Taiwan’s High Court concluded the trial of military personnel involved in espionage activities, revealing that Colonel Xie Mengshu of the Army Aviation Special Operations Command was instigated to conspire to fly a CH47 twin-rotor heavy transport helicopter to defect to the mainland. The eight defendants in the case were sentenced to a maximum of 13 years in prison. Taiwanese experts believe that the sentencing was too lenient and consider this espionage case to be just the tip of the iceberg, calling on the government to strengthen anti-Communist infiltration from various aspects.
According to the High Court’s ruling, it was discovered during the trial of retired Army officer Chen Yuxin’s espionage case that he recruited retired Major Xiao Xiangyun and retired Colonel Xie Bingcheng to establish an organization in Taiwan. These two individuals then lured six active-duty military officers to provide military documents, film surrender videos, etc. Xiao and Xie were sentenced to 13 and 8 years in prison, respectively, with Chen Yuxin currently being wanted. In particular, Colonel Xie Mengshu of the Aviation Special Operations Command was sentenced to 9 years for plotting to fly a military helicopter to defect.
It was reported that after businessman Chen Yuxin retired from the military, he was recruited by agents of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021. The Investigation Bureau obtained information in 2022 that Chen first lured active-duty officer Xiao Xiangyun to join, who then recruited Xie Bingcheng. Xiao Xiangyun, in August and September 2021, obtained defense plans for the Hualien and Kinmen regions and handed them over to Chen Yuxin, receiving bribes of NT$620,000, NT$600,000, and NT$700,000, respectively.
Xie Bingcheng, between the end of 2022 and March 2023, successively recruited Colonel Xie Mengshu of the 601st Brigade of the Army Aviation Special Branch, Officer Hong Ruiyang of the 104th Infantry Brigade, and active-duty soldier Lu Junfang. Xie Bingcheng instigated Xie Mengshu to fly a CH-47 Chinook military helicopter to defect to China, with Xie Mengshu devising a defection plan; Hong Ruiyang provided training plans to the Army Command; and Lu Junfang filmed a “I’m willing to surrender to the People’s Liberation Army” psychological warfare video. The three individuals received bribes ranging from NT$556,000 to THB40,000, NT$446,000, and NT$10,000.
Additionally, a soldier named Liu Liqi took advantage of his duty in May 2023 to steal classified documents from a secure cabinet that he was not authorized to access, in order to spy on military secrets.
Furthermore, the Investigation Bureau discovered in this case that the Chinese Communist Party used virtual currency as a new form of crime to pay for rewards.
The Chinese aircraft carrier Shandong passed through the Taiwan Strait twice in May and June last year. At the time, media reports mentioned that it was to assist the defection of the CH47 helicopter.
Former Dean of the Political Warfare College of the National Defense University of Taiwan, General Yu Zongji, told Epoch Times that this espionage case had a relatively dramatic plot, but it is just the tip of the iceberg.
He pointed out that at that time, the Chinese aircraft carrier fleet was conducting exercises in the waters east of Taiwan in an attempt to coordinate with the defectors, allowing Taiwanese helicopters to land on the Chinese aircraft carrier. If these defectors had succeeded, it would have been a significant blow to the ruling party, the military, and the morale of the soldiers in Taiwan. Fortunately, the Taiwanese military had relevant precautions in place, preventing the defection incident from happening.
Yu Zongji believes that in view of the national security threats Taiwan faces, the sentences handed down in this case were clearly too lenient.
“After 2024, China has escalated its ‘gray zone’ operations against Taiwan, with infiltration pervasive and new methods being used. Apart from temptations at banquets followed by blackmail, there is evident collaboration with underground moneylenders near military bases. Some officers and soldiers may need cash advances from these lenders, which could escalate. If they are unable to repay, they may have to trade stolen military secrets in exchange,” he remarked.
He pointed out that the issue goes beyond defection; the Chinese military also demands that these officers and soldiers cooperate in filming videos of ‘rebellion’ or ‘surrender on the spot.’ If there were to be future military action against Taiwan, China would undoubtedly make extensive use of such videos to affect the confidence and resistance of Taiwan’s forces, creating a sense of surrender or mutual suspicion, ultimately impacting Taiwan internally and leading to military morale collapse.
