taiwan now faces an added headache.
[Original source: Epoch Times]