【Epoch Times News on May 29, 2024】On May 28, the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China continued the review of the Parliamentary Powers Reform Act. Before 5 p.m., all five major bills were unanimously passed in the third reading. On that day, over 70,000 people gathered outside the Legislative Yuan to hold a protest.
The five controversial parliamentary reform bills were titled “Regularization of Presidential Reports on National Affairs,” “Legislative Yuan Investigation and Voting Rights,” “Contempt of Parliament Offense,” “Enhancement of Personnel Approval Rights,” and “Named Voting System for President and Vice President.”
Following three rounds of deliberations on May 17, 21, and 24, the Legislative Yuan continued to process the parliamentary powers reform proposed by the Kuomintang (KMT) and People First Party (PFP). Upon the opening of the session, KMT and PFP lawmakers occupied the main podium, while lawmakers from other parties chanted slogans. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) continued to employ tactics like roll call votes, repeated voting, whole-case review, and dragging out proceedings to demand a review of the bills.
Cheng Cheng-Ping, a professor of finance and economics at Yunlin University of Science and Technology, said in an interview with Epoch Times that even though the bills were passed, “the public’s protests have special significance.” There will be further protests on Friday.
According to Cheng, there are two main reasons for the public protests. Firstly, the so-called legislative power reform signifies an expansion of power, where the Legislative Yuan, controlled by the KMT and PFP, opposes the DPP’s legislative and executive authority. Secondly, there are concerns about Xi Jinping’s intentions to take over Taiwan, whether through military force or peaceful means. If it were solely about the power struggle between the Legislative Yuan and Executive Yuan, theoretically, it wouldn’t attract such massive protests.
On May 24, over 60 Taiwanese civic groups gathered outside the Legislative Yuan at the junction of Qingdao East Road and Jinan Road, demanding the bills related to the “Exercise of Legislative Powers Act” and “Contempt of Parliament Offense” in the Criminal Code to be sent back to committee for review. The organizers announced that over 100,000 people participated in the protest.
On May 28, amidst the push for “Parliament Empowerment” by the KMT and PFP, civilian protests continued to escalate. The “528 Bluebird Action” simultaneously took place in 15 counties and cities across Taiwan, with nearly 50 civilian groups participating.
Cheng mentioned: “The fierce clash over the Legislative Yuan’s expansion of power has brought out a significant number of young people, including high school and even junior high school students, as well as young adults, who are increasingly concerned about Taiwan’s future.”
He emphasized: “Civilian opposition to the Legislative Yuan poses a positive deterrence against the Chinese Communist Party. It shows that the people are becoming more aware, and what used to be seen as certain tactics of united front work—such as pulling in or dividing people openly and unabashedly to seize power, will face significant setbacks.”
He added, “These civic groups will proceed with a recall motion targeting KMT and PFP legislators. Any legislator who did not win by a significant margin in the initial election is at risk of being recalled. Therefore, if the KMT and PFP continue to push forward, it will impact those marginal lawmakers.”
“All of this is sending negative signals to the CCP. Under the leadership of Lai Ching-te, Taiwan will be more courageous in facing the threat of being annexed. Civil movements pose the biggest deterrent to the CCP or have a huge impact on preparing for potential conflicts,” Cheng said.
Prior to the current dispute over empowerment, following Lai Ching-te’s election, the KMT had close interactions with the Xi Jinping regime.
On April 10, 2024, former President Ma Ying-jeou and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping held the second “Ma-Xi Meeting” in Beijing, marking Ma’s second visit to Beijing and the first since a year.
On April 26, KMT Vice Chairman Xia Liyan led a delegation on a seven-day visit to the mainland.
On April 27, KMT Legislative Yuan Caucus Convener Fu Kun-chi led KMT lawmakers to meet with Wang Huning, Chairman of the CPPCC National Committee in Beijing.
Cheng mentioned: “Fu Kun-chi led 20 KMT and PFP legislators to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping. Wang Huning received them one by one in the Xinjiang Hall and had lengthy discussions.”
