Lin Hui: Beijing Imported a Large Number of Toyota Sedans for Taxis Before Nixon’s Visit to China

In recent times, I have been reading a collection of recollections and reflections from the 1970s edited by Kan Beishan and Li Tuo. Though more than fifty years have passed, the tumultuous history of that period and the fates of all individuals swept up in the tides of the times are brought back to life in the pages of these texts, leaving behind precious records for future generations.

In the article titled “The Excitement Before Dawn” by Bao Kun, there are mentions of some lesser-known events during former U.S. President Nixon’s visit to China. Nixon visited Beijing in February 1972, a period in the midst of the Cultural Revolution.

According to declassified documents and various memoirs, Nixon’s decision to visit China at that time was due to the intense U.S.-Soviet competition and being embroiled in the Vietnam War, which had led to heightened anti-war sentiments domestically. Hoping for re-election, Nixon aimed to improve relations with Beijing to balance against the Soviet Union and extricate himself from his own difficulties. The senior Chinese Communist Party spy codenamed Jin Wudai, who was embedded in the CIA, promptly conveyed this information to Beijing, allowing the CCP to adjust its policies in a timely manner to gain maximum political benefit.

Therefore, in November 1970, Zhou Enlai sent a message through Romania, with whom both China and the U.S. had good relations, welcoming Nixon to Beijing. China’s proactive stance was due to its own array of problems. On one hand, it was in conflict with the Soviet Union and faced threats from it, with few friends internationally apart from some impoverished countries in Asia and Africa. On the other hand, domestically, due to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and internal struggles, the economy was on the brink of collapse. Moreover, the defection of Lin Biao, Mao’s “closest comrade-in-arms,” and the Mongolian plane crash incident had severely diminished Mao’s and the CCP’s credibility, leading to increasing discontent among the populace. In such difficult times of internal and external crises, improving relations with the U.S. undoubtedly held immense benefits for the CCP.

With both sides having their own needs, Nixon finally set foot on Chinese soil. The CCP went all out to receive Nixon warmly, even having fishermen endure freezing temperatures below -20 degrees Celsius and the dangers of shark attacks to dive hundreds of times to catch fresh abalone, despite the risk of three of them freezing to death.

Additionally, Bao Kun’s article mentions that in order to welcome Nixon, Beijing imported a large number of Toyota sedans from Japan to use as taxis. Before this, there were no taxis in Beijing, only canopy-covered three-wheeled motorcycles available for hire at a rate of forty cents per kilometer. The emergence of Toyota cars gave Beijing a sense of modernity, but this was just one of the ways the CCP deceived Nixon.

Bao Kun further recounts that the weather was consistently bad after Nixon arrived in Beijing, with multiple heavy snowfalls. The Beijing municipal government hastily converted several Liberation brand trucks into snow sweepers and snow plows, outfitting them with rolling snow brushes and adjustable shovels. These vehicles were painted duck-egg blue and could be seen daily on the main streets, looking quite official.

According to a program disclosed by Phoenix Satellite TV in February 2012, due to heavy snowfall at the time, the roads leading to the Great Wall from Beijing were old and slippery, posing significant danger. Just when Nixon feared his dream of visiting the Great Wall would be dashed, Beijing mobilized over 100 water-spraying trucks overnight and had 800,000 people hit the streets to clear the snow.

Witnessing this scene, Nixon remarked to his staff, “I couldn’t gather this many people overnight in the U.S.,” indicating that such a level of “mobilization” was only possible in an authoritarian state.

Interestingly, after Nixon’s departure from China, all the snow-clearing vehicles that the CCP had modified suddenly disappeared, reverting to their original truck forms. Perhaps in the eyes of the CCP authorities, clearing snow manually showcased the party’s strong organizational and mobilization capabilities, better indoctrinating the Chinese people. The CCP’s so-called “hospitality,” including its lavish spending on foreign relations today, is built on the foundation of oppressing the Chinese people.