Recently, the Chinese Communist Party announced that starting from July 1, it will implement export controls on certain aerospace components and various military-related supplies and tools. This rare move by the CCP has attracted widespread attention. Experts analyzed that there are four possible reasons for the CCP to control the export of military supplies, while the control of aerospace components is seen as a political maneuver or to expedite “risk mitigation” in the West.
On May 30, the CCP’s Ministry of Commerce, General Administration of Customs, and Central Military Commission jointly issued an export control announcement, stating that starting from July 1, a series of materials and tools will be subjected to export controls. The controlled list includes: aerospace structural components and engine manufacturing related equipment and software, technology; gas turbine engine/turbomachinery manufacturing related equipment and software, technology; aerospace surface window related equipment and software, technology; and ultra-high molecular weight polyethylene fibers.
The export control list includes gas turbines that can be used for military combat ships and large vehicles like tanks. Ultra-high molecular weight polyethylene fibers can be utilized in the production of bulletproof helmets, bulletproof vests, bulletproof inserts, and armor plates.
American economist David Huang told Epoch Times, “This document is very special, being the first released in the name of the Central Military Commission, indicating four potential possibilities.”
He stated that the first possibility is that weapons illegally transported from within China have ended up being sold to countries in the South China Sea region, where tensions with China may have deepened. Therefore, the CCP may be reluctant to sell its weapons to adversaries.
The second possibility could be secret negotiations between China and the United States or Europe, requesting China to restrict excessive weapons supply to certain countries in Asia or Africa, although this likelihood is considered minimal.
The third possibility involves sealing off corrupt practices within the military. “Some defense industry sectors have been secretly selling products, such as engines, armor plates, and bulletproof vests, from orders to third parties. By closing this gap, no more products can be exported without a document from the Central Military Commission.”
Huang also suggested that the fourth possibility could be reducing the overall volume of exports. On one hand, it could be for domestic preparedness in the face of potential conflict, while on the other hand, it could be to supply Russia or other countries with which China might need to stockpile resources, hence the prohibition on overseas orders for many dual-use military and civilian enterprises.
According to Chinese customs data, in the first four months of this year, the United States, India, and Vietnam were the top three importing countries of restricted gas turbine-related commodities. Brazil, Vietnam, the United States, and Israel were the primary destinations for ultra-high molecular weight polyethylene fibers.
In addition to controlling the export of military supplies, a significant part of the CCP’s export control list comprises materials used in the production of components for aerospace equipment.
Regarding the purpose of China controlling the export of aerospace components, Chinese affairs expert Wang He told Epoch Times that the export of aerospace industry remains a minuscule fraction of China’s overall manufacturing exports, with the CCP treating it as a political move. He suggested that this action might be part of a psychological warfare strategy against the West.
Wang stated, “In terms of high-tech product components, it’s a tit-for-tat measure against the United States, restricting reverse exports to the U.S. This doesn’t mean that everything is negotiable; sometimes it’s a case of ‘I’ll do it to you as well when needed.'”
He also mentioned the aspect of threatening certain wavering nations, highlighting China’s capability to confront and sanction even the United States, implying potential economic coercion towards other nations following the U.S.
While China’s recent export control measures are somewhat limited, Wang emphasized the importance of negotiations between the West and China in determining the flexibility of actual enforcement.
Wang continued, “In recent decades, Western investment in China has facilitated rapid growth in the manufacturing industry, including advancements in aviation, aerospace, and defense sectors. China holds a significant share in the U.S. supply chain as well.”
However, he pointed out that the scope of China’s export controls remains limited, especially in areas such as manned lunar missions where the U.S. has primarily relied on its own capabilities for completion.
In terms of space technology, the United States is generally far ahead of China, with a development gap potentially spanning several decades.
In 2023, the CCP launched the Shenzhou-16 mission, marking the first time of sending astronauts into space, which was considered a notable breakthrough in the aerospace field. Commander Jiao Lizhong, a Chinese descent working at the International Space Station in Houston, stated that China initially relied on Russian assistance for aerospace, space station, and astronaut suit technologies but has gradually developed its own capabilities over the years.
The CCP has long considered the aerospace industry a strategically important sector, ramping up space programs over the past decade. Based on data from UCS Satellite Database, China successfully launched 203 satellites in 2023 alone. The CCP has set a goal to complete manned moon missions by 2030.
Wang explained, “The space industry holds significant strategic importance; for instance, in manned lunar missions, it serves as a pinnacle of current technological competition between the U.S. and China, as well as a driving force for economic development. Simultaneously, it is a key point for military applications.”
He further addressed China’s overt focus on surpassing the U.S. in space utilization capabilities through substantial resource investment, especially in human operations, aiming to outstrip the U.S.
Wang emphasized that China’s space development entails militarization under the pretense of numerous civil-military fusion projects to mask its true intentions for military space utilization.
He commented, “This is very clear to the Americans. Now, the U.S. aims to decouple from China and engage in strategic competition. Thus, implementing high-tech barriers and technology blockade against China is crucial.”
Notably, in August 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced the inclusion of seven major Chinese entities related to aerospace technology, including the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, in an export blacklist.
In August 2023, various U.S. agencies issued warnings about China’s acquisition of data, technology, and expertise through different means. The report suggested the enactment of new laws by Congress to prohibit support for all Chinese space projects within U.S. government departments, national labs, universities, companies, fund managers, and individual investors to prevent technology theft by China.
Wang noted that the current national security threats posed by China have alerted the U.S., prompting renewed efforts and advancements, making it challenging for China to catch up.
As per estimates from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, NASA is projected to invest $93 billion by 2025 for lunar mission developments.
With the high costs associated with space development and the ongoing economic distress in China following the pandemic, Wang expressed that China’s economy remains fragile, requiring a crucial prerequisite in international relations, including rebuilding trust and fostering comprehensive cooperation with the U.S. and the West to overcome the current challenges.
Regarding China’s recent export control measures, Wang criticized them as a foolish move by the CCP, which could potentially accelerate Western risk mitigation strategies.
He pointed out, “The West, including the U.S., is already working on risk mitigation strategies against China and identifying areas of decoupling. By voluntarily revealing these focal points, China is inadvertently speeding up the process. It’s becoming more precise, isn’t it?”
As China grapples with economic recovery challenges amidst the pandemic, the space industry’s strategic significance, ongoing technological advancements, and geopolitical tensions continue to reshape the landscape of international relations and global competition in the aerospace sector.