“Upon their return, Fu Kun-chi and the others, along with PFP’s Huang Guochang, urgently sought to pass the current ‘Five Laws of Empowerment’ before Lai Qing-te’s inauguration on May 17, as a show of force. This opened up a new model of cooperation between the KMT and PFP.”
Regarding the legislation they were debating concerning supervising executive authority, Cheng noted that while the DPP might be in the minority, they didn’t hold an absolute advantage in legitimacy. This is because in the past, during legislative battles, they didn’t necessarily show respect to some lawmakers, and Tsai Ing-wen had been absent from the Legislative Yuan for a long time without giving reports, among other things.
Thus, the extent to which the legislature should oversee executive authority is controversial, but it doesn’t usually incite nationwide protests.
Cheng continued, “The majorities formed by the KMT led by Fu Kun-chi and the PFP led by Huang Guochang grossly outweigh the DPP. This majority involves dual-interest exchanges. Firstly, Huang Guochang is likely to run for mayor of New Taipei City in two years, and secondly, when Lai Qing-te was elected, the KMT opened its doors to accept Xi Jinping’s ‘petting,’ making many think that the KMT-PFP cooperation in the Legislative Yuan will become a mouthpiece for the CCP.”
“What’s even more dangerous is the so-called ‘National Security Five Laws,’ similar to treason or espionage laws in Western countries. Before Fu Kun-chi returned, media reports suggested that his primary objective wasn’t the empowerment of these five bills but the future ‘National Security Five Laws’ because they involve a multitude of regulations such as promoting the CCP, assisting in CCP elections, establishing CCP agencies, and serving as CCP proxies.”
“Their goal is to get the ‘National Security Five Laws’ passed to essentially disarm Taiwan in the face of CCP threats,” Cheng explained.
“Most likely, the average voter doesn’t have a deep understanding or grasp of the current legislative expansion articles and items. However, they are concerned that the alliance between the KMT and PFP in the Legislative Yuan could potentially lead to Taiwan being sold out through these lawmakers, helping Xi Jinping achieve his goal of taking over Taiwan without using military force.”
In February of this year, Australian legal scholar Yuan Hongbing revealed to foreign media that Xi Jinping had issued new instructions for united front work, with a focus on “completely destabilizing and infiltrating Taiwan! The battlefield is in the Legislative Yuan!”
“After receiving Xi Jinping’s instructions, the CCP’s Taiwan Affairs Office quickly went into action. On January 27, they submitted a document titled ‘Key Points of the United Front Strategy to Occupy the Strategic Heights of the Legislative Yuan’ to Xi Jinping and Wang Huning. This document has been distributed to the various provincial, municipal, and autonomous region united front departments and CCP liaison offices at the local level.”
Analyzing on May 23, Yuan Hongbing stated that the CCP’s current strategy to take Taiwan can be succinctly summarized as employing cognitive warfare, information warfare, and propaganda, as well as buying off some Taiwanese politicians who lean towards the CCP internally. Their first step is to cause chaos in Taiwan’s parliament and Legislative Yuan.
Cheng stressed: “The resistance of Taiwan’s young people and native factions against the empowerment of the legislature indicates an increasing concern over the CCP’s potential takeover of Taiwan. This issue is more critical than just revising the ‘Five Laws’ of the parliament.”
Cheng commented that said current Legislative Yuan President Han Kuo-yu, Fu Kun-chi, and Huang Guochang, forming the KMT-PFP alliance, were initially “overconfident.”
He explained, “Since historically, the proportion of Taiwanese supporting the DPP has always been around 40% in presidential or legislative elections, meaning the DPP is a minority. However, the absolute majority formed by the KMT and PFP presumed they held the majority opinion. In reality, even within the PFP, many individuals have a strong sense of Taiwanese identity.
“So, they have doubts about the KMT’s pro-China stance. Nevertheless, they are also repulsed by potential corruption and governmental inaction during crises during the DPP’s rule.”
Cheng went on, “This is where Ko Wen-je and Huang Guochang play a role as ideal representatives, attracting nearly 30% of voters. In sum, the 40% or more supporting Lai Ching-te and the 20% or more supporting the PFP, who genuinely embody Taiwanese local consciousness, constitute over 65% of the populace.”
