On June 28, Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping signed and issued the “Law on Rural Collective Economic Organizations,” which is set to be implemented next summer. Why did the CCP rush to introduce this law just before the upcoming Third Plenary Session? What is its purpose? This article discusses the author’s views on this issue.
The law refers to rural collective economic organizations, which trace back to the agricultural cooperatives promoted by the CCP in the early 1950s.
After seizing power in 1949, the CCP immediately carried out land reform in rural areas by inciting peasants to fight against landlords. Within about three years, over two million landlords were killed, and more than 700 million mu of land was taken from them and distributed to over 300 million peasants. However, shortly after peasants obtained land, the CCP changed its stance and began the comprehensive movement of agricultural collectivization in 1953. Through administrative orders, peasants were required to hand over all land, production tools, and materials to agricultural cooperatives, establishing collective ownership of rural land. Over the years, a management system based on people’s communes, three-level ownership, and production brigades was implemented nationwide. The commune was the most basic political power structure of the CCP state, with production brigades managing thousands of mu of farmland and thousands of people’s production and living. Below the production brigades were production teams, serving as basic accounting units. Peasant members had to participate in collective labor organized by the production teams and receive labor rewards based on individual labor contributions. By the end of 1956, 96.3% of households nationwide had joined agricultural cooperatives, as documented.
Why did the CCP launch the agricultural collectivization movement and turn farmers’ private land into collective ownership? Because the CCP realized that their ability to seize power relied on inciting peasant revolutions, as history had seen numerous successful uprisings led by peasants. They believed that controlling peasants was crucial to maintaining power, and the key to controlling peasants was to control the land they depended on for survival. Therefore, the CCP learned from the Soviet Union’s practices and felt secure only when land was firmly held in the name of public ownership.
How did agricultural cooperatives bind farmers? Within people’s communes, peasants’ clothing, food, housing, and transportation were all under collective control. The commune system encompassed three-tier management organizations: communes, brigades, and teams. All able-bodied men aged 16-60 and women aged under 55 were designated as “full labor force” and required to work at least about 300 days a year. The elderly, weak, and women were also required to work a certain amount of days annually. Clearly, the CCP used a strong hand to tightly bind hundreds of millions of peasants to the land in rural areas. Peasants lost their freedom entirely; they could not produce freely, trade freely, let alone migrate freely. The livelihoods of peasants were entirely in the hands of the CCP.
This system created by Mao Zedong, the largest agricultural slave concentration camp in human history – the people’s commune – led to the greatest tragedy of tens of millions of Chinese peasants starving to death from 1959 to 1962. Undoubtedly, the rural collective economic organization is the rope the CCP uses to bind peasants, and Chinese peasants are the real victims!
The people’s commune system lasted until 1984. Over the twenty-eight years, rural collectives first had to pay agricultural taxes and hand over grain to the state free of charge, known as the “public grain.” In the 1950s, 40% of the national fiscal revenue came from agricultural taxes – public grain. Besides contributing public grain, collectives had to fulfill the state’s quota of grain purchase. The pricing of this part of the grain was calculated at a lower price according to government regulations, creating a ‘scissors gap’ between agricultural and industrial prices. Scholars estimated that in 1957, the gap amounted to 339.9 billion yuan in 1957. This pressure on farmers had a significant impact on their daily lives.
After the end of the Cultural Revolution, the CCP faced a comprehensive economic collapse and widespread public grievances, leading to a crisis of legitimacy. The CCP had to recognize the three self-management system in Xiaogang Village, Anhui Province and release a bit of freedom to farmers to avoid the crisis. Around 1980, the CCP began rural reforms and implemented the household responsibility system. In 1984, the people’s communes were abolished. Subsequently, the name of agricultural cooperatives was changed to rural cooperative economic organizations, with brigades called economic cooperatives, and teams known as economic cooperation societies. Essentially, it was swapping one method for another – land remained collectively owned, but contracted to farmers. Farmers could autonomously decide on production and sales, but still had to pay agricultural taxes per mu, comply with grain collection quotas, and endure the exploitation of the price scissors gap. It was not until 2006 that the CCP abolished agricultural taxes.
After the dissolution of the communes in 1984, remnants of the shackles that bound farmers remained through the control of farmland, homestead land, collective assets, and rural household registration, continuing to bind them.
Now, forty years have passed. What is the current situation of rural collective economic organizations?
Due to the long-standing dual rural-urban management system in China that created significant disparities between urban and rural populations, poverty and inequality were already pervasive before the economic reforms. However, post-reform, these disparities worsened dramatically. Rural areas can be broadly categorized into three types:
The first type comprises economically developed regions where most rural land has been requisitioned. Some areas have transformed into urban villages, with no farmland remaining. Villages here operate under various forms of cooperative economies, renting out many properties and distributing substantial profits to residents. Many villages have adopted a shareholding system, quantifying communal assets into shares for registered villagers. However, this system has produced challenges, such as the exclusion of women who did not receive shares, leading to continuous appeals and protests. Moreover, new daughters-in-law and grandchildren are also excluded from shares, while shareholdings cannot be transferred or removed. These issues have sparked conflicts and disputes, posing long-term challenges to rural social stability.
