Intelligence experts have increasingly turned their attention to China’s prolonged surveillance and information-gathering activities centered in California, with particular focus on the state’s technological innovations. From the early days of NASA’s space shuttle program to the contemporary landscape dominated by artificial intelligence, China has consistently regarded California as a primary target for collecting technological intelligence.
The recent resignation of Jensen Huang, the CEO of Nvidia, has intensified discussions surrounding this issue. American intelligence agencies are now investigating potential links between Huang and Alice Huang, a former executive at Singapore’s Megaspeed data center, who is suspected of gathering crucial information on Nvidia for the Chinese government. However, the United States government has yet to publicly confirm any relationship between Alice Huang and Chinese intelligence agencies.
William Hannas, a chief analyst at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, highlighted the unique confluence of factors that make California particularly appealing for Chinese intelligence operations. He noted that California boasts advanced tech industries, prestigious research universities, and a robust population of scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs. According to Hannas, the Chinese government aims to speed up its technological developments, reduce dependency on foreign suppliers, and gain a competitive edge in strategic fields like artificial intelligence.
He elaborated on Silicon Valley’s role, stating that it not only provides access to existing technology but also serves as a hub for early-stage innovations that are crucial to China’s ambitions.
Victor Shih, the director of the 21st Century China Center at the University of California, San Diego, pointed out the significant presence of Chinese Americans in California. This demographic factor allows intelligence operatives from China to more easily blend into local communities, thus making it more difficult for their activities to be detected.
James Gaylord, a retired FBI unit supervisor, spoke candidly about China’s Ministry of State Security, stating, “They will try anything.” The Ministry is the primary civilian intelligence and security agency in China. Gaylord has been involved in numerous counterintelligence investigations in California and has noted that, in contrast to Russia, Chinese intelligence adopts a broad approach in its operations. He mentioned that some operatives might approach their targets through relationships or other personal means, often reminding executives in the technology sector that their expertise, and not necessarily their personal lives, is what interests these operatives.
Horace Frank, a former assistant chief at the Los Angeles Police Department, emphasized the FBI’s ongoing warnings about China’s pursuit of technological, economic, and geopolitical advantages. He noted that the Chinese government exploits human vulnerabilities such as financial incentives, self-esteem, ambition, and even sexual allure.
Hannas discussed the historical context of China’s strategy to acquire foreign technology, tracing its roots back to the 1950s. Initially, the focus was on specific military technologies and components. Over the years, this focus has expanded to include manufacturing processes, advanced commercial technologies, and eventually fundamental scientific principles.
Court records reveal that Dongfan “Greg” Chung, an engineer previously employed by Rockwell International and Boeing, began receiving “mission letters” from representatives of China’s aviation industry as early as 1979. The FBI, during a search of Chung’s residence, uncovered over 250,000 pages of documents, including stress analysis reports for the space shuttle, engineering manuals for the B-1 bomber, and design data for the Delta IV rocket’s fuel system. In July 2009, Chung was convicted of economic espionage and sentenced to 15 years and 8 months in prison.
Chung’s case stemmed from an investigation into Chi Mak, an engineer at the defense contractor Power Paragon who conspired with his family to export sensitive military technology to China. Mak was sentenced in March 2008 to 293 months (approximately 24 years and 5 months) in prison for leaking technologies related to submarine quiet propulsion, the AEGIS combat system, and aircraft carrier electromagnetic catapult systems. Gaylord, who led the investigation, stated that Mak’s actions provided China with a technological leap of approximately 20 years.
Similar cases have emerged in recent years. In 2020, Zhang Hao, a professor at Tianjin University, was convicted of economic espionage and sentenced to 18 months in prison for stealing mobile radio frequency filter technology from two American semiconductor companies. In 2024, former U.S. Navy sailor Wenheng Zhao was sentenced to 27 months in prison for accepting bribes and providing military information to a Chinese intelligence agent. In January 2026, Jinchao Wei, who previously served on the amphibious assault ship USS Essex, was sentenced to 200 months (16 years and 8 months) for selling photographs and technical manuals to Chinese intelligence.
In a significant revelation, declassified FBI documents from August 2023 indicate that former Congressman Eric Swalwell engaged in multiple “physical relationships” with Christine Fang, an individual suspected of being a Chinese intelligence operative. The same documents show that the FBI found no evidence of Swalwell’s involvement in federal corruption crimes and subsequently removed him from their list of investigation targets in 2017.
Another notable case involved the FBI itself. Katrina Leung, a businesswoman in San Marino who acted as an informant for nearly 20 years, was indicted in April 2003 for illegally copying defense documents. Reports revealed that Leung had a long-term extramarital relationship with her contact, James J. Smith, an FBI supervisor. In January 2005, a federal judge dismissed all charges against her, citing prosecutorial misconduct in preventing the defense from contacting key witness Smith. By December of that same year, Leung pleaded guilty to two counts of making false statements to the FBI and tax fraud but was never charged with espionage. Smith later admitted to providing false statements to the FBI regarding their relationship.
Shih concluded by noting that China’s approach to intelligence gathering differs significantly from that of Russia and other countries. In addition to trained personnel from the Ministry of State Security, China utilizes a large number of non-professionals and ordinary citizens to assist in acquiring technology, exerting political influence, and intimidating dissenters. He pointed out that the Chinese government shows little concern for the fates of these individuals involved in these activities.
Shih remarked, “During the Cold War, both sides often said: ‘I caught one of your people, you catch one of mine, and we trade.’ The Chinese government has never attempted to negotiate for the return of such individuals. Essentially, if you get caught, you go to prison; that’s it. You can only consider yourself unlucky.”