“After Lai Ching-te’s election, the KMT and PFP aligning themselves with the CCP and coordinating with the CCP’s propaganda and military threats have heightened concerns among the Taiwanese. This represents a significant shock to the global community. For Lai’s camp, it’s invigorating because they were originally in the minority. Seeing such strong public support is a positive force for them.”
He also pointed out, “Additionally, the US or its European allies will gradually realize that while Taiwanese people might not have strong resistance against the CCP during elections, the recent ‘Green Bird Movement’—previously known as the Sunflower Movement—showed significant support for Taiwan’s autonomy, concerns about the CCP, and resistance against the CCP, forming an overwhelming majority. This has immense significance for the international community.”
The “Green Bird Movement,” initially called the “Qingdao Movement,” was renamed to the “Green Bird Movement” due to social media algorithms limiting the flow of specific articles and words. Thus, netizens named the protest action after the protests’ location at Qingdao East Road, changing “Qingdao” to homophonic “Green Bird,” labeling the protest movement against parliamentary reform as the “Green Bird Movement.” Civic groups mobilized supporters through social media, rapidly spreading across different age groups and communities, gradually expanding to multiple counties and cities in Taiwan.
“The ‘Green Bird Movement’ is definitely beneficial for Lai Ching-te’s administration,” Cheng observed.
He mentioned, “Taiwan’s economy is currently thriving. With a cutting-edge semiconductor and AI industry that is spreading into traditional ICT industries and even mechanical sectors, Taiwan’s government doesn’t need to do much; the economy will naturally prosper, drawing closer ties with Western and progressing nations globally.”
Cheng remarked, “The biggest challenge for Lai Ching-te’s administration isn’t economic but national security and defense. For instance, Taiwan’s defense pillars are lacking, and it needs to continue purchasing advanced weaponry from the US to resist CCP’s cognitive warfare, espionage, and the subversion of various physical fifth column activities. These issues pose the most significant obstacles to Lai’s governance.”
“The current ‘Green Bird Movement’ complements Lai Ching-te’s administration in this aspect,” Cheng noted. “If they were solely focused on civilian and green energy bills, the people’s voices wouldn’t be as strong. But if they are aimed at blocking military purchases, military budgets, espionage, treason, and various defensive military actions, the public gathering and resistance will grow, turning into a long-term movement of opposition.”
“Besides public opinion, as a governing team, the country itself has a healing function,” Cheng remarked.
On May 28, the Legislative Yuan of Taiwan passed the third reading of amendment bills to some articles of the “Exercise of Legislative Powers Act” (Parliamentary Reform Bill), including penalties for “Contempt of Parliament Offense,” inviting the president to the Legislative Yuan for national reports, and establishing norms for exercising parliamentary hearing and investigation rights.
“Focusing on the passed bills, two functions of restoration can be identified so far,” Cheng explained. “The president can choose not to sign them. If the president doesn’t sign or announce them, the laws won’t be enforceable.”
“The second method is through constitutional interpretation by the grand justices. As most grand justices in Taiwan were appointed during Tsai Ing-wen’s term, this mismatch in executive authority or judicial interpretations can restrain the Legislative Yuan. However, this could lead to considerable social unrest.”
Cheng continued, “Lai Ching-te won’t decline to sign all bills. “He will sign some because some, such as the president attending questioning in the Legislative Yuan, which almost everyone agrees is appropriate. However, matters like urgency responses might have some controversy, which shows that Taiwan itself has mechanisms for adjustments.”
Cheng concluded, “Another cooperative mechanism is that political figures are highly sensitive to public opinion. Currently, the shift in overall public support is evident, with more young people standing with the Green camp, directly challenging the support base of the People’s Party and Ko Wen-je. If this trend continues to expand, Ko Wen-je might prevent Huang Guochang from leading his eight legislators and possibly move these eight People’s Party legislators closer to the Green camp, along with offering an olive branch to Lai Ching-te’s camp.”