Chinese military intimidation of Taiwan continues. The Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan stated on the 23rd that from 6 a.m. yesterday to 6 a.m. today, it detected 41 instances of Chinese aircraft approaching Taiwan, with 32 instances of them flying past the median line into the airspace of the north, southwest, and east, and detected 7 instances of Chinese naval vessels, making a total of 48 Chinese aircraft and vessels carrying out operations near Taiwan, with some aircraft flying as close as 63 nautical miles to Gueilunbi.
Yu Zongji said that the consensus within Taiwan now is that the military threat from China is not terrifying because of Taiwan’s military capabilities, along with firm allies, increased defense budget investments, improved training, and independent defense weapons. In the recent Russia-Ukraine war, it can be seen that China would face significant challenges if attempting military action to land in Taiwan.
“Taiwan is facing Chinese cognitive warfare, including internal infiltration within the Taiwanese military, which will undoubtedly intensify. For example, Xiamen University recently proposed a so-called takeover plan to establish a ‘shadow government’ in Taiwan and exploit retired military and civil servants in Taiwan internally,” he pointed out.
He stated that the circling of Chinese warplanes and warships around Taiwan, which poses a visible threat, is not the real cause for concern. “The real fear lies in the unseen infiltration. The recent cases are just the tip of the iceberg,” he emphasized.
On the 23rd, Taiwan’s Control Yuan stated that the number of espionage-related cases detected by the country’s military security department has significantly increased in recent years. The targets and infiltration methods are different from the past. From 2011 to 2023, Taiwan had cracked down on 40 spy cases, three times the number from 2001 to 2010, involving 113 military and civilian personnel, with several cases of ‘top-secret’ defense secrets leaked.
The National Security Bureau of Taiwan stated on August 23 that since President Lai Ching-te took office on May 20th, 6 new national security defense cases involving Chinese coercion of grassroots officials and espionage have been uncovered, indicating a significant increase in the investigation of related national security cases.
Assistant Researcher Zhong Zhidong of the Taiwan Institute for National Defense Security told Epoch Times that the significant increase in espionage cases highlights the effectiveness of counterintelligence efforts, but more importantly, it underscores the relentless infiltration by the Chinese Communist Party against Taiwan. Authoritarian regimes like the CCP will go to great lengths to conduct illegal intelligence collection activities beyond international laws and regulations being detrimental to vulnerable points in democratic societies, so special vigilance needs to be exercised.
He noted that during the civil war between the KMT and the CCP, spies played a critical role, and Taiwan must heed the lessons of history. If precautions against spies continue to be lacking, the leakage of military secrets to the Chinese military would also harm allied countries, affecting American trust in Taiwan, for example.
As a countermeasure against Chinese infiltration, Yu Zongji proposed several suggestions:
First, there must be a prompt consensus on responding to threats to Taiwan’s survival and development from external threats by transcending party lines and uniting outwardly.
Second, within Taiwan, through educational means, every citizen and organization should have a consensus on responding to external threats. As the CCP’s extensive united front organizations infiltrate through cultural, educational, and religious exchanges, various disguised forms enter Taiwanese democratic society, education must be used at the forefront to raise vigilance and immediate counter-reaction, along with rejection.
Third, strengthening the military’s ‘security and defense manpower,’ relevant units should be valued, receiving more resources and manpower to face China’s comprehensive infiltration effectively across departments.
Fourth, Taiwan currently needs an interdepartmental government organization response group to address China’s all-encompassing infiltration.
Assistant Researcher Gong Xiangsheng of the Taiwan Institute for National Defense Security also told Epoch Times that although the methods of Chinese infiltration are evolving, they still center around money and seduction targeting human weaknesses. Vigilance should begin with closely monitoring abnormal personnel behavior, especially by strengthening information control of classified operations and continuing political warfare propaganda for secrecy and counter-espionage.
Assistant Researcher Hong Mingde of the Political and Military Arts and Concepts Research Institute of China expressed to Epoch Times that Taiwan should enhance the national defense awareness of all citizens. He believes that whether it be military personnel or the general public, everyone should have a sense of national security consciousness concerning Taiwan, with each person having a duty to protect against espionage activities, avoid violating relevant laws, and contribute to safeguarding Taiwan’s national security.
Assistant Researcher Zhong Zhidong of the Taiwan Institute for National Defense Security recommended that the deterrence effect of current penalties for spies should also be reviewed, considering a return to military trials to enhance deterrence. Additionally, there should be strengthened intelligence cooperation with allied partners, such as the Five Eyes Alliance.