The second type encompasses underdeveloped regions where parts of village land have been requisitioned; however, resulting income is often unjustly distributed among village officials and residents. With limited collective income, many villages have become economically stagnated, causing most able-bodied adults to seek work elsewhere. This exodus has led to subsequent generations losing ties to agriculture, exacerbating concerns on future agricultural labor.
The third type involves economically backward regions marked by agricultural decline, desolation in rural areas, and deep-rooted poverty. These areas paint a grim picture of rural life characterized by extreme poverty. The plight has driven many young adults to urban areas in search of work, leaving villages populated mainly by the elderly, women, and children. These demographics rely on agriculture for survival but are barely able to make ends meet. This dire landscape has resulted in tragic incidents like the 2016 Yang Gailan case in Gansu Province, where poverty-stricken circumstances led a mother to commit an unfathomable act of infanticide before taking her own life, followed by her husband upon his return. The family of six was tragically consumed by poverty, manifesting the suffering endured by these forgotten rural masses.
Due to the lack of legislation by the CCP for rural collective economic organizations, creating a legal structure for their activities, an array of issues has plagued rural areas for over forty years:
1. Land management issues have persisted over the years, fostering conflicts and tensions among the government, land users, village officials, and residents, leading to collective unrest like the prominent Wukan village land dispute in 2011.
2. The growing discord between village officials and residents has resulted in recurring conflicts, even violent incidents where some unscrupulous village officials exploit and oppress villagers, resulting in multiple killings of village officials each year.
3. Economic challenges plague economically developed regions with widespread mismanagement of collective assets and finances. With commercial properties, factories, or warehouses under collective ownership, the opaque and corrupt financial management often leads to public demands for transparency in village finances.
4. The prevalent issue of migrant workers, with a reported total of 295.62 million rural laborers nationally in 2022, highlights how Chinese farmers are relegated as second-class citizens with minimal protection and rights, especially concerning urban migration.
Migrant workers represent one of the most vulnerable groups, as acknowledged by CCP leader Xi Jinping at the 2020 Rural Work Conference, where he admitted that economic fluctuations primarily impact migrant workers.
So why has the CCP long avoided legislation in these matters?
Throughout history, the CCP managed rural society using policies rather than legal frameworks, operating on the basis of rule by man rather than rule of law, as their policies could be adapted at will. The inconsistency of CCP policies became a common lament among rural residents – “the CCP’s policy changes like the phases of the moon.” Without legislation, the CCP could exert control and exploit peasants at their whim, allowing for arbitrary extraction of resources and wealth from rural areas without recourse to legal protections. Peasants were left defenseless, unable to defend their rights through the legal system. This lack of legislation has been a deliberate choice by the CCP to maintain unchecked control and authority over rural areas, exploiting farmers for their benefit.
Now, why the rush for this new law? The author believes:
1. The CCP’s next step is to enhance control over rural areas and farmers. With the current economic downturn leading to massive layoffs and economic uncertainties, the CCP recognizes that the migration of millions of rural migrant workers back to villages due to urban job losses poses a significant risk. The returnees have lost touch with their rural roots, making it challenging to reclaim the land they once farmed. Without clear lines of communication with the collective entities, reclaiming land for returning farmers becomes increasingly challenging. The lack of legislation on defining the membership status within rural collective organizations adds complexity to the situation. Thus, the CCP is swiftly introducing this law to consolidate control over land and resources to manage rural populations effectively.
2. Another reason for the rushed introduction of this law is the CCP’s necessity to control rural areas. The previous household responsibility system led to individualistic farming practices, a departure from the ideal cooperative economy envisioned by the CCP. Despite utilizing village party branches and village committees for control, these measures were ineffective. The CCP now aims to use this legislation to bind farmers to the land through collective ownership, particularly targeting urban villages like those in Guangzhou. Although most residents do not reside in the villages, their economic sustenance depends on rental income and dividends from collective economic conglomeration. The law stipulates that houses built on collective homestead land cannot be sold, creating dependencies on rental incomes. Additionally, the law mandates that farmers’ collective shares are non-transferable and inalienable, further entrenching control over rural residents.
3. The influx of longstanding issues and accumulated conflicts in rural areas necessitated the CCP’s legislation. Since opening up to economic reforms, the overreliance on rural communities to self-manage has reached an impasse. Decades of minimal intervention have led to the accumulation of various challenges in rural communities. The new legislation, developed through expert consultation and monumental effort, is seen as a solution to these age-old rural problems. However, the author emphasizes that unless the CCP fundamentally addresses the root cause of rural issues – the communist system – no amount of legislation can solve the plight of China’s rural population. Instead, the legislation may exacerbate rural chaos and intensify existing challenges.
In conclusion, the article highlights the complex history and current challenges faced by rural collective economic organizations in China, underscoring the need for comprehensive, sustainable solutions that prioritize the well-being and empowerment of rural communities.